THINKING GLOBALLY, ACTING LOCALLY:

A SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY APPROACH OF THE PROSPEROUS JUSTICE PARTY (PKS) AND ITS ISLAMIST TRANSNATIONAL FRAMING

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DECLARATION

This sub-thesis is the result of original research and does not contain any result previously published by another person or submitted for a degree or diploma at any university except where due reference is made in the text.

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As has been the rule in academic writing, I bear sole responsibility for any error and inconsistency in my sub-thesis.

ABSTRACT

Over the last five years, there is evidence of an emerging interest in the application of theories and approaches from social movement perspectives to Islamic movements in a broad sense. Such emerging research has mostly been undertaken in the Middle East and North Africa, but not in Southeast Asia. By applying the fundamentals of social movement theory i.e., political opportunity structure (POS), resource mobilisation theory and collective action frames, I will examine the emergence and the rise of the Islamist Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesian politics. PKS emerged from quiet conversations among students in secular universities who subsequently transformed their activism into a political movement. PKS attracted public and scholarly attention since its success in increasing vote in by six hundred percent, from 1.4 percent in 1999 to 7.3% in 2004.

I will demonstrate that social movement approach can shed important light on the dynamics of PKS. Results of this study suggest that PKS: (1) emerged from an array of tumultuous social and political conditions that gave rise a favourable political opportunity structure; (2) took advantage of expanding political opportunities by enhancing its resource mobilisation, including its organisational structures, cadres and recruitment, financial assets, and communication networks; and (3) consciously responded to the significant increase in political opportunities and its organisational capacities to mobilise supporters with shared ideas, beliefs and values.

In addition, I argue that PKS cannot be seen as merely a political party which only articulates its political agenda within the framework of institutionalised politics, but it also acts as a SMO, which vigorously engages in collective action. No other party is so active in mobilising their supporters on the streets. In this sub-thesis, I will examine the behaviour of PKS by employing protest-event analysis, which is commonly used in the tradition of social movement research. My study captured 225 PKS collective events as reported by *Kompas*, *Republika*, and the results suggest that PKS' collective actions have been driven by a strong sense of anti-Zionism and anti-Americanism as well as support for the Palestine cause. This indicates PKS' preoccupation with distant but religiously charged issues. It is true that anti-Israeli and America sentiments are widespread in Indonesian Muslim circles. Unlike PKS, however, other Muslim organisations' anti Israeli and America stance does not manifest in direct actions.

By using timing and sequence indicators, I found that during election time in 1999 and 2004, the number of PKS' predecessor, PK and PKS collective actions declined significantly. Aside from the increasing participation of PKS in election process, this decrease of PKS actions at election time can be seen as a wish to avoid alienating voters by appearing militantly Islamic.

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GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS

abangan: nominal Muslims who also adheres to pre-Islamic spiritual beliefs.

ABRI: Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia.

aliran: socio-cultural "streams" or patterns of social and political organisation.

Al-Qur'an: The Holy Book of Muslims.

amar ma'ruf nahi munkar (Ar. *amr bi al-ma'rūf wa nahy 'an al-munkar*): Islamic teaching of commanding good and forbidding evil deeds.

aqidah (Ar. *al-'aqidah*): faith.

asas tunggal: the requirement during the New Order that all social and political organisations adopted Pancasila as their sole ideological foundation.

baiat: (Ar. *al-bay'ah*): allegiance.

dakwah (Ar. *da'wa*): Islamic predication or missionary activity; proselytising.

Darul Islam: literally means 'House or Abode of Islam'; rebellion against the central government in Jakarta which aimed to establish an Islamic state.

daurah (Ar. *ad-Dawrah*): training.

DDII: Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia or Indonesian Council for Islamic Preaching. An Islamic missionary organisation founded in 1967 by M. Natsir, a former leader of Masyumi.

Din wa daulah (Ar. *al-Din wa al-Dawlah*): Religion and State. A common concept among Islamists believing that there is no separation between religion and state.

DPR: Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or People's Representative Council. National parliament.

FPI: Fron Pembela Islam or Islamic Defender Front.

FSLDK: Forum Silaturahmi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus or Forum of Coordination of Campus Predication.

Golkar: Golongan Karya. Golongan Karya, or "functional groups." A secular political party founded by the Suharto regime.

hadis (Ar. *ḥadīth*): literally, 'speech, report, narrative'. The traditions or reports of the sayings of the Prophet

hajj (Ar. *ḥajj*): pilgrimage to Mecca required for all Muslims who can afford it.

halal (Ar. *ḥalāl*): permitted. That which is allowed according to Islamic law.

Halaqah (Ar. *al-H{alaqah*): Circle

haram (Ar. *ḥarām*): forbidden, sinful. That which is prohibited according to Islamic law.

Hizb (Ar. *al-Hizb*): Party, group.

Hizbut Tahrir: (Ar. *al-Hizb al-Tahrir*): An Islamist movement founded by Taqiyyuddin al-Nabhani which has promoted the restoration of a global Islamic caliphate.

HMI: Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam or Indonesian Students Muslim Association. Predominantly modernist students' association founded in 1947.

HTI: Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia or Indonesian *Hizbut Tahrir*.

ICMI Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslims Indonesia, or Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association, established in 1990.

Ikhwanul Muslimin (Ar. *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*). The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood founded by Hasan al-Banna in 1928.

infak, *infaq* (Ar. *infāq*): literally, 'expenditure, disbursement.' According to Islamic law, *infak* is the charitable gifts for humanitarian purposes.

istigosah (Ar. *Istighotsah*)**:** public praying

ITB: Institut Teknologi Bandung or Bandung Institute of Technology.

jamaah, *jemaah* (Ar. *jamā'a*): congregation, community.

JI: Jemaah Islamiyah (Ar. *al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyyah*): Islamic Group. A radical Islamic group often associated with Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir.

kabupaten: regency; the next tier of government below the provincial level.

kecamatan: sub-district.

Kafah (Ar. *al-Kaffah*): Total and comprehensive.

KAMMI: Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia or Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union. An extra-campus organisation founded by Tarbiyah activists in in 1998.

Khilafah: (Ar. *al-Khilafah):* Caliphate.

khutbah: sermons.

LIPIA: Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab or Institute for Islamic and Arabic Studies.

liqa: meeting every week by PKS' cadres.

LMD: Lembaga Mujahid Dakwah or Institute of Predication Strivers

mabit: staying the whole night at mosques.

Majelis Syuro (Ar. *al-Majlis al-Shurah*): Consultative Council.

Masyumi: An Islamic political party often associated with modernist Muslims. The second largest political party prior to 1960.

MMI: Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia or Indonesia Fighters Council.

MPR: Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or People's Consultative Assembly. .

Muhammadiyah: Modernist Indonesian Islamic organisation, founded in 1912.

Mukhayam (Ar. *al-mukhayyam*): Camp.

Muktamar (Ar. *al-Mu'tamar*): Conference.

Murabbi (Ar. *al-Murabb*): religious instructor in the Islamic study group.

Nadwah (Ar. *al-Nadwah*): Seminar.

NII: Negara Islam Indonesia or Indonesia Islamic State.

NKK/BKK: Normalisasi Kehidupan Campur/Badan Koordinasi Kampus or Normalisation of Campus Life/Student Coordination Bodies.

NU: Nahdlatul Ulama or Revival of Islamic Scholars. The largest socio-cultural Islamic organisation associated with traditionalist group founded in 1926.

pahala: moral reward for a virtuous deed.

PAN: Partai Amanat Nasional or Party of National Mandate. A party linked to Muhammadiyah.

PBB: Partai Bulan Bintang or Party of Moon and Crescent. A party linked to Masyumi.

PDIP: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan or the Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle.

Pembangunan: The New Order's economic development program.

Pesantren: Islamic boarding school.

PHI: Persatuan Haji Indonesia or Indonesian Pilgrim Association.

Piagam Jakarta: the Jakarta Charter, compromise preamble to the Constituion of 1945 that would have given shari'a constitutional status. Omitted from the final draft of the Constitution.

Piagam Madinah: Medina Charter, a gentlement agreement between Muslims, Christians and Jews in Medina under the rule of the Prophet Muhammad.

PK: Partai Keadilan or Justice Party. A party established by Tarbiyah activists in 1998 and later renamed PKS, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or Prosperous Justice Party in 2002.

PKB: Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa or Nation's Awakening Party. A party often associated with NU.

PPP: Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or United Development Party. A government fusion of Islamic political parties established in 1973.

priyayi: Javanese aristocrat.

Pancasila: the Indonesian national ideology consisting belief in God, humanitarianism, nationalism, democracy, and social justice.

PBNU: Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Ulama, the central leadership of NU.

rihlah (Ar. *ar-Rihlah*): Recreation.

santri: devout Muslim

syari'ah (Ar. *al-Shari'ah*): Islamic legal code or Islamic law.

syamil (Ar. *al-Shaamil*): Comprehensive; general, universal, perfect, complete.

ta'aruf (Ar. *al-Ta'a'ruf*): introduction.

tabligh akbar: great meeting.

tafa'ul (Ar. *al-Tafa'ul*): Assistance.

tafahum (Ar. *al-Tafahum*): Mutual understanding.

tanzim (Ar. *al-Tanzdiim*): Organisation

tarbiyah (Ar. *al-Tarbiyyah*): Education or training model employed by Jemaah Tarbiyah in learning its core teachings..

UGM: Universitas Gadjah Madah or Gadjah Madah University in Yogyakarta.

ulama (Ar. *'ulamā'*): Muslim religious scholars, often informal leaders.

umat (Ar. *umma*): community, people, nation. Within Islamic circles, it is taken to mean the community of believers.

UI: Universitas Indonesia or University of Indonesia.

UNAIR: Universitas Airlangga or Surabaya's University of Airlangga.

usrah (Ar. *al-Usrah*): Family

wakaf, (Ar. *waqf*): endowment for religious or social ends, usually in the form of usufruct.

zakat (Ar. *zakāt*): obligatory alms tax which constitutes one of the five pillars of Islam.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1. 1. Background

After many years of authoritarian rule and hostility to political Islam[1] under President Suharto, Indonesian Muslim activists now have the public space to develop and express their views. The resignation of Suharto on May 21, 1998 created a window of opportunity for mushrooming Islamic activism[2] in the country. Islamic activism takes a number of forms, but in this study I will concentrate on just two. The first is the (re)birth of Islamic political parties. Among 141 new political parties established shortly after the fall of Suharto, 42 parties—nearly one-third—were Islamic, defined here "as parties that either explicitly claim Islam as their ideology or draw most of their support from Islamic organisations."[3] Twenty of the 42 parties that eventually contested in the 1999

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[1]The term 'political Islam' here refers to "Islam as political ideology rather than as a religious or theological construct." See, Mohammad Ayoob, "Political Islam: Image and Reality", in *World Policy Journal*; Fall 2004; 21, 3, p. 1. Similarly, Fuller uses the terms 'political Islam' and "Islamism' synonymously to point to those Muslims who believe that "Islam as a body of faith has something important to say about how politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary Muslim World and who seek to implement this idea in some fashion." See, Graham E. Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004, p. xi.

[2]It is important to bear in mind that I do not use the terms 'political Islam' and Islamic activism synonymously in this work. Borrowing from Quintan Wiktorowicz, Islamic activism is "*the mobilisation of contention to support Muslim causes*." He preferred this broad definition to accommodate "the variety of contention that frequently emerges under the banner of "Islam," including propagation movements, terrorist groups, collective action rooted in Islamic symbols and identities, explicitly political movements that seek to establish an Islamic state and inward-looking groups that promote Islamic spirituality through collective efforts." See, Quintan Wiktorowicz (ed.), *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 2004, p. 2.

[3]Anies Rasyid Baswedan, "Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and Future Trajectory," in *Asian Survey*, Vol. XLIV, No. 5, Sept/Oct, 2004, p. 672. See also Arskal Salim, *Partai Islam dan*

elections were 'Islamic.' Given that only 24 political parties qualified to compete in the 2004 elections, the total number of Islamic parties involved in the last election declined sharply, to only 7 parties.

Second, the post-Suharto era has also been marked by the proliferation of Islamic movements that run the gamut from violent to peaceful, from 'democratic' to anti-democratic.[4] Among new Islamic movements that use violence to achieve their goals are the Front Pembela Islam (the Islamic Defenders' Front or FPI), and Laskar Jihad (the Jihad Troops),[5] to mention a few notorious groups. Although Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, the Indonesian Mujahidin Council) described itself as a non-violent organisation, the group does not repudiate the use of force. Hizbut Tahrir (the Party of Liberation) is a non-violent organisation, but it strongly opposes the notion of democracy and that of the nation-state.[6]

There have been, often unstated, assumptions which have informed much of the discussion in the West regarding the distinction between Islamic political

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Relasi Agama-Negara, Pusat Penelitian IAIN Jakarta, 1999. However, out of 42 Islamic parties, only 20 Islamic parties qualified to compete in the 1999 elections. Moreover, out of these 20 parties, only 10 Islamic parties gained one seat or more in the people's Representative Council (DPR). They were PPP (58 Seats), PKB (51 Seats), PAN (34 Seats), PK (7 Seats), PNU (5 Seats), PP (1 Seat), PPII Masyumi (1 Seat), and PKU (1 Seat). Taken together, these Islamic parties gained 37.5 percent of the votes (172 seats out of 462 seats). See, Agus Salim, "The Rise of Hizb ut-Tahrir (1982-2004): Its Political Opportunity Structure, Resource Mobilisation, and Collective Action Frames," unpublished M.A Thesis, UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta, 2004, p. 2.

[4]For a detailed account of the proliferation of radical Islam movements, see, for example, Khamami Zada, *Islam Radikal: Pergulatan Ormas-Ormas Islam Garis Keras di Indonesia,* Teraju, Jakarta, 2002; Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni (eds.), *Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia*, Rajawali Press, Jakarta, 2004.

[5]Noorhaidi Hasan, "Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia," PhD Dissertation, Universiteit Utrecht, Netherland, 2005. A short version of this dissertation can be found in Noorhaidi Hasan, "Faith and Politics: The Rise of Laskar Jihad in the Era of Transition in Indonesia, *Indonesia 73,* (April 2002),

[6]The most detailed account of the Hizb Tahrir in Indonesia can be found in Agus Salim, "The Rise of Hizb ut-Tahrir," 2004.

parties and social movements. The former is defined as the confessional dimension of formal politics, while Islamic social movements entail non-formal politics. It has been argued that political parties are an inherent part of normal institutionalised politics, which include activities such as standing as political candidates, lobbying, legislating and the like. Jenkins and Klandermans, for instance, suggest that "social movements...constitute a potential rival to the politics from the political representation system."[7] Katzenstein points out that "students of social movements commonly associate institutionalisation [of politics] with demobilisation…Social movements...are necessarily extra-institutional."[8]

For this distinction to be valid, Islamic political parties would not mobilise their supporters or sympathisers in the streets or organise other kinds of extra-institutional collective actions. Likewise, Hizbut Tahrir, MMI, FPI, and other Islamist groups are not allowed to use institutional methods in order to express their discontent. Thus, it is pertinent to ask: Can a social movement be clearly distinguished from a political party? Or, following Smith's questions in regards to the relationship between "movement," "political party," and "mass public": To what extent can a party be considered independent of the electoral forces which

[7]J. Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans (eds.), *The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1995, p. 5.

[8]Mary Fainsod Katzenstein, "Stepsisters: Feminist Movements Activism in Different Institutional Spaces," in David Meyer and Sidney Tarrow, *The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century,* Rowman & Little field, Lanham: MD, 1998.

back it? At what point can a social movement be said to exist and not just be an ephemeral social spasm?[9]

Of the Islamic political parties in Indonesia that have used extra-institutional actions to draw the attention of the public, the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) is the only one which actively mobilises its sympathisers on the streets for non-electoral activities. In the wake of the war against terrorism declared by U.S. President George W. Bush after the September 11 attacks, PKS has intensified its Islamist mobilisation, criticising American foreign policies towards the Muslim world. For instance, on April 17, 2005, more than 200,000 slogan-chanting protesters—the males in white Islamic attire, the females in headscarves—marched through the main streets of Jakarta and eventually converged upon the most protected site in the capital, the U.S. Embassy.[10] Banners held aloft in the demonstration accused the U.S. and Israel of being "the real terrorists" and perpetrators of "state terrorism".[11] The most frequently referred to issue for PKS members is the Israeli occupation of Palestine, and they have often organised anti-Israeli and anti-America demonstrations. Generally speaking, PKS' collective actions are carried out very peacefully.

PKS is an unusual party in many respects. Unlike other political parties, PKS has gained public sympathy for mobilising its constituencies on a continual

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[9]Gordon Smith, "Social Movements and Party System in Western Europe," in Martin Kolinsky and William E. Paterson, *Social and Political Movements in Western Europe*, ST Martin's Press, New York, 1976, p. 331..

[10]Sadanand Dhume, "Radicals March on Indonesia's Future," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May Vol. 168, 2005.

[11]Ibid.

basis and not just at election time, operating as a ‘cadre party’ which requires strict standards of training and behaviour for members, and assisting victims of natural disasters and poverty throughout Indonesia. An examination of the formation of PKS and its Islamist transnational framing will unveil the various factors behind its emergence and the process of its transformation from a social movement to a political party.

1.2. The Research Question

Two main questions underlie this study. The first is why and how did PKS emerge? To answer this question it is important to look at political processes and organisational factors that may constrain or facilitate the emergence of the party. All perspectives in the field of social movements emphasise theories of movement emergence.[12]

The second is how does PKS provide clear messages of its ideology that resonate with its target audience? As is widely known, PKS has now built its image on a reputation for being the cleanest political party in Indonesian politics, with a record of social work, and the championing of Islamic causes. This study will investigate the extent to which non-Islamist issues such as fighting corruption drive its collective action. It also examines the extent to which the Islamist issues,

[12]For a detailed account of the importance of movement emergence, see Doug McAdam, John D. Mc.Carthy, and Mayer N. Zald, “Opportunities, Mobilising Structures, and Framing Processes: Toward a Synthetic, Comparative on Social Movements,” in Doug McAdam, John D. Mc.Carthy, and Mayer N. Zald (eds.) *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilising Structures, and Cultural Framings,* Cambridge University Press, USA, 1996.

including PKS' efforts to address geographically distant issues, are visible in its collective action. The interplay between PKS' ideology and its Islamist character form a major part of this sub-thesis.

1.3. State of Current Research

Learning from its experiences in the 1999 election, PKS achieved a considerable success in the 2004 election by campaigning on a 'clean and caring' image. PKS has succeeded in avoiding other typical shortcomings of political parties in Indonesia such as inactive branches, internal fractiousness, clientelism and excessive dependence on charismatic leaders.[13] Unlike other political parties that are derived from so-called 'local traditions,' PKS draws ideological influence from the Middle East, most notably the Muslim Brotherhood.

Given its novelty in Indonesian politics, PKS is not surprisingly become the subject of a growing literature. The development of PKS and its remarkable achievements in the 2004 election as well as the party's political behaviour have been interpreted in a variety of maya, many of them unflattering. From this literature we can extrapolate that there are two main approaches in the discussion of PKS: the first of these, which was written by journalists, can be described as a 'journalistic approach,' the second, which was written by academic observers, might best be referred to as an 'academic approach.' Within both, we have critical

[13]Amy McCreedy, "Piety and Pragmatism: Trends in Indonesian Islamic Politics," *Asia Program Special Report*, April, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2003. For a detailed account of the pitfalls of Indonesian parties, especially Islamist parties, see Greg Fealy, "The Politics of Islam in Democratising Indonesia," paper presented at conference, "Islam in Modern Indonesia," US-Indonesia Society, Washington DC, February 7, 2002.

and sympathetic writings. Western journalists are more commonly critical such as Sadanand Dhume and Andrew Steele for what they saw as PKS' hidden agenda to eventually push for the implementation of Islamic law in public life. They suggest that PKS is opportunistically using democratic political means to eventually hijack it when political power is in its hand. They saw that there is no significant difference between PKS and other Islamist groups. Dhume described it as an "evolutionary and gradual movement to the establishment of Islamic state." In comparing its political ideals with the militant jihadist group Jemaah Islamiyyah (JI), he wrote:

> "Like JI, in its founding manifesto PKS calls for the creation of an Islamic caliphate. Like JI, it has placed secrecy-the cell structure both groups borrowed from the [Muslim] Brotherhood-at the heart of its organisation. Both offer a selective vision of modernity, one in which Western science and technology are welcome, but Western values are shunned"[14]

The main difference between JI and PKS, Dhume added, is not of goals, but of methods. Similarly Steele warned Indonesians to take account of PKS' hidden agenda to switch its focus from anti-corruption issues to a more fundamentalist direction.[15]

Meanwhile, some academic observers are scholarly in tone and content, but they are often still critical of PKS. For example, Platzdasch's study examines the nature and development of Islamism in Indonesia in the post Suharto era,[16]

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[14]Dhume, "Radicals March," 2005, pp. 18-19.

[15]Andrew Steele, "The Decline of Political Islam in Indonesia. *Asia Times Online Ltd, Mar 28, 2006.* Retrieved from 6 June 2008, from http://www.atimes.com/atimes/ Southeast_Asia/ HC28Ae03.html

[16]Platzdasch, "Religious Dogma," 2005.

focusing on the PBB (Crescent Star Party), the PPP (United Development Party) and the PK (Justice Party). After a thorough consideration of the dynamics between ideological idealism and political pragmatism among Islamist parties, he concludes that pragmatism still prevails. Liddle and Mujani's study of Islamist parties and democracy demonstrates that so far, PKS has exploited Islamist and non-Islamist issues or in the words of Liddle and Mujani, "the two-track strategy, expanding its cadre network through new recruitment from the universities while promoting its broader message through participation in national and local government."[17] However, Liddle and Mujani asserted that the double track strategy is not working well due to its own internal contradictions.

Other scholars focus primarily on the influence of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood upon PKS. Damanik's work on the phenomena of the PKS' predecessor, PK, describes it as a political party which has its roots in a campus *dakwah* movement.[18] He argues that the PKS' transformation from a student movement into a political movement was facilitated by two global influences: the 1979 Iranian revolution and the Brotherhood.[19] He concluded that PKS is more influenced by the Brotherhood ideas and activism through the writings of the Brotherhood's ideologues such as Hassan Al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb than the events in Iran. Likewise, Bubalo and Fealy's work on the influence of Middle

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[17]R. William Liddle and Saiful Mujani, "Islamist Parties and Democracy: The Indonesian Case," unpublished paper. I am grateful to William Liddle l and Saiful Mujani for bringing this paper to my attention.

[18]The word 'dakwah' is derived from Arabic for someone who supports religious propagation, preaches, and spreads the religious understanding of Islamic teachings. Campus *dakwah* means a wide range of *dakwah* activities conducted by and for university students.

[19]Damanik, *Fenomena*, 2002.

Eastern sources towards Islamist movements in Indonesia affirm that PKS was inspired by the Brotherhood. Given that PKS seeks to gain mass support from the public, Bubalo and Fealy see that its impact is larger than *salafism* or radical *salafism*.[20] On the contrary, Furkon's study reveals that the party cannot be seen as an offshoot of the Brotherhood.[21] He argues that, unlike the Brotherhood's over-reliance on Al-Banna, the party has no charismatic leaders and its political views are in line with Islamic modernism.

In the last few years, an emerging generation of Tarbiyah or PKS intellectuals has also contributed to the growing literature on PKS. Notable among these was Yon Machmudi, one of the people who founded the party. His study, extracted from his Ph.D. dissertation at the Australian National University (ANU), offers the term "global *santri*" to describe the characteristics of PKS supporters.[22] In his dissertation, Machmudi focuses on PKS origins, ideology and efforts to Islamise Indonesia. In contrast to the critical camp who frequently accuses PKS of bringing a hidden agenda to Islamise the country, he maintains the claim that "PKS has not tried to impose *shariah* but rather it has attempted to revise its image by focusing on the issues of prosperity and justice."[23]

Some scholars seem to be sympathetic to PKS despite the fact that they are not personally connected to PKS. For example, Nandang's work, which was based

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[20]Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, *Joining the Caravan? Middle East, Islamism, and Indonesia,* Lowy Institute for International Policy, Australia, 2005.

[21]Aay Muhammad Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Ideologi dan Praksis Politik Kaum Muda Muslim Indonesia Kontemporer,* Teraju, Jakarta, 2004.

[22]Yon Machmudi, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Wajah Baru Islam Politik Indonesia*, Syaamil Cipta Media, Bandung, 2005.

[23]Machmudi, *Islamising Indonesia, 2006.*

on his master's thesis at the University of Indonesia, relies heavily on the views of PKS predecessor, PK on the implementation of *shari'a* (Islamic law).[24] He sees PK as a political vehicle for implementing *shari'a* within democratic processes. Similarly Firman's study on PKS' political thinking and behaviour asserts that PKS is moderate in nature. He argues that PKS operates within democratic constitutionalism, refutes the use of violence, uses a gradualist approach, and the like.[25] In a similar vein, Elizabeth Collins sees PKS as "a moderate alternative to radical Islamism in Indonesia."[26]

Aside from the growing academic literature and journalistic writings on PKS based on scientific inquiry, there have been abundant non-scholarly writings on the party in the last few years. They were published for various reasons, including for propaganda or campaign or training purposes. Some of them were generally written by PKS key leaders and its sympathisers and were published by PKS-affiliated publishers.[27] PKS has also published many compilations of the

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[24]Nandang Burhanuddin, *Penegakan Syariat Islam Menurut Partai Keadilan*, Al-Jannah Pustaka, Jakarta, 2004.

[25]Firman Noor, "Moderate Islamic Fundamentalism.": A Study of Political Thinking and Behavior of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), 1999-2005," unpublished M.A. Thesis, Faculty of Asian Studies, ANU, 2006.

[26]Elizabeth F Collins, "Islam is the Solution:" Dakwah and Democracy in Indonesia, unpublished paper. Available at http://www.classic.ohio.edu/faculty/collins/islamsolutions.pdf.

[27]For example, Abu Ridha*, Negara & Cita-Cita Politik,* Syaamil, Bandung, 2004; Abu Ridha, *Saat Dakwah Memasuki Wilayah Politik,* Syaamil, Bandung, 2003; Abu Ridha, *Amal Siyasi Gerakan Politik Dalam Dakwah*, Syaamil, Bandung, 2004; Abu Ridha, *Islam dan Politik: Mungkinkah Bersatu?* Syaamil, Bandung, 2004; Mahfudz Sidiq, *Dakwah & Tarbiyah di Era Jamhariyah,* Pustaka Tarbiatuna, Jakarta, 2002; Mahfudz Sidiq, *KAMMI dan Pergulatan Reformasi: Kiprah Politik Aktivis Dakwah Kampus dalam Perjuangan Demokratisasi di tengah Krisis Nasional Multidimensi,* Era Intermedia, Solo, 2003; Mahfudz Sidiq, *Pemikiran dan Manhaj Politik Ikhwanul Muslimin*, Pustaka Tarbiatuna, Jakarta, 2003; Andi Rahmat and Mukhammad Najib, *Gerakan Perlawanan dari Masjid Kampus,* Purimedia, Surakarta, 2001; Hidayat Nurwahid and Untung Wahono, *Pengaruh Sekularisasi dan Globalisasi Barat Terhadap Harakah Islamiyah*

speeches and articles of its leaders, including the chairman of the PKS' Consultative Council or Majelis Syuro, K.H. Hilmi Aminuddin,[28] President of PKS, Tifatul Sembiring,[29] the party's general secretary, Anis Matta,[30] and Sapto Waluyo.[31]

Above all, the aforementioned studies, for the most part, remain isolated from the perspectives developed by social movement theories. I have presented briefly most literature describing the history of PKS, the influence of Middle Eastern sources and its political stance in contemporary Indonesian politics. This study seeks to build on the available literature by engaging in further research according to the traditions of social movement research.

1.4. Significance of the Study

Much has been written about PKS and its tendency to be more moderate and democratic than many other parties in the political and religious domains, but little attention has been given to the party from the perspective of social movement theories. It is regrettable that many students of Islamic activism and those of political Islam have apparently ignored new developments in research on collective action and contentious politics that could provide a theoretical basis

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di Indonesia. Jakarta: Pustaka Tarbiatuna, 2001; Muzammil Yusuf, *Isu Besar Dakwah dalam Pemilu*, PT Syaamil Cipta Media and DPP PKS, 2003.

[28]K.H Hilmi Aminuddin, *Bingkai Dakwah di Jalur Politik*, Arah Press, Jakarta, 2008.

[29]Tifatul Sembiring, *Dakwah adalah Perubahan ke Arah yang Lebih Baik*, Arah Press and DPP PKS, Jakarta, 2008.

[30]Anis Matta, *Integrasi Politik dan Dakwah*, Sekjen Bidang Arsip dan Sejarah and Arah Press, Jakarta, 2008.

[31]Waluyo, *Kebangkitan Politik Dakwah,* 2005. This volume is basically a compilation of his articles published mostly by the Islamic magazine *SAKSI* from 2002-2004.

relevant to understanding the Islamist movement.[32] This is all the more surprising given the pivotal importance of collective action theory in explaining the interaction between social movements, the state, and the mass public in the contemporary world. This theoretical approach has gained popularity among scholars in North America, Western Europe and Latin America, but has been little applied in Southeast Asia. The development of a social movement approach in the contemporary perspective of conventional social sciences can be useful to illuminate various aspects of Islamist movements such as their methods of financing and recruitment, the political dimensions of Islamist activities and how their ideologies and theological origins influence the formation of their collective action frames.

Aside from the reluctance of scholars of Islamic activism to show much interest in social movement theories, the relatively small number of studies on Islamism from the perspective of social movement studies is due to the fact that most students of collective action and contentious politics tend to draw their research from many secular and religious social movements in the West, and not from Islamist mobilisation.[33] In other words, the lack of integration of Islamic movement studies into the mainstream of social movement theory reflects the reluctance on the part of students of social movements to include them. McAdam,

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[32]See, for instance, Wiktorowicz (ed.), *Islamic Activism,* 2004, p. 3. See also, Asef Bayat, "Islamism and Social Movement Theory," in *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 6. pp. 891-908, 2005.

[33]Philip W. Sutton and Stephen Vertigans, "Islamic 'New Social Movements'? Radical Islam, al-Qaeda, and Social Movement Theory," in *Mobilisation: An International Journal* 11 (1), p. 101.

McCarty and Zald's (1996) collection, for instance, focuses specifically on secular movements.[34] Zald and McCarthy's (1987) compilation includes religiously social movements, but only those in the Western tradition.[35] Similarly, the recent volume of Davis and his colleagues (2005) has no indexed references to Islam or Islamic movements but their list of representative social movement organisations does not mention Islamic movements.[36]

It comes as no surprise, as Kurzman notes, that "Over the past generation, the fields of social movement theory and Islamic studies have followed parallel trajectories, with few glances across the chasm that has separated them."[37] Indeed, there is evidence of a new interest in looking at Islamism with regard to the emergence of new social movements in the globalised world. This new interest has much to do with the proliferation of transnational movements and the intensification of globalisation.[38] Tarrow's (1998) book, for instance, rightly classified Islamic fundamentalism as one of three transnational social movements,[39] but he does not explore the characterization in detail. It is true that

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[34]McAdam, Mc.Carthy, and Zald (eds.), *Comparative Perspectives,* 1996.

[35]Mayer N Zald and John D. McCarthy (eds.), *Social Movements in An Organizational Society*, Transaction Inc., New Brunswick: New Jersey, 1987.

[36]Gerald F Davis, et al., *Social Movements and Organization Theory*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005.

[37]Charles Kurzman, "Social Movement Theory and Islamic Studies," in Wiktorowicz (ed.), *Islamic Activism,* 2004, p. 289.

[38]For instance, Paul Lubeck, "The Islamic Revival: Antinomies of Islamic Movements under Globalisation," in R. Cohen and S.M. Rai, *Global Social Movement*, Athlone Press, Brunswick: NJ, 2000.

[39]Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1998.

Tarrow's recent work (2005)[40] contains many more indexed references to Islamic movements, such as Jamaat al-Islami, but he tends to define largely Islamic transnational movements as violent, which is a result of what Tarrow has termed 'Qutb, al-Mawdudi and Khomeini's political Islamism' such as jihad, suicide bombings, and al-Qaeda. Also, the McAdam and Snow collection (2003) includes just one selection on Islam, that is, Kurzman's analysis of the 1979 Iranian revolution which uses political opportunity structures.[41]

Above all, however, Islamism has been isolated from the mode of inquiry developed by social movement theories in the West. According to Bayat, this isolation is more a consequence of 'modernist' interpretations that portray Islamism "as reactive movements carried by traditional people, the intellectuals, and the urban poor, against Western-style modernisation."[42] The modernist framework is then divided into two[43]: The first group, on the right, the "clash of civilisations" camp, asserts that Islamism is anti-democratic and regressive in character. This group is best represented by Bernard Lewis,[44] Elie Kedourie,[45] and

[40]Sidney Tarrow, *The New Transnational Activism*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005.

[41]Doug McAdam and David Snow (eds.), *Social Movements: Readings on Their Emergence, Mobilisation, and Dynamics*, Roxbury Publishing Company, Los Angeles, 1997. Kurzman's article in the collection was initially published by the *American Sociological Review*; see Charles Kurzman, "Structural Opportunities and Perceived Opportunities in Social Movement Theory: Evidence from the Iranian Revolution of 1979," *American Sociological Review 61*, 1994, pp. 153-170.

[42]Bayat, "Islamism," 2005, p. 894.

[43]Ibid.

[44]See, for example, Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong,* Phoenix, London, 2002; Lewis, "Roots of Muslim Rage," *Atlantic Monthly*, September, 1990.

[45]Elie Kedourie, *Democracy and Arab Political Culture*, Frank Cass, Portland, 1994.

Samuel P. Huntington.[46] The second group, on the left, accuses religious movements, including Islamism, of being regressive utopian and anti-movement.[47] This camp is represented by respected collective action theorists, Albert Melucci and Alain Touraine. For Melucci, Islamism is a kind of religious movement, defining its identity "in terms of the past drawing on [the] totalizing myth of rebirth which is often at least quasi-religious in content."[48] "Totalising monism," he believes, "is the central distinguishing feature of regressive Utopianism."[49] In turn, as Touraine has stated, within social movements there must exist 'positive' and 'progressive' ideas, so distinguishing them from religious movements, which do not have such notions.[50]

Recent attempts by scholars such as Carrie Wickham, Quintan Wiktorowicz, and Diane Singerman, to bring Islamic activism into the realm of collective action theory must be noted. In so doing, the integration of religious movements, particularly Islamism, within collective action theory can be pursued. Further, this inclusion of Islamism does not only relate to the presence of

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[46]Suggesting the West is "unique", Huntington points out the Western Christianity is the single most important historical characteristic of Western civilization, while "Islam is still bound to the idea that church and the state are one; in essence, God is Caesar". Huntington and his counterpart see the root cause of the democracy predicament in the majority Muslim countries as lying in Islamic traditions. Islam suffers from the poverty of civil society, the lack of civil liberties, and is more largely associated with "a spirit of collectivism" than with individualistic values. For the Western world, however, this individualism has played a vital role in developing liberal democracy. For more discussion, see Samuel. P. Huntington, "The West: Unique, Not Universal," *Foreign Affairs,* New York, Nov/Dec. volume 75, issue 6, 1996b: 31; Huntington, *The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order,* Simon & Schuster, New York, 1996a.

[47]Bayat, "Islamism," 2005, p. 894.

[48]Alberto Melucci, *Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 104.

[49]Ibid. As also quoted by Bayat, "Islamism," p. 894.

[50] Bayat, "Islamism," 2005, p. 894.

transnational movements largely associated with violent actions, such as Al-Qaeda, but also draws on various aspects of Islamism (i.e. ideology, characteristics, mobilisation and female participation). In the last five years there has been evidence of an emerging interest in the application of theories and approaches from social movement perspectives to Islamic movements in a broad sense.[51] Nonetheless, such emerging research has mostly been undertaken in the Middle East and North Africa, particularly in Egypt,[52] Algeria,[53] Palestine,[54] Iran,[55] Turkey,[56] and Yemen.[57]

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[51]Among others, Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *Mobilising Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2002; Quintan Wiktorowicz (ed.), *Islamic Activism*; A Oberschall, "Explaining Terrorism: The Contribution of Collective Action Theory," in *Sociological Theory*, 22 (1) 2004, pp. 26-37, Charles Kurzman, "Structural Opportunities and Perceived Opportunities in Social Movement Theory: Evidence from the Iranian Revolution of 1979," *American Sociological Review 61*, 1994, pp. 153-170; Charles Kurzman, "Social Movement Theory and Islamic Studies," to mention a few important works on Islamism and social movement studies.

[52]Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *Mobilising Islam*; Diane Singerman, *Avenues of Participation: Family, Politics, and Networks in Urban Quarters of Cairo*, Princeton University Press, Princeton: NJ, 1995; see also, James Toth, "Islamism in Southern Egypt: A Case Study of a Radical Religious Movement," in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 35 (2003), 547-572; Ziad Munson, "Islamic Mobilisation: Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood," in *The Sociological Quarterly*, Vol. 42, Number 4, pages 487-510; Mohammed M. Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement," in Wiktorowicz (ed.), *Islamic Activism,* 2004.

[53]Mohammed M. Hafiz, "From Marginalization to Massacre: A Political Process Explanation of GIA Violence in Algeria," in Wiktorowicz (ed.), *Islamic Activism,* 2004*;* Rick Fantasia and Eric L. Hirsch, "Culture in Rebellion: The Appropriation and Transformation of the Veil in the Algerian Revolution, " in Bert Klandermans and Hank Johnston, *Social Movement and Culture*, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, 1995.

[54]Marwan Khawaja, "Resource Mobilisation, Hardship, and Popular Collective Action in the West Bank," in *Social Forces*, Vol. 73, No. 1. (Sep., 1994), pp. 191-220; Glenn E. Robinson, "Hamas as Social Movement," in Wiktorowicz (ed.), *Islamic Activism,* 2004.

[55]Benyamin Smith, "Collective Action with and without Islam, Mobilising the Bazaar in Iran," in Wiktorowicz (ed.), *Islamic Activism,* 2005*;* Kurzman, "Structural Opportunities and Perceived Opportunities," 1994.

[56]Cihan Z. Tugal, "The Appeal of Islamic Politics: Ritual and Dialogue in a Poor District of Turkey," in *The Sociological Quarterly*, 47 (2006) 245-273; M. Hakan Yavuz, "Opportunity Spaces, Identity, and Islamic Meaning in Turkey," in Wiktorowicz (ed.), *Islamic Activism,* 2004.

[57]Janine Clark, "Social Movement Theory and Patron-Clientelism: Islamic Social Institutions and the Middle Class in Egypt, Jordan and Yemen," in *Comparative Political Studies*,

Surprisingly little attention has been paid to the study of Islamist movements that employ social movement theory in Southeast Asia.[58] As is widely known, Muslims constitute the largest religious community in contemporary Southeast Asia, particularly in Indonesia. An estimated 207 million or 45 per cent of the sub-continent's 470 million inhabitants are Muslim.[59] Of these, 90 per cent live in Indonesia, which makes Indonesia the most populous Muslim country in the world. Indeed the characteristics of Islam in Indonesia in particular, and Southeast Asia in general, are among the least Arabized forms of Islam. This is partly the result of its geographical location, with Southeast Asia being situated far from the Middle East. Apart from this, many scholars argue that the different characteristics of Islam in Southeast Asia are largely the result of a process of Islamisation that was generally peaceful, gradual, and most importantly, adaptive to local traditions.[60]

In recent years, however, many observers have commented that Southeast Asia is starting to seem like the new home base for radical Islamist groups such as

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Vol. 37, No. 8, October 2004, pp. 941-968; Janine Clark, "Islamist Women in Yemen: Informal Nodes of Activism," in Wiktorowicz (ed.), *Islamic Activism,* 2004; Jillian Schwedler, "The *Islah* Party in Yemen: Political Opportunities and Coalition Building in a Transitional Party," in Wiktorowicz (ed.), *Islamic Activism,* 2004.

[58] To my knowledge, only a very few studies on Islamism use social movement theories have been made in the region. Among others, see Agus Salim, "The Rise of Hizb ut-Tahrir (1982-2004), " 2005.

[59] Greg Fealy, "Islamisation and Politics in Southeast Asia: The Constrasting Cases of Malaysia and Indonesia," in Nelly Lahoud and Anthony H. Johns (eds.), *Islam in World Politics*, Routledge, London and New York, 2005, p. 153.

[60] Azyumardi Azra, "Islam in Southeast Asia: Tolerance and Radicalism," paper presented at Miegunyah Public Lecture, the University of Melbourne, 6 April 2005, p. 2.

Jemaah Islamiah (JI), the Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) and the like.[61] Interestingly, the Islamist movements in the region are not only represented by radical groups, but also by moderate ones too. PKS, for instance, is described by many as a moderate Islamism because the party consistently abides by democratic process and does not use violence to achieve its goals.[62] In the light of the very small number of studies on Islamism in the region using the social movement theory approach, this study endeavours to use this approach to convey a better understanding of Islamism in Indonesia.

1.5. Theoretical Framework

1.5.1. Social Movement Integrated Approach

I have indicated the emerging consensus among students of social movements regarding the importance of three factors: *political opportunities, mobilising structures* or *resource mobilisation* and *framing processes*. In the social movement research tradition, virtually all perspectives in the discipline are, first and foremost, theories of movement emergence.[63] The primary concern is with understanding: (1) the origin of certain social movements and the factors and processes that may shape or explain the emergence of the movement; and (2) the

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[61]John Gershman, "Is Southeast Asia the Second Front," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August, Vol. 81, Iss. 4., 2002.

[62]Among others, see, Firman Noor, "Moderate Islamic Fundamentalism," 2006; Elizabeth F. Collins, "Islam is the Solution."

[63]McAdam, McCarthy, and N. Zald, "Introduction," in McAdam, McCarthy, and N. Zald, (eds), *Comparative Perspectives*, 1996, p. 7.

extent and form of the movement in its ongoing development.[64] Previously, each intellectual trend was more likely to focus on only one aspect of a movement. For example, the proponents of resource mobilisation stress the significance of the organisational dynamics of collective action while advocates of collective action frames criticise resource mobilisation and political opportunity theories for rendering too much attention on organisational and political terms, and accordingly neglecting the importance of the social construction of ideas.

For the purposes of this analysis, I will neither discuss each factor separately nor give added weight to one particular aspect of a movement. Rather, these three emerging trends in the study of social movements are treated equally in an integrated rather than fragmented fashion (See figure 1).[65] According to Lichbach, the three main perspectives are a mixture of the study of "conditions" and "norms" as well as "means" of collective action.[66] McAdam and his collaborators identified three interrelated factors, they are: environmental, relational, and cognitive mechanisms.[67] The key reason for investigating the "conditions" or the environmental mechanism is that the prospects of movement activists for advancing particular claims, mobilising supporters, and affecting

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[64] *Ibid*.

[65] For a more detailed account of the discussion for synthesis of the three perspectives see, Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, "Toward an Integrated perspective on Social Movements and Revolution," in March Irving Lichbach and Aland S. Zuckerman (eds.), *Comparative Politics,* Cambridge University Press, New York, 1997; see also, McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (eds.), *Comparative Perspectives,* 1996.

[66] Mark Irving Lichbach, "Rethinking Rationality and Rebellion: Theories of Collective Action and Problems of Collective Dissent," *Rationality and Society* 6, January 1994:8-39 as cited by Mc Adam, Tarrow and Tilly, "Toward an Integrated Perspective," *Ibid.*, p. 144.

[67] Doug McAdam, Sydney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2001, pp. 25-26.

influence are context-dependent.[68] It focuses extensively on external factors that affect actors' capacities to bring about change.[69] It has come to be known as the *political opportunity structure* which stresses the significance of expanding political opportunities when the state is vulnerable that allows for the instigation of social movements.[70]

Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that political opportunities alone do not make a movement. As claimed by McAdam and Snow, "the most facilitative political environment only creates a certain structural potential for collective action."[71] When sufficient organisations and networks are absent among the aggrieved group, the political potential is unlikely to be realized. Accordingly, the study of "means" or the relational mechanism is crucial for activists, to provide the supportive infrastructure they require for collective action. There are at least three aspects of this infrastructure that are especially critical: a membership base, a

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[68]David S. Meyer, "Protest and Political Opportunities," in *Annual Review of Sociology*, 30, 2004, p. 126.

[69]John. L. Campbell, "Where Do We Stand? Common Mechanism in Organizations and Social Movements Research," in Davis, et al., *Social Movements and Organization Theory*, 2005, p. 43.

[70]The first explicit use of a "political opportunity" perspective was Eisinger (1973). In an attempt to explain why some cities in the U.S. witnessed extensive riots about race and poverty in the late 1960s while others did not. In order to analyze the case, he focused on the openness of urban authorities to more political inputs. See, Peter K. Eisinger, "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities," in *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 67, No. 1 (Mar., 1973), pp. 11-28. Building upon Eisinger's work, Tilly provided the beginning of a more comprehensive framework on the political opportunity structure. See, Charles Tilly, *From Mobilisation to Revolution,* Addison-Wesley, Reading: MA, 1978.

[71]McAdam and Snow, "Conditions of Organisation: Facilitative Context," in McAdam and Snow (eds.), *Social Movements,* 1997, p. 80.

communication network and leaders.[72] The study of means has come to be known as resource mobilisation[73] or mobilising structure approaches.

Finally, within the social movement approach there is an investigation into the norms or cognitive mechanisms that deal with shared ideas and interests or what students of social movement call "collective action frames." Frames are interpretative schemata that ''enable participants to locate, perceive, and label occurrences."[74] In other words, frames indicate what "to look at, what is important, and thereby indicate what is going on."[75] Thus, mobilising ideas and beliefs is seen as important as the resource acquisition and deployment activities of movement vehicles and the waning of political opportunity processes.

Figure 1: Social Movement Integrated Approach[76]

[72]*Ibid*.

[73]This framework is strongly influenced by rational choice theory. This perspective adopts as one of its underlying problems, that of American economist Mancur Olson's (1968) "free-rider." McCarthy and Zald then offer an answer by introducing the perspective of *resource mobilisation* which focuses on means available to the actors of social movements.

[74]David A. Snow, D.A., E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden, Robert D. Benford, "Frame Alignment Processes, Micro-mobilisation, and Movement Participation," in McAdam and Snow (eds.), *Social Movements*, 1997, p. 235.

[75]Hank Johnston, "Verification and Proof in Frame and Discourse Analysis," in Bert Klandermans and Suzanne Staggenborg (eds.), *Methods of Social Movement Research*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2002, p. 64.

[76]Adapted from Salim, "The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir," 2005, p. 18.

Based on the above integrated perspective on social movement, I will show that PKS: (1) emerged from an array of tumultuous social and political conditions that gave rise to a favourable political opportunity structure; (2) was able to take advantage of conducive social and political opportunities by enhancing its resources mobilisation, including its organisational resources and networks, to support the sustainability of the movement; and (3) consciously responded to the significant increase in political opportunities and its infrastructural capacities to mobilise supporters with shared ideas, beliefs and values.

1.5.2 Islamist Transnational Framing

As noted earlier, this study will also seek to grapple with the PKS' contentious actions on the Palestinian issue and its attachment to Islamic causes in general. Sceptics may ask: what is new and different about PKS' protest of the Iraq war in particular, and anti-Americanism in general? Accordingly, this study will emphasise the international contexts of political opportunities that have facilitated the rise of PKS. The structure of political opportunities that supported the emergence of the party is not mutually exclusive in terms of domestic political institutions and processes.[77]

In addition, this sub-thesis introduces the notion of Islamist transnational framing. The term *frame* is rooted in the study of communicative interaction.

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[77]McAdam introduced the term 'international context of political opportunities' as opposed to the tendency among social movement scholars to reveal unintentionally a state-centered or closed-polity bias as if it is "the structure of political opportunities almost exclusively in terms of domestic political institutions and processes." See, McAdam, "Conceptual Origins,"in McAdam, Mc.Carthy, and Zald (eds.), *Comparative Perspectives*, 1996, p. 34.

Gregory Bateson introduces the idea of a frame as a meta-communicative device that sets parameters for 'what is going on.'[78] He demonstrates that the interaction of individuals always involves an interpretative framework in order to ascertain how the actions and words of others should be understood.[79] Drawing upon Erving Goffman's *Frame Analysis* (1972) and *Forms of Talk* (1981), Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina introduce the notion of an injustice frame in the study of collective action.[80] In short, frames are to denote "schemata of interpretation" that enable individuals to legitimate and motivate collective action."[81] There is an isomorphic relationship between participants of a movement and a movement organisation. On the one hand, movements are seen as carriers and transmitters of beliefs and ideas. On the other hand, "they also actively engaged in the production of meaning for participants, antagonists, and observers."[82] Movements can thus be regarded as signifying agents involved in actively shaping and structuring existing meanings.

What I am offering by introducing the idea of Islamist transnational framing is the notion of an Islamic identity that transcends geographical boarders. Most Islamist movements take advantage of the concept of *umma* (community of

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[78]Pamela E. Oliver and Hank Johnston, "What a Good Idea! Ideologies and Frames in Social Movement Research," in *Mobilisation: An International Journal*, 2000, 4 (1), p. 40.

[79]*Ibid*.; See also, Hank Johnston, "Verification," 2002, p. 63.

[80]For a detailed discussion, see William A Gamson, Bruce Fireman, and Steven Rytina, *Encounters with Unjust Authority*, Dorsey, Homewood, III, 1982.

[81]See, Snow, Rochford, Jr., Worden, Benford, "Frame Alignment Processes," 1997, p. 235.

[82]David A Snow and Robert D. Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilisation," in Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriese, and Sydney Tarrow (eds.), *International Social Movement Research*, *Vol. 1: From Structure to Action, Comparing Social Movement Research Across Cultures*, JAI Press, Greenwich: CT, 1988, p. 198.

believers) embodied in the long history of Islam as a means of religious propaganda to appeal to Muslims throughout the world. To solidify the relationship between Muslim countries with different nationalities and races, a religious identity should be strengthened. In practice, however, the Islamic identity or *umma* has contested meanings, "relying on discrete political, social, and economic contexts in which particular Islamic identities have been forged."[83]

What is important to understand regarding Islamist transnational framing, is the dialectical relationship between the consciousness of 'imagined' *umma* and transnational framing. However, even while Islamist transnational activists make transnational claims, they still draw on the political opportunities, resource mobilisation, and networks of the country in which they live.[84] PKS' collective action has used an Islamist transnational framing derived heavily from the Middle East. It is thus hardly surprising that the party has similarities with a number of the region's other social movement organisations. For instance, PKS' cultural framings on Palestine and its beliefs in a Jewish conspiracy are virtually the same as those of Hamas in Palestine.[85] As will be further explained in the following chapter, this study will offer four elements related to the concept of Islamist

[83]Jillian Schwedler, "Islamic Identity: Myth, Menace, or Mobiliser," in *SAIS Review*, Vol. 21, Iss.2. Washington, 2001, p. 6.

[84]Tarrow identified this point as 'a characteristic of transnational activism,' *The New Transnational Activism*, 2005, p. 2.

[85]For a detailed account of Hamas as a social movement, see Glenn E Robinson, "Hamas as Social Movement," in Wictorowics, *Islamic Activism*, 2004. Meanwhile, for detailed examples of how the belief in the Jewish conspiracy, see Al-Muzammil Yusuf, "Hizbus Syaithan," in Irwan Prayitno, *Kepribadian Dai,* 2002; Irwan Prayitno, "Yahudi Sebagai Hizbus Syaithan," in Prayitno, *Kepribadian Dai*, 2002; Irwan Prayitno, "IMF Perpanjangan;" in Prayitno, *Kepribadian Dai*, 2002, Abu Ridha, *Apakah Terorisme Itu,* 2001.

transnational framing: (1) Islam is the solution; (2) Islam is under siege by the West; (3) Jewish Conspiracy; and (4) Global *umma*.

1.6. Methodology

This study relies on two main sources of investigation: library research and fieldwork. The library research was conducted by surveying a number of relevant books, articles, research reports, journals, thesis, dissertation, and the like. Aside from that, the library research was undertaken by exploration of electronic (the Internet) and printed media (newspapers, magazines) pertinent to the subject of this study.

Another main source of information was field research. Field work was conducted in Jakarta, and in a number of PKS political strongholds in Depok, Bekasi, and Tangerang. Field work was crucial in order to obtain important materials. During my field research, I obtained documentary evidence found in PKS' archive, including records of party congresses and official statements by party boards, PKS journals, bulletins, books and pamphlets available at the party's branches.

Thus, this study used the following research techniques by benefiting materials obtained during my field research in Indonesia.

1. *The Large-N, National-Level Analysis*

I took advantage of the large-N, national-level analysis by employing protest-event which is frequently used in social movement research. I used this method in order to see the general pattern of PKS' collective action in Indonesia

i.e. to answer these questions: When the PKS' action takes place? This is to develop information on the timing and sequences of collective action in regard to political opportunity structures. What forms of the party's action has it primarily taken? What issues or claims has it raised? How many participants are being involved in the action? Where the action takes place?

Accordingly, during my two-month fieldwork in Indonesia, I relied on two national dailies, *Kompas* and *Republika,* in order to collect data on PKS' collective actions as a basis of the large-N, national-level analysis. This covered a span of 27 years (1980-2007). Why a span of 27 years and why *Kompas* and *Republika*? This time-period allows me to see the variance since the emergence of the campus *dakwah* movement in the late 1970s, which led to the formation of KAMMI during Suharto's authoritarianism (1980-1998) and the birth of PK, now known as PKS, as the movement's political vehicle in the-post Suharto era (1998-2007).

I selected *Kompas* and *Republika* because both are nation-wide. *Kompas* is the most appropriate and most widely journal of record in the country. *Republika* was established in the 1990s. Nonetheless, *Republika* was selected because the newspaper is seen by many as a voice of Muslims. Not surprisingly, *Republika* seems to cover a broader range of PKS' collective actions rather than *Kompas*, which includes the party's tendency to address a broad range of Islamist issues and international Islamism. To confirm the validity of the data and to capture PKS' collective actions that were not reported by *Kompas* and *Republika*, I also referred to other national and regional dailies and their electronic archives

2. *Interviews*

I conducted in-depth interviews and informal conversations with PKS key leaders, the Majelis Syura, rank and file members, parliamentarians, and protest participants. Regarding the process of interview, I used a semi-structured format. That is, I had certain core topics that I wanted to address in each interview, but I was also flexible in responding to specific cases of each of the respondents. Accordingly, in order to facilitate this process, I employed an open-ended approach. To appropriately investigate the key areas raised in the interview, I paid attention to what the large-N analysis tells us about the general pattern of PKS' collective actions.

3. *Direct, Close Observation*

During my field research in Indonesia, I also conducted observations of relevant events involving the PKS such as Jakarta local elections (campaign, elections), '1 Dollar Movement for Palestine' and other PKS' protest actions which occured during my field work. I visited DPP PKS, the University of Indonesia's (UI) LDK, Al-Azhar, etc. In order to enrich the observation, I also attended seminars, public speeches, public sermons, Friday prayers, discussions, etc that were related to the subject under investigation.

1.7 Outline of the Report

Chapter 1 explains the background of PKS and its collective actions. The background then raises research questions that this work will address. It discusses existing theoretical explanations based on abundant writings about PKS in the last

few years. This chapter presents the importance of this study as well as explaining social movement integrated approach employed in this study

Chapter 2 describes PKS as a political party, which presents itself as a force of collective action by functioning as a social movement organisation. It explains the origins of PKS which can be found in the *dakwah* movement in the late 1970s. Meanwhile Chapter 3 provides a detailed account of PKS collective events as recorded by mass media. This chapter relies primarily on protest event analysis which is commonly used in social movement research.

The socio-political context of the emergence of PKS will be examined in Chapter 4. This chapter describes the origins of PKS during Suharto's authoritarianism and its development in post-Suharto Indonesia. It also discusses international influences that help to explain the emergence of PKS.

Chapter 5 explores various means of mobilisation that shape the emergence of PKS and its collective action. This chapter focuses on the importance of PKS organisational structures, from leaders, cadres and recruitment channel, networks, and financial assets. Chapter 6 analyses PKS' framing process explaining the content of its ideology and its Islamist transnational framing and how this message is transmitted through a number of media networks. The last chapter ends with a summary of the whole discussion in regards to the research questions.

CHAPTER 2

PKS AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANISATION

To better understand PKS, it is necessary to look at the history of its emergence. Like other Indonesian Islamist movements formed in the early 1980s that drew inspiration from the Middle East, PKS emerged from quiet discussions among students in many secular universities who subsequently transformed their activism into a political movement. PKS emerged out of an Islamist movement and it still relies on the 'movement' aspect of its character by taking advantage of its capacity and resources to mobilise huge rallies.

This chapter will describe the emergence of PKS. In the first part of this chapter, I will present the three phases of its emergence in an attempt to show that entering institutionalised politics was a key aim of the movement. The first is that phase of campus *dakwah* or predication movement; the second is that of instituting a student movement; and the third is that of a political movement. In addition, I will also highlight the party's strategy of pursuing Islamism. Analysis of PKS' from social movement organisation to political party will be developed in the last part of this chapter.

2.1. Three Phases of PKS' Emergence

2.1.1. Campus *Dakwah* Movement

The origins of the PKS can be found in the so-called campus *dakwah* movement.[1] The campus *dakwah* involves a wide range of propagation activities conducted by and for university students. Briefly, the emergence of the campus *dakwah* itself can be explained as a reaction to Suharto's hostility towards and repression of political Islam, which became apparent shortly after he took power. Suharto's New Order was reluctant to rehabilitate the largest pre-New Order Islamic political party, Masyumi, which was banned by the Sukarno regime in 1960 and whose primary objective was to establish an Islamic state. Instead, Suharto permitted the formation of a new party, Parmusi (Indonesian Muslim Party) to cater to Masyumi's constituency, but prohibited Masyumi leaders from leading it.

Realising that the Suharto regime was still hostile to ideas of political Islam, former prominent Masyumi leaders, headed by Mohammed Natsir, established the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII, Indonesian Council for Islamic Preaching) in 1967. This *dakwah* council initially focused on a serious attempt to conduct Islamic propagation among Indonesian Muslims in response to

[1] *Dakwah* literally means 'call' to Islam or religious propagation to revive faith or to protect Islamic society from immorality. Broadly speaking, *dakwah* is proselytising, missionary work, or means of propagating *ad-din* (religion). The activists of *dakwah* are called *du'ah* (plural form of *da'i*). This word is derived from Arabic for someone who supports religious propagation, preaches, and spreads the religious understanding of Islamic teachings.

Christian missionary efforts throughout the country.[2] Subsequently, DDII also responded to perceived threats from the so-called Cultural or liberal-minded Muslims.[3] The main aim of Cultural Islam was to reject much of the political Islamic agenda, to redefine the relation between state and religion and to propose tolerance between religions.[4] On the contrary, DDII was a vocal proponent of political Islam repeatedly arguing that Islam is not only a religious or theological construct, but also a political ideology.

Driven by its religio-political agenda, but confronted by the regime's intolerance of political Islam and Cultural Islam's refutation of the DDII's ideas, this *dakwah* council tried to revitalise *dakwah* by "creating" a subtle and fluid social movement on campuses. This movement was relatively impervious to state control and took advantage of campus mosques as the base camp of its Islamic social movement in secular universities.[5] The leading figures of DDII deliberately targeted students of secular universities in order to resist the influence of thoughts espoused by supporters of Cultural Islam.

In doing so, in late 1967, DDII began to promote campus mosque-based Islamic study groups at the University of Indonesia, at Surabaya's Airlangga

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[2]Burhanuddin, "The Conspiracy of Jews: The Quest for Anti-Semitism in Media Dakwah," Graduate Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies, 5: 2 (2007), p. 55. See also, Martin van Bruinessen, 'Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia,' *Southeast Asia Research*, 10, 2 (2002), pp. 122-23.

[3]Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia,' *Southeast Asia Research*, 10, 2 (2002), p. 127.

[4]Greg Fealy, "Divided Majority: The Limits of Political Islam in Indonesia," in S Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed (eds), *Islam and Political Legitimacy in Asia,* Routledge Curzon, London, 2003, p. 12.

[5]Yudi Latif, "The Rupture of Young Muslim Intelligentsia in the Modernization of Indonesia," *Studia Islamika*, Vol 12, Number 3, 2005, p. 391.

University, at Yogyakarta's Gadjah Mada University, and also in Makassar and Padang.[6] At the same time, DDII initiated to recruit leaders of Islamic students from diverse secular university backgrounds in order to be trained as religious mentors for the mosque movement. The cadre training was conducted at the Panitia Haji Indonesia (PHI, Indonesian Haji Committee) headquarters in Jakarta. The major trainers were DDII leaders and intellectuals such as Mohammad Natsir, Pranoto Mangkusasmita, M. Rasyidi and the like.[7]

The significant role of DDII in expanding campus predication was also evident in Lembaga Mujahid Dakwah (LMD, the Institute of Predication Strivers).[8] This institute was established by DDII's high-profile affiliate, Imaduddin Abdulrahim who, beginning in the 1970s, conducted intensive religious trainings at ITB's Salman mosque. Despite Imaduddin's opposition to the Cultural Islam pioneered by Nurcholish Madjid, the ideology of LMD and its curriculum were in fact a modified version of the Nurcholish-composed NDP (*Nilai-nilai Dasar Perjuangan*).[9] Imaduddin gave stronger emphasis to the doctrine of *tauhid* and the danger of *ghazw al-fikr* (intellectual warfare) which was perceived as a Western-influenced ideological challenge to the Muslim worldviews.[10] Many Islamic student activists were attracted to the LMD trainings and began to

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[6]Platzdasch, "Religious Dogma," 2005.

[7]Machmudi, *Islamising Indonesia*, Chapter 1, most notably in the sub-title "Predication Movement."

[8]For a detailed discussion of LMD, see, Dra. Nurhayati Djamas, "Gerakan Kaum Muda Masjid Salman," in Dr. Mamat Salamet Burhanuddin, M.Ag (ed.), *Gerakan Islam Kontemporer di Indonesia*," Pustaka Firdaus, Jakarta, 1989.

[9] Latif, "The Rupture," 2005, p. 393. The establishment of LMD was in part to counter Nurcholish's liberal-minded thought, see, Djamas, "Gerakan Kaum Muda Masjid Salman," 1989, pp. 250-252.

[10]Ibid.

disseminate LMD's ideology and curriculum on their own campuses. Aan Rohanah, a one-time student activist and now PKS Member of Parliament, recalled:

> In fact, there was nothing new in LMD's curriculum and materials. I was more amazed at the way its curriculum was applied in daily activities during the training. There had been an increasing spirit of '*dakwah'* in my mind after completing the training and a great desire to spread a truly Islamic understanding in my campus at the time.[11]

By the late 1970s, the scope and force of the campus *dakwah* movement began to enter a new chapter in the wake of Suharto's increasing political repression. Student political activities at the time were permanently "frozen" since the implementation of the 'Normalisation of Campus Life' (NKK) and Student Co-ordination Bodies (BKK) policy in 1978. The Suharto regime launched this depoliticisation program on campuses as a reaction to students' growing of and challenge to the regime. NKK/BKK banned all students' political activism inside university campuses and replaced the previously independent Students' Councils (Dewan Mahasiswa/DEMA).[12] After this clampdown on student activism, the 1980s was marked by the emergence of various types of non-political student activism such as study groups and non-governmental organisation (NGO)

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[11]Interview, Aan Rohanah, Jakarta, 4 October 2007.

[12]For detailed information of the 1978 student movement, see Hariyadhie, *Perspektif Gerakan Mahasiswa 1978 dalam Percaturan Politik Nasional*, Citra Mandala Pratama, Jakarta, 1995; Herbert Feith, "The Indonesian Student Movement of 1977-78," a revised of a talk at he Contemporary Indonesia Study Group of the Monash Centre of Southeast Asian Studies on 15 March 1978.

activities.[13] Among other forms of student activism that emerged in this period, campus *dakwah* was the most popular.

Aside from that, in 1985 Suharto required all mass-based organisations, including political parties, to adopt *Pancasila* as the sole ideological basis (*asas tunggal*) of their organisations. These policies outraged some Islamic leaders, who described the regime's treatment of political Islam as "*kutjing kurap"* (cats with ring-worm).[14] At the height of the regime's suppression of political Islam and student activism, the mosque became what respected Muslim intellectual Jalaluddin Rakhmat describes as 'a sanctuary for the expression of political dissatisfaction and frustration'.[15] The recollections of economist Rizal Ramli, support this notion:

> "When I was at ITB in the late 1970s all student political activity revolved around the student center. But ever since the government imposed restrictions on campus politics, the student center had been dead. All the activity is now funneled to the mosque. Young people need an outlet for their political aspirations and they will find it where they can."[16]

Coincidentally, the phenomenon of Islamic resurgence in the late 1970s brought about by the collapse of American supported regime in Iran is believed to

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[13]The students' study groups were loosely structured whose members were a small number of students who met regularly surrounding campus to discuss social and political theories. Another alternative student activism since the banning of political activity on campus was non-governmental organisations (NGO). Furthermore, there were a small number of students who operated clandestinely in the face of the regime's suppression by publishing critically inclined students' leaflets, brochures or magazines, but thereby they were relatively easily handled by authorities and military. For a detailed account of this, see Edward Aspinall, *Opposing Suharto, Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia*, Stanford University Press, California, 2005.

[14]Salim, "The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (1982-2004)," 2005.

[15]Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s*, Allen & Unwin, NSW, 1994, p. 174.

[16]Ibid.

be a significant factor of the growing level of religiosity among students. There was a desire among students to identify themselves with the wider Muslim *umma* or worldwide Islamic community.[17]

In the early 1980s, campus *dakwah* began to introduce *usrah* (Arabic for 'family') and serves as a pattern to manage and train its followers in a more systematic way.[18] *Usrah* are small, closely-knit groups that are connected in a hierarchical structure. However, most members do not know members in other *usrah*.[19] From this kind of organisational structure campus *dakwah* grew rapidly and campus mosques have since become a centre for its activities.

The use of *usrah* (cells) for religious training in campus *dakwah* was borrowed directly from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Campus *dakwah's* association with the Brotherhood was also entrenched by student leaders disseminating and promoting the works of influential Brotherhood figures as primary references for study, thereby making the ideas and models of Brotherhood activism — in Bubalo and Fealy's words—"the cornerstone of the *dakwah*'s thinking."[20]

The process of transplantation of the Brotherhood's ideas and methods into campus *dakwah* groups was made possible by extensive DDII networks. Since its

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[17]See, for instance, Hussin Muthalib, "Islamic Revivalism in ASEAN States: Political Implications," in *Asian Survey*, Vol. 30, No. 9. (sep. 1990), pp. 877-891.

[18]For more discussion of the training programs, see The Department of Cadreisation's Team, *Manajemen Tarbiyah Anggota Pemula* PKS and Syamil Cipta Media, Bandung, 2003.

[19]Martin van Bruinessen, "Post-Suharto Muslim Engagements with Civil Society and Democratization," in Samuel Haneman and Henk Schulte (eds.), *Indonesia in Transition*, Pustaka pelajar, Yogyakarta, 2004, p. 61.

[20]Bubalo and Fealy, *Joining the Caravan?* 2005, p. 67.

establishment, the DDII leadership directed its attention towards the Middle East. It had and still has strong connections with the Islamic World League (*Rabithat al-Alam al-Islami*), the worldwide Islamic organisation that was funded by the Saudi Kingdom, and to which Natsir was appointed Vice-Chairmen.[21] This strong connection along with the boom in oil prices in the 1970s gave rise to more funds for religious scholarship programs. Many Islamic students, most notably those with close ties to DDII were sent by Natsir to undertake overseas study in the Middle East. Not surprisingly, they were influenced by the teachings and methods of the Brotherhood.[22]

By the early 1980s, the Brotherhood's ideas and models of activism had been disseminated through the interactions of students returning from study in the Middle East.[23] At the same time, through the work of DDII's intellectuals and affiliates, most notably known as Abu Ridha and Prof. Rahman Zainuddin, the writings of top leading figures of the Brotherhood such as Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb and the like, had been translated into Indonesian thereby making it possible for campus *dakwah* activists to access these writings in their own native language.

[21]Bruinessen, "Genealogies," 2002, p. 123.

[22]See, Machmudi, *Islamising Indonesia,* 2006. *Also, see* Latif, "The Rupture," 2005.

[23]Damanik, Fenomena, 2002; Machmudi, *Islamising Indonesia, 2006. Also, see* Latif, "The Rupture," 2005.

2.1.2 Instituting Student Movement

Campus *dakwah* also took advantage of the emergence of so-called Islamic resurgence among well-educated people, especially students of secular universities in the late 1970s. Many of these students possessed religious and spiritual inquiries. Not surprisingly, campus mosques became the centre of *dakwah* activities, and were attended by many students who wanted to participate in religious circles (*halaqah*).[24] Subsequently, students developed a sense of confidence and assertiveness to espouse Islamic ideals and values. Also, the influence of Islamic revivalism was evident in increasing prevalence of Islamic attire (e.g. *jilbab* or headscarf for female students), the greater number of students praying at campus mosques, the increase in number of students who preferred Islamic publishing and so on.

Campus *dakwah* then metamorphosed into a legalised unit of student activity, that is, it became the Campus Predication Institute (LDK).[25] More importantly, activists of campus *dakwah* used this campus-sponsored religious body for recruitment and organisational purposes. LDK benefited from being an officially recognised student organisation in two ways. First, it received financial support, in the same way as other registered student organisations, from the campus administrator. This yearly financial assistance was useful for the sustainability of the organisation and was helpful for supporting massive and

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[24]*Halaqah* is an Islamic gathering or forum to discuss religious issues.

[25]The most detailed account of the LDK can be found in Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan*, 2002. See also, Damanik, *Tarbiyah Menjawab Tantangan*, 2002; Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, 2004.

costly religious events such as the celebration of the Prophet Muhammad's birth (*mauled*) and Ramadhan-related (fasting month) events. Second, in the context of suppression of student activism, through establishing itself as a legal student organisation, LDK sent a clear message to the regime that it did not oppose the status quo. It emphasised to the state that its main activity was the cultivation of religious understanding and practice.

In the mid 1980s, LDK was established by a number of Islamic students who were active in campus *dakwah* activities at the Indonesia University (UI) under the umbrella of the so-called Forum of Islamic Studies (FSI, *Forum Studi Islam*).[26] FSI is a pseudo name for campus *dakwah* established in almost all faculties at UI. Since FSI developed rapidly and won wide support among students, the establishment of a well-organised forum for managing a broad range of Islamic activities such as LDK was very important. LDK soon began to build broader contacts with various bodies of *dakwah* movements on other university campuses.[27] Considering that the development of campus *dakwah* increased significantly in many prestigious universities, most remarkably, in Java and Sumatra, LDK activists tried to build a broader network of intercampus predication by establishing the Forum for Coordination of Campus Predication (FSLDK).

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[26]Machmudi, *Islamising Indonesia, 2006.*

[27]For example, at ITB, activists of the campus *dakwah* activists operated out of the university's Salman Mosque and coordinated their regular activities through the so-called Family of Islamic Students (Gamais, Keluarga Mahasiswa Islam). At the Bogor Agricultural Institute (IPB, Institute Pertanian Bogor) and the Gadjah Mada University (UGM), campus *dakwah* activists ran their religious activities through the Council for Mosque Cultivation (DKM, Dewan Kemakmuran Masjid) al-Hurriyah, and the Shalahuddin Congregation (Jamaah Shalahuddin) respectively.

It is worth noting that LDK alone is hardly homogenous and within the organisation there are a range of different opinions about strategies for establishing an Islamic state and the degree of acceptance toward the ideas of democracy and nation-state. Followers of Hizbut Tahrir (HT, the Liberation Party), for instance, were also actively involved in LDK, particularly at IPB. HT is an Islamist transnational movement which strongly rejects the notions of democracy and nation-state, and whose primary objective is to rebuild a global Islamic caliphate.[28]

Initially, the core religious convictions of LDK were largely adopted from the Brotherhood's Hassan al-Banna and Jamiat al-Islamy's al-Mawdudi views. That is the idea that Islam is *al-diin* or a total, comprehensive, and all-encompassing way of life with no separation between *aqidah wa shari'ah* (belief and law), *diin wa dawlah* (religion and state), and *diin wa dunya* (spiritual and temporal). In this regard, there is no sharp contrast between the Brotherhood-inspired LDK activists and their HT counterparts. What makes HT very different relative to the rest of LDK activists is the ideological framework created by its founder Shaikh Taqiyuddin al-Nabhani. Unlike the mainstream LDK who believe

[28]HT's ideas were brought to Indonesia in the 1980s by a Palestinian born activist of HT, Abdurrahman al-Baghdadi, who received an invitation from the head of Ghazali Islamic boarding school KH. Mama Abdullah bin Nuh. Most favoured early recruits of Al-Baghdadi and Nuh's such as Al-Khatthath, Hafiz Abdurrahman, Ismail Yusanto, Zulia Ilmawati and Fahmi Amhar used officially campus religious bodies for the purposes of recruitment. Among other things, Badan Kerohanian Islam Mahasiswa (BKIM) which was part of the LDK network in IPB, was the primary institutional site of HT. There is evidence showing that HT utilized LDK to advance its ideologies through methods of intensive training called *halaqah* (study circle) and *daurah* (training program) and benefited largely from LDK's networks of activism throughout campus mosques. The most detailed account of HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia) can be found in Salim, "The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (1982-2004)," 2005. See also, Burhanuddin, "Beyond the Nation-State: The Quest for Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia," in the Asian Journal of Social Science (NUS and Brill) 36:5 (2008), forthcoming.

that democracy can provide a way to form an Islamic state, HT strongly opposes the idea of democracy because it is perceived as a human-made system.[29]

In the mid-1980s, the name *usrah* came to be associated with radical Islamist groups such as the underground Darul Islam (The House of Islam).[30] This group used a cell structure (*usrah)* to maintain its clandestine operation against the state. In fact, as noted earlier, campus *dakwah* sought to avoid direct confrontation with the regime by staying away from politics and focusing its activities on cultivating religious understanding and practice among students. Given that the association of *usrah* with radical organisations could harm campus *dakwah,* its leaders began to call their movement *halaqah*, which refers to an informal religious circle of students and their teachers.[31]

In other occasions, some leading figures of campus *dakwah* called their movement 'Jemaah Tarbiyah'[32] in order to keep distance from politically radical

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[29]Interview, Ismail Yusanto, Jakarta, 23 February 2005.

[30]Darul Islam is the oldest radical Islamic movement led by Kartosuwirjo. The DI rebellion began in 1947 and yet the army crushed it in the 1960s. However, there were a few units in West Java which succeeded in reviving the movement. They utilized the Brotherhood-style cell structure (*usrah*) to recruit members. For a detailed account of Darul Islam, see C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze, "The Dar ul-Islam Movement in Western Java," in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Jun. 1950), pp. 169-183.

[31]Collins, "Islam is the Solution."

[32]The word "*tarbiyah*" is derived from Arabic for "the process of education, training, and caring someone." It is closely associated with the use of *usrah* (cell) or *halaqah* (religious circle) that consists of ten to twelve cadres, which are led by a type of religious instructor called *murabbi,* whose mission it is to form an evenly strong-mind assemblage of cadres. The word "murabbi" is a variant spelling of "tarbiyah" derived from the same form of Arabic word, that is, *rabba yurabbi* which means "to educate, to train, to care, to bring up, to maintain." While "tarbiyah" is a *mashdar* (original) form of the verb, *murabbi* is a fail (subject) form the verb meaning to 'persons who carry out the process of education or training.' Salman, "Participation in Social Movement: Explaining People's Choice to Join the Tarbiyah Movement in Indonesia," unpublished MA thesis, at Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, Jakarta, 2006.

associations.[33] In fact, there is no clearly defined meaning of the word 'tarbiyah' issued by campus *dakwah* activists or the central board of PKS.[34] Some argue that this name is not a formal name of a movement.[35] Jemaah Tarbiyah is used interchangeably with *Ikhwan*, which refers to the Egyptian Muslim group (*Ikhwan al-Muslimin* or Muslim Brotherhood) whose ideas and model of activism have largely inspired the movement.[36] In short, Jemaah Tarbiyah is used to distinguish itself with other Islamic groups, especially those who came out of Islamic student predication movements but have substantial differences in ideological frameworks and methods to achieve their goals.

In a further development, despite some differences, a broad range of streams within LDK eventually supported the establishment of the Forum for Coordination of Campus Predication Institution (FSLDK, Forum Shilaturrahmi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus) in 1986. FSLDK is a forum for coordinating *dakwah* activities on campuses throughout Indonesia and for building broader networks among LDK activists. Taking advantage of the tenth annual meeting of FSLDK in Malang during 1998, which was attended by hundreds of students from various parts of Indonesia had assembled in Malang, some LDK activists announced the formation of the Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union (KAMMI, Kesatuan

[33]Interview, a Prominent *Dakwah* Leader (Anonymous), Jakarta, 21 August 2007.

[34]Mahfudz Sidiq, *KAMMI dan Pergulatan Reformasi: Kiprah Politik Aktivis Dakwah Kampus dalam Perjuangan Demokratisasi di Tengah Gelombang Krisis Nasional Multidimensi,* Era Intermedia, Solo, 2003, p. 84.

[35]Ibid.

[36]Abdul Aziz and Damanik argue that the term "Tarbiyah" and "Ikhwani" are synonymous in this case, which refers to LDK activists whose methods (*manhaj*) and ideas are inspired from the Egyptian Brotherhood. See, Abdul Aziz, Gerakan Islam Kontemporer di Indonesia, Pustaka Firdaus, Jakarta, 1996. See also, Damanik, *Fenomena*, 2002.

Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia). In fact, as was clarified by the coordinator of the FSLDK's communication centre, the assembly itself did not formally endorse the birth of KAMMI.[37] Rather, the new organisation was based on individual initiatives and was declared after the meeting was officially closed.[38] This rejection was voiced by those who came from Hizbut Tahrir.[39] The birth of KAMMI during the tenth annual meeting of FSLDK was seen as abusing the conference for political interests.[40] KAMMI was indeed established by FSLDK's activists who were closely associated with Tarbiyah such as Fahri Hamzah. Regardless of this opposition, Tarbiyah-affiliated activists succeeded in establishing KAMMI.

In the wake of deepening social political unrest in the latter period of Suharto, KAMMI emerged as one of the most conspicuous student movements voicing public grievances through massive rallies throughout the country and pressuring for regime change. Most of all, the formation of KAMMI reflected the evolution of the *dakwah* movement from mere consolidation through personal Islamic propagation and political quietism to a more critical view of the nation's current condition. As explained earlier, campus *dakwah* had previously maintained its strategy of distancing itself from political confrontation with the state; believing that the path of *dakwah* would have a long-term impact.[41] The fall of Suharto, after

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[37]Budi Mulyana, *Gatra*, 2 May 1998.

[38]Machmudi, *Islamising Indonesia, 2006.* See also, Kraince, "The Role of Islamic Students," 2000.

[39]Interview, a Prominent *Dakwah* Leader (Anonymous), Jakarta, 21 August 2007.

[40]Ibid.

[41]See Machmudi, *Islamising Indonesia, 2006.*

months of grand-scale demonstrations pioneered by a number of student movement organisations, including KAMMI, gave proponents of campus *dakwah* a chance to redesign its strategy for advancing their ideals in a relatively new democratic environment.

2.1.3 Political Movement

Shortly after the resignation of Suharto on 21 May 1998, KAMMI leaders embarked on forming an Islamic political party. This initiative was also supported by some campus *dakwah* activists who argued that the already established networks and resources of the *dakwah* movement should be transformed into a political party. They believed in the benefits of participating in the newly democratic system. However, some activists opposed the idea and proposed to turn the movement into a non-political organisation (*ormas*). An internal survey involving core cadres of the movement resulted in the majority of activists agreeing to establish a party.[42] The party was then named "Partai Keadilan" (Justice Party), now known as Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, Prosperous Justice Party).

It is important to keep in mind that despite the contribution of KAMMI's leaders to the formation of PK, KAMMI and PK claim no formal relationship, but there is much evidence to the contrary. They acknowledge, however, that the two

[42]Ibid. See also, Damanik, *Fenomena*, 2002

share a social, cultural, ideological relationship with PK and its successor PKS.[43] The relations between KAMMI and PK/PKS are obvious, and it sometimes serves as "the student wing of (PK)/PKS."[44] Furthermore, PK and its successor PKS provide opportunities for KAMMI activists to pursue political careers. The first chairman of KAMMI, Fahri Hamzah, and his successor, Andi Rahmat, are currently serving as PKS representatives in the national parliament (2004-2009). Most alumni of KAMMI hold key positions of leadership in the party structure, either in the central board or in local branches.

The first priority for the leadership of PK was how to transfer the ideological loyalties of the campus *dakwah* movement to the party. The reformulation of the relationship between the party and movement is pivotal to the long-term success of the party.[45] Like the Brotherhood and its offshoots elsewhere, PK and its current manifestation PKS hold the view that "*al-jama'ah hiya al-hizb wa al-hizb huwa al-jama'ah"*, which means "the movement is the party and the party is the movement." The term *jamaah* (Arabic for 'movement') was employed by the Brotherhood followed by PK and PKS to describe an Islamic movement that operates clandestinely to avoid regime oppression. As is widely known, the Egyptian Muslim organisation faced harsh punishment from the regime. Nonetheless, the term *'jamaah'* is then no longer valid when the regime has granted a space for democracy. Instead, the term *hizb* (Arabic for 'political party')

[43]Troy A. Johnson, "Islamic Student Organisations and Democratic Development in Indonesia: Three Case Studies," unpublished M.A. Thesis presented at Ohio University, 2006.
[44]Machmudi, *Islamising Indonesia*, 2006.
[45]Ibid.

is more favourable in the pursuit of Tarbiyah's goals.[46] Accordingly, in the emergence of a new democratic regime in Indonesia in 1998, Tarbiyah activists decided to form PK and utilize Tarbiyah's preexisting networks and resources.

In the run-up to the 1999 elections, PK attracted many observers because it campaigned as "the only political party with a clear program and transparent structure."[47] Unlike other Islamic parties, which seem to rely heavily on their extraordinary leaders, PK emphasised the egalitarianism of Islam and collective strength, and showed less concern for charismatic leaders, while at the same time demanding strict submission to religious norms.[48]

PK drew its support largely from Tarbiyah activists who are mainly from urban areas, well-educated, younger and have an orthodox outlook. Ironically, this party appeared to exclude a mass following, which, it is deemed by PK leaders, do not understand Islamic principles. It was widely perceived as 'an exclusive party' because of the strict selection criteria for its members, and the fact that its cadres are subjected to thorough training. Indonesianist Jim Schiller's field research in Jepara, for example, shows that in "the very tiny PKS [in the district] is led by doctors, its men and women sit separately at rallies which cater more to deepening loyalty than attracting new voters."[49]

In Indonesia's first free elections in over 30 years in 1999, PK failed to meet the electoral law permitting parties to compete in the next elections. This

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[46]Ibid. See also, Machmudi, *Islamising Indonesia*, 2006.

[47]Bruinessen, "Post-Suharto," 2004.

[48]Platzdasch, "Religious Dogma," 2005, pp. 50-51.

[49]Comment to I-Discussion email list managed by Edward Aspinall, as quoted from Collins, "Islam is the Solution."

failure was expected by many due to PK's inability to attract new voters by offering a broader message. After this unsuccessful campaign, the newly political party reconstituted itself as the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or PKS) in April 2003. In the 2004 parliamentary elections, PKS succeeded in gaining 7.34% of the popular vote or 45 out of 550 seats, a size-fold increase over its predecessor Partai Keadilan (PK), which received only 1.4% in the 1999 elections. This remarkable success of PKS was in part due to the fact that the party adopted so-called a two-track—simultaneously Islamist and non-Islamist—electoral strategy.[50] This was pivotal to maintaining the party's base of support from its traditional and orthodox constituencies and it played a crucial role in generating new voters by promoting universal issues such as anti-corruption and clean government.

2.2. PKS as Islamist Social Movement

2.2.1 What is Islamism?

Having sketched the transformation of PKS from a student movement to political party, I will emphasise the position of the party as an Islamist movement. Before discussing PKS as an Islamist movement, one must define what Islamism and social movements are. Islamism is the extent to which Islam is perceived as a set of specific norms, comprehensive and superiority of Islam and, therefore, it contains the blueprint of a social order. Hence, Islamists intend to replace the

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[50]Liddle and Mujani, "Islamist Parties."

present social and political order with such norms based on a certain understanding of Islamic teachings. This may be carried out peacefully or through violent actions that are determined by the value system of the actors.[51] According to Bubalo and Fealy, the major consequence of Islamism is the existence of an Islamic state or system.[52] This is the core element of Islamism followed by Islamic activism.[53] Both characteristics of Islamism cannot easily be separated, because an Islamic state is impossible to build without activism.

Above all, however, PKS can best be understood as moderate Islamism instead of radical *jihadist* Islamism.[54] This is largely because the party operates within a democratic system as well as because it accepts the idea of nation-state. Also, it describes itself as a peaceful movement that rules out the use of violence in achieving its goals. In attempting to delineate the position of PKS among various Islamic organisations in Indonesia, the former president of PKS, Hidayat Nurwahid, describes the party as a centrist Islamic party which occupies the middle ground between radical Islamist groups that reject democracy and Muslim organisations committed to democracy.[55] Nonetheless, no other major party would agree with Hidayat's claim that PKS is a centrist party. PKS is still viewed by

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[51]For more discussion of the indicators of Islamism, see, Saiful Mujani et al., *Benturan Peradaban: Sikap dan Perilaku Islamis Indonesia terhadap Amerika Serikat* PPIM, Freedom Institute, Penerbit Nalar, Jakarta, 2005.

[52] Bubalo and Fealy, *Joining the Caravan?* 2005, p. 9.

[53]Ibid., p. 10.

[54]Radical *jihadist* is commonly defined as the Islamic armed struggle (*al-jihad*), which exists in three main variants: internal (combating nominally Muslim regimes considered impious); irredentist (fighting to redeem land ruled by non-Muslims or under occupation); and global (combating the West). The characteristic actors are the fighters (*al-mujahid).* See, International Crisis Group (ICG), "Understanding Islamism," *ICG Middle East/North Africa Report No. 37,* 2005.

[55]As quoted from Collins, "Islam is the Solution."

many as an Islamist party, but it uses an existing democratic system to pursue its political agenda.

2.2.2. Between Movement and Party

In this part, I will look at PKS as a political party, which presents itself as a force of collective action by functioning as a social movement organisation. In order to understand the term 'social movement,' it is necessary to look at the emergence of social movement theory in the early 1970s. In the 1950s and the mid-1960s, social psychology dominated scholarship on movements, focusing extensively on the collective behaviour approach which saw social movements as long-lasting panics and crowds.[56] Subsequently, a group of scholars, particularly proponents of resource mobilisation, criticised collective behaviour theories and began to formulate ideas about the importance of political structure and organisational factors to account for social unrest.[57]

Maintaining the view that social movements and political parties are a distinct category, McAdam and Snow list a number of characteristics of social movements that include the following elements: (1) collective or joint action; (2)

[56]There are at least three main differences between social movements and collective behavior: institutional versus non-institutional, spontaneous versus planned and ephemeral versus prolonged. It has been claimed that collective behavior is relatively characterised by its non-institutional and spontaneous activity, but the biggest difference between social movements and the other forms of collective behaviour concerns the duration of the social movement, that its more long-lasting than collective behaviour. See, Gary T. Marx and Douglas McAdam, *Collective Behaviour and Social Movements: Process and Structure*, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1994, p. 72.

[57]The most influential account of this approach can be found in John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource Mobilisation and Social Movements: A Partial Theory," in Mayer N Zald and John D. McCarthy (eds.), *Social Movements in An Organisational Society*, Transaction Inc., New Brunswick: New Jersey, 1987.

change-oriented goals; (3) some degree of organisation; (4) some degree of temporal continuity; and (5) some extra-institutional collective action, or at least a mixture of extra-institutional (protesting in the streets) and institutional (lobbying) actions.[58] Blending these elements together, we can draw the conclusion that social movements are a collectivity or a group of people acting with some degree of organisation and continuity outside of institutional procedures or the mechanisms of formal politics, for the same purpose of challenging the authorities.[59] Undoubtedly, McAdam and Snow still maintain that outsiders are the prevailing image of the actors within social movements.

I will treat PKS as a social movement. There is a growing trend in the field of social movements to see protest as 'politics by other means,' and it is now well recognised that extra-institutional and institutional politics are intertwined and interdependent.[60] Social movements that consist of extra-institutional actions can exist not only at election time. As noted by Goldstone, political parties and social movements in the U.S. and Western Europe have become:

> "Overlapping, mutually dependent actors in shaping politics, to the point where even long-established political parties welcome social movement

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[58]Doug McAdam and David Snow, "Introduction, Social Movements: Conceptual and Theoretical Issues," in Dough McAdam and David Snow (eds.), *Social Movements: Readings on Their Emergence, Mobilization, and Dynamics*, Roxbury Publishing Company, Los Angeles, 1997, p. xviii.

[59]Ibid.

[60]Pamela E Oliver, Jorge Cadena-Roa, and Kelley D. Strawn, "Emerging Trends in the Study of Protest and Social Movements," forthcoming in volume 11 of *Research in Political Sociology*; see also, John K. Glenn, "Parties out of Movements: Party Emergence in Post-communist Eastern Europe," in Jack A. Goldstone (ed.), *States, Parties, and Social Movements*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: UK, 2003.

> support and often rely specifically on their association with social movements in order to win elections."[61]

If PKS is viewed as a social movement organisation, its existence can be explained by three crucial factors: (1) political opportunity structure; (2) resource mobilisation; and (3) collective action frames. As will be further explained, there are a significant number of external factors or political opportunities that gave rise to PKS. By using the perspective of resource mobilisation, PKS is able to generate the involvement of its sympathisers and to transform it into activism and long-time commitment. More importantly, PKS takes on an organisational framework. In social movement theory, this is a large specialty area known as resource mobilisation. Lastly, PKS' collective action entails what social movement scholars call 'frame alignment processes,'[62] which is a pivotal point of collective action frames. This emphasises the importance of ideas in conjunction with organisational and political opportunity factors.

In short, PKS takes the form of a movement for a number of reasons. First, PKS has not only articulated its political agenda within institutionalised politics, but has also translated its grievances and interests through a range of collective actions which involve large numbers of its sympathisers. No other party has such a high degree of engagement with extra-parliamentary activity. An investigation of

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[61]Jack A. Goldstone, "Bridging Institutionalized and Non-Institutionalized Politics," in Goldstone (ed.), States, Parties, and Social Movements," 2003, p. 4.

[62]For a detailed account of this term, see David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden, Robert D. Benford, "Frame Alignment Processes, Micro-mobilisation, and Movement Participation," in Doug McAdam and David Snow (eds.), *Social Movements: Readings on Their Emergence, Mobilisation, and Dynamics*, Roxbury Publishing Company, Los Angeles, 1997, pp. 235-251.

PKS' collective action will be comprehensively presented in Chapter 3. It can be said that elements of social movement organisations i.e. collective action, change-oriented goals, extra-institutional procedures and so on, have been apparent in PKS' social movement.

Second, PKS is a political party which comes out of the Tarbiyah, a religious movement. As explained earlier, PKS utilised the already established networks and resources of Tarbiyah to advance its political agenda. In other words, there is no distinction between PKS and Tarbiyah. Like Tarbiyah on which it is based, PKS is a cadre party. PKS is based on a network of cells (*usrah*) where members are required to meet for Al-Qur'an reading and memorising and discussion every week (*halaqah*).[63] Through this process of cadreisation, PKS demands that its members conform to Islamic ideals and norms in all aspects of life. Members must have passed through a series of six levels ending with *takhassus*, holders of special expertise in *dakwah*.[64]

In this regard, PKS considers itself as a vanguard rather than, in Duverger's term, 'a mass party.'[65] As a party, PKS actively engages its constituencies on continual basis, not only at election times and has a remarkable record of social work. In other words, cadres are not only an important part of PKS' electoral strategy, but they also play significant role in the process of mobilising the party's collective action. The prevalence of grand-scale demonstrations and the high level

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[63]*Panduan Lengkap Manhaj Tarbiyah Kader PK-Sejahtera*, Media Insani Press, Solo, 2005.

[64]Ibid. See also, Liddle and Mujani, "Islamist Parties."

[65]Maurice Duverger, "Caucus and Branch, cadre Party and Mass Parties," in Peter Mair, (ed.), *The West European Party System*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990, pp. 37-45.

of participation in PKS' collective activities have been made possible by the strong commitment and loyalties of its cadres.

Illustration 1

Caption:
10.000 PKS sympathisers rally against Israel (date unspecified). Available at zioneocon.blogspot.com/Indonesian%20rally.jpg.

CHAPTER 3

THE COLLECTIVE ACTION OF PKS: EXAMINING THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN ISLAMISM AND PERCEPTIONS OF FAR AND NEAR ENEMIES

In order to understand PKS as a social movement, we need to consider more detailed information about actions or related events carried out collectively by PKS supporters as recorded by the mass media. This chapter relies primarily on protest event analysis, which is frequently used in social movement research. Nonetheless, some excerpts from my interviews with several prominent leaders of PKS will be presented as well to support the findings of this protest event analysis.

3.1 Operational Definitions

As noted earlier, PKS not only articulates its agenda within the framework of institutionalised politics, but also acts as a social movement organisation, which spiritedly engages in collective action. Given that the notion of social movement and that of collective action are inexorably intertwined, we must adequately define what collective action is. As described earlier, one of the most salient characteristics of social movements is the element of collective action.[1] It can be said that collective action is one of the core elements of social movement. McAdam and Snow argue that social movements are a form of collective action.[2] Klandermans

[1]See, Chapter II, especially sub-title, "Between Movement and Party."
[2]McAdam and Snow, "Social Movements," 1997, p. xxiv.

states that social movements are dominated by "individuals sharing collective goals and a collective identity who engage in disruptive collective action."[3]

Hence, collective action is closely associated with the process of mobilisation outside the mechanism of formal politics, for example petition, rallies, marches, sit-ins, and other actions. In this sense, collective action relies on unconventional forms of political participation as opposed to the conventional ones. According to Kaase and Marsh, conventional participation is any activity by ordinary people, not elites, to influence political outcomes according to relatively settled procedures or laws such as voting, campaigning, etc.[4] In contrast, unconventional participation refers to any activity by ordinary citizens to influence political outcomes "that does not correspond to the norms of law and custom" such as demonstration, strikes and boycotts.[5]

Another characteristic of collective action is a "joint action in pursuit of a common objective."[6] It is also worth noting that collective action is not an abstract category. It is a real, visible movement, a "product," and its messages are clearly sent to opponents or the public.[7] In a similar vein, Olzak stipulates a minimal definition of collective action, that is, (1) collective (involving more than one

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[3]Bert Klandermans, *The Social Psychology of Protest*, Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1997, p. 2.

[4]Max Kaase and Alan Marsh, "Political Action: Theoretical Perspective," in Samuel H. Barnes and Max Kaase (eds.), *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies,* Sage Publication, California, 1979, pp. 39-42.

[5]Ibid., p. 41.

[6] McAdam and Snow, "Social Movements", 1997, p. xxiv.

[7]Dieter Rucht, "National Contexts and Movement Structures," in McAdam, McCarty, and Zald (eds.), *Comparative Perspectives*, 1996, p. 186

person),[8] and (2) it makes claims in sustained sequences of interaction with opponents or authorities.[9]

In investigating PKS' collective action, I adhere to the aforementioned characteristics, they are (1) collective; (2) making a claim while challenging others; (3) visible and observable by the public; (4) change-oriented goals; and (5) using extra-institutional procedures that involve some degree of mobilisation. Accordingly, following Burstein, I will not include PKS' political party conventions, and the like in the list of collective action.[10] However, I will not exclude the process of mobilisation during PKS' congressional activities or following the party's anniversary celebrations. Usually at the time of its anniversary, the party mobilises its sympathisers into the streets or conducts great meetings or public sermons addressing various issues on international Islamism.

Having said that the concept requires some degree of extra-institutional politics and mechanism, I also exclude a huge number of reports published by both the print and electronic media on PKS and its parliamentary members' comments in formal political activities from the notion of collective action. The way the party is striving in parliament, in elections (either at the national or local levels) and at the negotiating table cannot be seen as forms of collective actions. For instance, media

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[8]Students of social movement have been varied in their interpretations of the meaning of *collective* in collective events. Charles Tilly proposed a minimum of 50 people. See, Charles Tilly, *From Mobilisation to Revolution*, Addison Wesley, Reading: Mass., 1978. Olzak and West use at least 2 people, but most observers choose a minimum in the range of 10 and 20. See, Susan Olzak, "Analysis of Events in the Study of Collective Action," *Annual Review of Sociology,* Vol. 15 (1989), p. 126.

[9]Ibid., p. 124.

[10]See, P. Burstein, *Discrimination, Jobs and Politics: The Struggle for Equal Employment Opportunity in the United States since the New Deal*, University Chicago Press, Chicago, 1985.

reports on PKS' support for Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in the run-up to the presidential election in 2004 or an inter-party coalition that included PKS and aimed to support a government policy called 'Koalisi Kerakyatan' will not be classified as collective action. This is largely because those activities or repots are primarily concerned with the scope of elite rather than spontaneous grass-root mobilisation.[11]

3.2 Protest Event Analysis

In order to examine PKS' collective action, I take advantage of a growing approach in the field of collective action research, that is, a study of protest events.[12] Events, wrote Paige and Tilly, are a *non-routine type of action repertoire*,[13] *unconventional*, *collective*, *disruptive* and *public acts* that involve claims on behalf of a larger collective.[14] The benefits of using event analysis are the following: (1) events are (at least potentially) commensurate across different kinds of movements, thus facilitating a unified theory of mobilisation; (2) an event-centred approach can

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[11]Olzak, "Analysis of Events," 1989, p. 125.

[12]Most major research traditions in collective action have taken advantage of analysis of newspaper event data. Apart from using newspaper data for conducting protest event analysis, I also use them along with other primary sources for political discourse analysis as will further developed in the chapter 4 and 5. For a detailed account of protest event and political discourse analyses, see Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham, "Political Claims Analysis: Integrating Protest Event and Political Discourse Approaches," in *Mobilisation: An International Quarterly*, Vol. 4, No. 2/Fall 1999, pp. 203-221.

[13]This is to distinguish with *routine activities* such as public discussion, religious meetings, and so on. As is widely known, PKS has continuously built its reputation on being a so-called cadre party (*partai kader*) which actively engages its constituencies on a continual basis, with a remarkable record of social work and dealing with non-political issues such as running a number of educational institutions both formal (*Sistem Terpadu*) or non-formal, and so on. PKS also manages such religious activities as *liqo* (weekly meeting), *mabit* (spending the night at the mosque), *daurah* (training program), *rihlah* (travel program) and the like in regular ways. These routine activities cannot be seen as forms of collective action. Olzak even excludes anniversary marches and annual celebrations since their timing is predetermined and not spontaneous. See, Olzak, "Analysis of Events," 1989, p. 126.

[14]See, J.M. Paige, *Agrarian Revolution*, Free Press, New York, 1975; See also, Tilly, *From Mobilisation, 1978.*

incorporate the dynamics of timing and mutual causality; and (3) as a consequence of this, the decline or rise of mobilisation can be tested by an examination of the relation between protest and political opportunity structures.[15]

While acknowledging these inherent limitations of the use of newspaper data,[16] this study will use newspaper data for the following reasons: First, newspaper-based event data provides a rich collection of information on the occurrence of PKS' collective action, its duration, its participants, its targets and the like. In other words, among other sources, "newspapers provide the most complete account of events for the widest sample of geographical or temporal units."[17] Second, as offered by Earl and her collaborators, I used so-called 'triangulation of multiple sources' to ensure a broader range of coverage, which is likely both to capture more events (addressing description bias) and to provide multiple accounts of each event (addressing description bias).[18] Third, related to the use of multiple

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[15]Oliver, Cadena Roa, and Strawn, "Emerging Trends."

[16]Some scholars have criticized protest event analysis. First of all, newspaper content is not intended or created for academic purposes so that the reliability and validity of the data might be questioned.[16] In other words, researchers, who use newspaper data, depend on the work of others to help in providing collective events. Also, some critics argue that the protest event method that relies heavily on newspaper data suffers from selection bias because a news desk has a number of limitations such as space restriction to report on all events that actually occur. Likewise the newspaper data cannot be immune from impressions and inferences of journalists or commentators or actors thereby making such data more vulnerable to description bias. David G. Ortiz, Daniel J. Myers, N. Eugene Walls, and Maria-Elena D. Diaz, "Where Do We Stand With Newspaper Data," in *Mobilisation: An International Journal,* 10 (3): p. 397. See also, Jennifer Earl, Andrew Martin, John D. McCarthy, and Sarah A. Soule, "The Use of Newspaper Data in the Study of Collective Action," *Annual Review of Sociology*, 30, 2004, pp. 68-73.

[17]Olzak, "Analysis of Events," 1989, p. 128.

[18]Earl, et al., "The Use of Newspaper," 2004.

sources, I also take advantage of the increasing popularity of electronic archives as sources of data on PKS' collective actions.[19]

In doing so, I relied on two national dailies *Kompas* and *Republika* during two-months of fieldwork in Indonesia to collect data on PKS' collective actions from 1980 to 2007. Given that the two print media have their own official websites, I also took advantage of their electronic archives by using keyword search strings. To confirm the validity of the data and to capture PKS' collective events that were not reported by *Kompas* and *Republika*, I also referred to other national and regional dailies or weekly magazines and their electronic archives such as *Media Indonesia, Suara Merdeka*, and *Tempo*. Among the 225 collective events carried out by PKS captured in this work, 37.8% of them were reported by *Kompas*, 48% were covered by *Republika*, and only 14.2% were obtained from other sources.

Clearly, by using more than two sources of newspaper data, this study captured more PKS collective events and is thus able to assess differences in reporting on the same events that are covered by more than one newspaper. However, for the purposes of the protest event analysis carried out in this chapter, I have just put "unique events" in the dataset where the same events are covered by *Republika*, *Kompas* and other news agencies will be enumerated as one event. *Republika*, based on the dataset, captured more PKS' collective events than *Kompas*.

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[19]For the benefit of electronic archives, see, Earl, et al., "The Use of Newspaper," 2004, p. 75.

3.3 Indicators

In an attempt to assess PKS collective actions from 1980-2007, I use several indicators that are commonly used in when conducting protest event analysis. The first is when the action takes place.[20] This is to develop information on the timing and sequences of events in conjunction with theories of political opportunities. In Indonesia's case, the collapse of Suharto's regime in 1998 is crucial to mark the end of political repression in the country. As will further be explained, the openness and repressiveness of political systems are influential in determining the emergence of movements.

The second is types of actions.[21] These forms of actions are distinguished into 12 categories; that are, demonstrations/rallies, great meetings (*tabligh akbar*), fundraising, *istighotsah* (public praying), a devotion to social work and mobilisation to help victims of natural disasters, public statements of opinion, flag burning, sending of fighters (*jihadits)* and 'volunteers,' mobilisation during the party's declaration, anniversaries and convention and unconventional mobilisation related to elections. This is to define the extent to which PKS conducts its collective actions out in peaceful, disruptive or violent ways.[22]

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[20]See, Hanspeter Kriesi, Ruud Koopmans, Jan Willem Duyvendak and Marco G. Giugni, New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1995.

[21]Olzak, "Analysis of Events," 1989.

[22]Some researchers propose a wide range of definitions on collective violence. Olzak defines events as violent if weapons or attacks are used to threaten or damage persons physically or objects. See, Susan Olzak, "Labour Unrest, Immigration and Ethnic Conflict in Urban America, 1880-1915," in *American Journal of Sociology*, May, 1994. A violent event has been defined in terms of the number of deaths during collective actions E.N Muller, "Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Political Violence," in *American Sociology Review* 50, pp. 47-61.

The third is that each of PKS' collective events will be assessed on the basis of issues or claims.[23] Main issues raised through the party's collective action are "a much more common—if more prosaic—reason why people band together in movements."[24] People will not risk their lives or sacrifice their time, money, or energies to participate in PKS' collective action unless they have good reason to do so. To this end, I classify PKS' collective action into two broad categories defined based on either Islamist or non-Islamist issues. Fourth, PKS' events to raise certain issues will be classified as either addressing international or domestic issues.

The fifth is that each of PKS' collective actions will be weighted by its duration multiplied by the average number of participants.[25] This is to measure event intensity that has been operationalised in many ways, including through its size and duration. The analysis of event intensity will also be developed to specify any particular issues which attract PKS' sympathisers to go to the streets. The sixth is the involvement of actors or political leaders in PKS' events.[26] Finally, given that an event's location can matter in several ways, the measurement of dataset based on the location of events will be presented as well.[27]

3.4 Findings

I have discussed at length that PKS as a social movement organisation cannot be simplified as a political party. It evolved out of an informally Islamist-

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[23]Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, 1998.
[24]Ibid., p. 4.
[25]Olzak, "Analysis of Events," 1989.
[26]Ortiz, Myers, Walls, and Diaz, "Where Do We Stand."
[27]Ibid.

based movement called ‘Jemaah Tarbiyah.’ After the resignation of Suharto in 1998, Tarbiyah advocates formed a political party called Partai Keadilan (PK, Justice Party), a predecessor PKS, as a political vehicle to advance its goals. Hence, the term “Tarbiyah” here refers to LDK/FSLDK, KAMMI, PK, and PKS. Indeed, FSLDK is hardly monolithic, but it is dominated by those who are affiliated with Tarbiyah. Also, despite the claim that KAMMI has no formal relationship with PK/PKS, the dominant trends among the leadership and membership of this student organisation are the ideas of Tarbiyah. Further, in many instances, KAMMI presented itself as, in Machmudi words, “the student wing of PKS.”[28]

Among the total collective events captured in this work, the majority of events are held under the banner of PKS (60.9%), KAMMI (25.8%), PK (12%), and FSLDK (1.3%). The relatively little activity carried out by FSLDK is an unsurprising finding considering the fact that it is merely a friendship forum for building networks to facilitate intercampus predication. PK merged into PKS in 2003 following its failure to generate sufficient votes in 1999. It comes as no surprise that PKS draws more attention from news agencies than other forms of Tarbiyah. Its remarkable success in the 2004 elections is a crucial reason why many people, including media, are looking at PKS more closely.

3.4.1. Timing and Sequence

Most events carried out by the FSLDK, KAMMI, PK and PKS have been conducted after the resignation of Suharto in May 1998. Only 6.2% of them

[28]Machmudi, *Islamising Indonesia*, 2006.

occurred when Suharto was still in power. These small portions of collective events were carried out largely by KAMMI. As is widely known, KAMMI, as one of the most influential student forces, played key role in demanding total reform actions which subsequently led Suharto to step down in 1998. Bearing slogans demanding 'non-violent reform' (*reformasi damai*), KAMMI held massive rallies throughout the country from April to 21 May 1998 when Suharto announced his resignation. Still today, KAMMI is a leading force among Islamic student movements in Indonesia. Above all, however, the grand-scale demonstrations pressuring the government for change before 21 of May 1998, including those under the banner of KAMMI, were made possible by the declining capacity of Suharto to sideline any challenges. The regime's weakened ability to suppress student demonstrations was facilitated by the emergence of the 1997 economic crisis which created a large hole in Suharto's political regime and thereby created a window of political opportunity for regime change.

The Graph 1 shows that prior to 1998 Tarbiyah did not appear publicly in order to avoid sustained political repression. Tarbiyah then focused its activities on cultivating religious understanding and practices in campus mosques. This finding affirms the theory of political opportunities where it is stated that the more the political system is opened, the more opportunities are available for the emergence of collective action. In contrast, the more the political system is closed, the less opportunity there is for collective action.[29]

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[29]The next chapter will further discuss the relationship between the timing of PKS' collective actions and political opportunity by taking a closer look at the final days of Suharto.

Graph 1

In addition, the graph highlights that the majority of PKS' collective actions were carried out in November 2006 (8.4%), July 2006 (6.2%), March 2003 (4.4%), August 2006 (4.4%), May 2006 (4.4%), etc. Overall, 2006 was the most intensive in terms of PKS' events as 33% of its collective actions were conducted in that year (Graph. 2). Interestingly, during election time in 1999 and 2004, the number of PK and PKS' collective actions declined significantly, respectively 2.7% and 8.9%. Aside from the increasing participation of PKS in election process, the decrease of PKS' collective actions at election time can be seen as a wish to avoid alienating voters by appearing militantly Islamic. As will be explored, six-in-ten of PKS' collective actions can be classified as 'Islamist' in substance. If the party organizes such an Islamist-based action at election times, it would damage the image of the party. As the national leadership of PKS decided to sell non-Islamist issues in the 2004 elections, most notably, promoting clean and caring image, the party's refrains from openly pushing Islamist agenda.

Aside from that, the answer to why 2006 became the most active year for PKS' actions is that the majority of PKS collective events can be classified as event-connected collective action, which responds to certain actual issues. In 2006 for instance, there were a number of controversies which PKS reacted to: the uproar over cartoon portrayals of the Prophet Muhammad published by a Danish newspaper (3.6%), the Israeli invasion against Lebanon (6.2%), George W. Bush's visit to Indonesia (8.9%), anti-pornography movements following the release of Indonesian version of "Playboy" magazine (5.8%), and a proposed national anti-pornography law. The intensity of PKS' collective action also increased slightly in 2003 following the U.S. attacks on Iraq (6.2%) and continuing wars in Afghanistan (1.8%).

Graph 2

3.4.2. Forms of Action

Among the 12 forms of collective actions looked at in this study, demonstration is the most preferred action of PKS, including PK and KAMMI (51.6%). 16.9% of PKS events take the form of position statement (*pernyataan*

sikap). Another favourite type of action is a call, appeal or demand (6.2%) and a devotion to social work in regard to natural disasters (4.9%). Aside from that, PKS' campaigns for raising donations was made up 4% as well as organising great meetings (*tabligh akbar*) (3.6%). Other actions are reported at about the same level, on average no more than 3% of the total of PKS' collective events gathered in this work (Graph 3).

Almost all of PKS' collective actions, including FSLDK, KAMMI, and PK, are peaceful and orderly.[30] Nevertheless, there is some indication that just a few of PKS' events are classified as "violent" such as readiness to send *jihadist* (fighters) to the Middle East (1.8%).[31] Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that this readiness to send *jihadist* is merely a rhetorical-by-product of a larger event and constitutes an effort to publicly display Islamic solidarities in defense of its fellow Muslims in other parts of the world. For example, some PKS branches conducted registration for 'volunteers' willing to be sent to Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, and Afghanistan. As reported by media, hundreds of PKS cadres from Kediri in East Java were ready to leave for Lebanon to help Hizbullah troops in their struggle against the Israeli invasion in 2006. The men were ready to leave for Lebanon at any time while waiting for the go-ahead from the party's central executive board. But, to my knowledge, no one was sent to the Middle East. Apart from the rhetoric of

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[30]Editorial, "Aksi Simpatik Partai Keadilan," *Media Indonesia*, 19 October 2001; "Demonstrasi Itu Tertib dan Damai," *Media Indonesia*, 15 September 2003; "Ketertiban Sejuta Umat," *Media Indonesia*, 31 March 2005; Dahlan Iskan, "Massa Santun di Dunia yang Bergetah," *Suara Indonesia*, 20 September 1998. For the case of KAMMI's non-confrontational character approach, see, *Jakarta Post*, 11 April 1998, p. 1; "5000-an Mahasiswa Islam Serukan Aksi Damai," *Republika*, 11 April 1998, p. 12; "Demonstrasi Sambil Tersenyum," *Merdeka*, 11 April 1998, p. 1.

[31] *Antara,* 27 July 2006.

sending *jihadist*, PKS also frequently drew attention from the public on its readiness to send volunteers to help distribute financial and logistical assistance to its fellow Muslims suffering from Israeli and American invasions in the Middle East. Nonetheless, there was no clarity whether the volunteers were sent or not.

Another form of PKS actions that is rarely seen in public is flag burning (2.7%). It is difficult to classify "flag burning" as a violent action because of the absence of injuries and death in such action. However, given that PKS and KAMMI are generally widely known as peaceful movements, the burning of photos of President Bush or the U.S. and Israeli flags throughout demonstrations signaled the growing escalation of anger among their participants. For instance, in response to the Israeli full-scale offensive against Lebanon, local branches of student organisations in Ambon, including KAMMI and LDK, organised thousands of people to march through the main streets of the city while waving Palestinian flags, chanting anti-America and Israeli slogans and burning Israeli flags. A few protesters in the demonstration carried with them fake guns, rocket launchers, and bombs and these people tended to cover their faces with martial "ninja" masks as is commonly found among the radical Palestinian group HAMAS.[32] In general, however, in PKS' demonstrations it is hard to find violent actions that result in the presence of injuries and property damage as is the case in religious vigilante groups such as Front Pembela Islam (FPI, Islamic Front Defenders) and Laskar Jihad (Jihad Troops), who, as parts of their anti-American demonstrations, carry out sweeping operations against Westerners in a number of Indonesian hotels.

[32] *Antara* 21 July 2006.

Graph 3

Actions

Action	%
Demonstration/rallies	51.6
Great meeting/Tabligh...	3.6
Position statement	16.9
Boycott	1.8
Flag burning	1.8
Call, appeal, demand	6.2
Sending of volunteers	1.8
Fundraising	4
social work&mobilisati..	4.9
Public Praying (istigh...	0.4
Mobilisation during par...	4.9
unconventional mobilis...	1.3

3.4.3. Main Issues

Criticism of Western domination of the global political order, epitomized by U.S. foreign policies against the Muslim world, has been apparent in PKS collective events. Specifically, along with the rise of anti-America sentiment that has been a dominant issue in PKS protests (17.3%), the Palestine cause has also aroused outpourings of Islamic solidarity among the party's supporters. Not surprisingly, anti-Israeli sentiment has become the most salient characteristic of PKS demonstrations, with almost one third (29.9%) of its total events focusing on this issue.

This figure makes PKS different from other Islamic parties and Islamic-based mass organisations such as the largest traditionalist Muslim organisation Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) and the Muslim modernist-based organisation Muhammadiyah. No other Islamic party has such an attachment to the Palestine cause as well as such an enduring criticism of America as does PKS. It is true that that anti-Israeli and America sentiments are widespread in Indonesian Muslim

circles. Public opinion polls conducted by a respected pollster Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI, Indonesian Survey Institute) in 2004 and 2005 suggest that many Indonesian Muslims had an unfavourable view of America and Israel.[33] Unlike PKS, however, other Muslim organisations' anti-Israeli and America stance does not manifest in direct actions. In PKS we find relatively high levels of participation in various types of actions against America and Israel. In other words, PKS supporters have more successfully transformed their anti-America and Israeli sentiment into actions relative to their fellow Muslims who affiliate with other Islamic parties or with Muslim organisations like NU and Muhammadiyah.

Other contentious events captured in this work are KAMMI's call for *reformasi,* which was followed by Suharto's relinquishing power (5.8%) and its rejection of Suharto's cronies and the New Order (0.9%). Since its inception, KAMMI successfully mobilised massive rallies and great meetings (*tabligh akbar*) against Suharto in many public universities in Indonesia. Yet it is true that the *reformasi* struggle was not only dominated by KAMMI's demonstrations, since other student groups and non-governmental organizations long active in the pro-democracy movements also contributed significantly to demanding regime change. Compared to other groups, "KAMMI's demonstrations have been widely recognized as being amongst the least prone to violence."[34] This study also looks at the way KAMMI acted as a political pressure group against President Wahid leading to his downfall in 2001 (3.6%)

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[33]Saiful Mujani, "Anti-Americanism in Contemporary Indonesia," in *Studia Islamika* Vol. 12, No. 2, Jakarta, Indonesia: Centre for the Study of Islam and Society, National Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN), 2005.

[34]Kraince, "The Role of Islamic Student Groups," 2000, p. 15.

Apart from the issues mentioned above, this study also gathers data of collective events showing that PKS has tried to build its reputation through organising collective actions to fight against corruption (4%) and money politics (1.8%), call for sustainability of the reformation struggle (1.3%), and the abolishment of ABRI's (the Indonesian Armed Forces) dual function (1.3%). As the most disciplined political force in Indonesia, PKS also exerts its capability to send hundreds of its tight-knit cadres to offer support in natural disaster zones (5.8%). PKS also paid significant attention to the anti-pornography movement (5.8%) and anti-stigmatisation of Muslims as terrorists (1.3%). Other issues raised in PKS' demonstrations but occupied at about the same level, on average no more than 1% of the total PKS collective events gathered in this study.

However, among the issues surveyed in this study, the principal finding is that PKS' collective events have been driven by a strong sense of anti-Zionism and anti-Americanism as well as support for the Palestine cause. This indicates PKS' preoccupation with distant but religiously charged issues. It could be said that the Palestine question is a "trademark" of the party. In fact, PKS collective actions are generally event-based. One event may come and go, but the prevalence of PKS actions against Israel can emerge across time and location. The Palestine question keeps occupying the minds of PKS supporters as reflected in its everlasting large-scale demonstrations protesting Israeli actions against Palestinians.

In other words, the high number of PKS' actions which focus on the Palestine cause vis-à-vis the anti-American and Israeli sentiment suggest that the party remains preoccupied with the relatively distant issues, which is Islamist in

essence, rather than grappling with local issues that correspond with national interests. The data shows that PKS uses domestic events to bring attention to international issues, such as demanding that the government takes a firm line against Israel and give stronger support to the Palestinian struggle. During the fiftieth anniversary of the Asia-Africa Conference held in Bandung on 2-24 April 2005, PKS urged the government to address the Palestine cause. Also, during the political turmoil of 2001, PK and KAMMI also actively mobilised its supporters to demand the downfall of President Wahid for his alleged involvement in a corruption scandal along with their opposition against his plan to open an economic relationship with Israel (3.6%). For some people, turning greater attention to geographically distant issues like Palestine and Israel as the nation is still struggling with a number of economic, political and social issues (e.g. corruption, poverty rate, oil price) is unwise.

Nonetheless, the data shows again that PKS has paid greater attention to any international events which relate to anti-Israel and America sentiments. Among the total PKS' anti-Zionist actions (29.2%), a large proportion was carried out to condemn Israeli attacks against Palestinian militants and the Israeli military actions against Hizbullah in Lebanon. Anti-Zionist actions are also carried out to respond to the issue of imposing economic sanctions on Palestine and the planned "development" of al-Aqsha Mosque dedicated to reclaiming the site. PKS even pays a lot of attention to "small-scale" event-based issues in the Middle East such as the Israeli incursions into Palestinian territories over the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier and the arrest of Palestinian parliament members.

Interestingly, anti-Israel sentiment has been widespread among PKS cadres who either come from the party's central executive board in Jakarta or even from local and small branches. As described in Graph 5, the intensity of PKS' anti-Israeli demonstrations, in which its participants chanted anti-Israeli slogans, held placards equating Nazi and Zionist regime symbols and yelled *Allahu Akbar* (God is great), are not exclusively conducted in Jakarta. Similar processions wound their way simultaneously through other big and small cities across the country, such as Surabaya, Makassar, Kediri, Gresik, and so on. This is hardly found in other Islamic parties. Unlike PKS, many Islamic parties are rarely seen to mobilise their supporters to go the streets. If they do so, they will usually raise issues of more domestic relevance such as demanding the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter into the preamble of the constitution.

Further, it is plausible to say that PKS are capable of increasing the likelihood of coverage in the media. Some of its protests against Israel are not event-based, yet receive greater coverage from news gatherers. For example, the fiftieth commemoration of the Israeli occupation of Palestine received massive media coverage, even though the public previously deemed this issue unimportant, distasteful and not of interest to news readership.[35]

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[35]Just a few people are aware of this issue as PKS held huge rallies attended by hundreds of thousands of its sympathisers in Jakarta, Surabaya, and other cities. As explained earlier, most of PKS actions against Israel and the U.S. are conducted in response to internationally conflictual events, which are normally followed by the presence of violence, including injuries and deaths. For example, actions as a response to the Israeli air strike against Palestinians the U.S. unilateral attacks on Iraq were more likely to be reported by media, since the events involved a bunch of solidarity and addressed an actual issue.

3.4.4. Islamist and Non-Islamist Category

This study will also distinguish the aforementioned issues based on Islamist and non-Islamist categories. As described earlier, such Islamist issues point to an "active assertion and promotion of beliefs, prescriptions, laws or policies that are held to be Islamic in character."[36] These Islamist issues range from moral reform to transnational Islamism. Moral reform is centred upon religious values and is characterized by coercive moralism, that is, "the stated goal of the movement is to ensure that all citizens, regardless of their individual preferences, conform to their group's moral values and standards."[37]

In this regard, PKS opposition to the "Playboy" magazine and so-called deviant Islamic sects and its strong endorsement of the anti-pornography bill and the implementation of *shari'a*-based laws in local governments can be included as Islamist moral reform in character. Meanwhile, transnational Islamism refers to a form of Islamic solidarity that transcends geographical boundaries by taking advantage of the concept of *umma* as shown in PKS enduring actions against Israel and America.

On the other hand, PKS events on anti-corruption, the *reformasi* struggle, anti-money politics and the like are classified as non-Islamist issues. The data shows that roughly six-in-ten of PKS' collective events can be classified as Islamist (62.2%), but just 25.8% of them were non-Islamist in essence. The gap is

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[36]ICG, Understanding Islamism, No. 37, 2005, p. 1. For a more detailed account of definition of Islamism, see Chapter 1 c.q. "What is Islamism?"

[37]Rory McVeigh and David Sikkink, "God, Politics, and Protest: Religious Beliefs and the Legitimation of Contentious Tactics," *Social Forces*, June 2001, 79 (4), p. 1431.

substantial, but with a very few exceptions to this distinction making it not a cut and dry category. Curiously, PK and KAMMI's call for President Wahid's resignation was not only motivated by his alleged corruption involvement as widely aired in the public, but also his strong ties and associations with the Zionist government[38] and his controversial plan to lift the ban on Marxism, Communism and Leninism thought.[39]

Graph 4

Given that there is no other party which has such a high degree of engagement in collective action, it is difficult to make comparisons. However, the finding has told us something significant about PKS. The fact that six-in-ten of PKS' events are Islamist suggests that, in spite of PKS' successful campaign in 2004 on an anti-corruption ticket, the party is still pushing forward its hard-line religious views. If PKS' "clean and caring" campaign really matters, this message should be more visible in its collective actions, not just during election time. Graph

[38]Sekretariat Jenderal DPP PKS, Sikap Kami: Kumpulan Sikap Dakwah Politik PK dan PKS Periode 1998-2005, Harakatuna Publishing, Bandung, 2007, pp. 181-182.

[39]Marxism, Communisum and Leninism were banned with the following a decision made by the People's Consultative Assembly TAP/XXV/MPRS/1966 after the so-called failed coup of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in 1965.

4 illustrates that PKS' actions on non-Islamist issues (e.g. anti-corruption, rule of law, etc) make up less than half of the amount of the party's Islamist views. Through its collective actions, PKS has presented itself as being amongst the best organised Islamist force raising geographically distant issues that correspond with the increasingly anti-America and Israeli sentiment along with issues relatively closer to home, which are still Islamist in essence (e.g. support for a controversial anti-pornography bill, strong opposition to the "Playboy" magazine, etc).

3.4.5. Far and Near Enemies

Unlike other Islamic parties, PKS has shown more explicitly its concern for the plight of fellow Muslim countries, most notably, Palestine, Afghanistan, Lebanon and Iraq. This does not necessarily mean that PKS are only concerned about what is happening globally. The data shows that PKS is also concerned about what is happening in its home country.

Accordingly, a wide variety of issues addressed during PKS' events will be classified in both challenging the relatively far enemy and the nearer enemy. Like Islamist movements elsewhere, PKS has extended its perceptions of "enemy" to both domestic and foreign foes.[40] The party's strong criticism against America's aggressive international anti-terrorist campaign is perceived as undermining the Muslim world as shown in its grand-scale demonstrations against Bush's state visit to Indonesia; American attacks on Iraq and Afghanistan; as well as its enduring anti-

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[40]Platzdasch, "Religious Dogma," 2005, p. 55.

Zionist sentiment, can be classified as PKS' tendency to challenge its distant enemies.

Another internationally contentious event, that is, the row between America and Iran over the Iranian nuclear program, which has attracted the world's attention, gained only 0.4% from the total of PKS' actions. Indeed PKS describes itself as Sunni.[41] The party's reluctance to address the issues between the U.S. and Iranian might be caused by the existence of Sunni-Shi'ah rivalry among PKS activists.

On the contrary, PKS events, which promise to bring a clean and caring government, massive mobilisation of its cadres for assisting victims of natural disasters, as well as its endorsements for the implementation of *shari'a*-inspired laws in some local governments and its huge collective actions to call for the enactment of an anti-pornography bill can be categorised as addressing the relatively nearer enemies.

Interestingly, the data reveals that the majority of PKS events were anchored in geographically distant enemies focusing on transnational Islamist issues rather than on relatively nearer enemies and the national interest. Nearly half of PKS' events as recorded by the mass media were dedicated to challenge foreign foes, while 37.8% of them were concerned with domestic issues (Graph. 5). Hidayat Nurwahid, former president of the party, admitted that the relatively distant enemies (notably pro-Palestine) have been a dominant trend in PKS demonstrations.[42] Another PKS key leader, Untung Wahono held:

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[41]Abu Ridha, Interview, 25 September 2007.
[42]Hidayat Nurwahid, Interview, 4 October 2007.

> We must send a strong message to Israel and the U.S. which usually favours Israel over Palestine, that the attacks will receive more protests and condemnation from global publics. The easiest way to show our opposition to Israel is grand-scale demonstrations, by which our disapproval towards Israel can be reported by Western news agencies. PKS does not need to organise massive rallies that raise domestic issues because we have already articulated them through a number of PKS representatives in the legislature. In terms of PKS demonstrations, our target audience is, in fact, Westerners.[43]

After all, bearing in mind, this far and near enemies' distinction is not exclusive and there is a considerable overlap between the two. For instance, PKS' strong opposition to the release of the Indonesian version of "Playboy" magazine cannot be included as a merely domestic issue, since the magazine is considered by PKS cadres as an American-influenced publication deliberately injected into Indonesia to undermine religious and moral values.

Graph 5

Far Enemy	Near Enemy	Both	Neither
48.9	37.8	3.1	10.2

3.4.6. Location, Participants, and Leaders

By wide margins, Jakarta is the most active city, where a large proportion of PKS' collective actions were being conducted (55.6%), but just 5.8% of them are held in Surabaya, Bandung (4.9), Semarang (4%), Yogyakarta (3.6%). Other cities

[43]Untung Wahono, Interview, 4 October 2007.

like Solo, Medan, Cirebon, and Bekasi are reported at the same percentage (1.8%). Pontianak, Palembang, Denpasar, and Pangkal Pinang share the same level (1.3%). Other cities are reported at about the same level, on average no more than 1% of the total PKS collective events gathered in this work.

Graph 6

There are a number of reasons why more than half of PKS' collective actions occurred in Jakarta. First, Jakarta is the capital of Indonesia, where *Republika*, *Kompas* as the primary sources of this study along with many news agencies are situated. Media sources are less likely to attend and report events that are far away because of the lack of journalists and it is more costly to cover the events. Second, as the centre of political and economic activities and the place where all foreign embassies are located, Jakarta provides target specific locales. PKS' most favoured sites for demonstrations are situated in the capital including the U.S. Embassy, the United Nation's representative, the Hotel Indonesia roundabout, the House of Parliament and others. More importantly, Jakarta is a PKS stronghold, where the party won convincingly in the 2004 elections and thus collective events are more likely to occur in Jakarta.

Meanwhile, among the total of PKS events that mobilised a number of participants (n= 141), 41.8% of them were attended by thousands of the party's participants and 25.5% of them were attended by hundreds of protesters. Surprisingly, 7.8% of PKS' events were converged on by hundreds of thousands of its sympathisers, while 3.5% of them involved tens of thousands of people. Even more so, there were thousands of people gathered in 5.7% of PKS actions. But there were just 5.7% of PKS' events that succeeded in mobilising dozens of protesters. PKS actions that occur in Jakarta involve grand-scale demonstrations and most are related to the virulent strain of anti-Zionist and American sentiments.

Finally, the measurement, which is based on the involvement of significant actors or leaders in an event, is politically and culturally significant. Hence, those events are more likely to be reported.[44] In many instances, this significance may arise because of the social status of an actor, notoriety or celebrity.[45] In the case of PKS, however, there are no outstanding leaders or extraordinary party figures. Unlike other parties who rely on particular leaders or charismatic people such as Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono for the Democrat Party, Abdurrahman Wahid for the Nation's Awakening Party (PKB), Megawati for the Indonesian Democracy Party-Struggle (PDI-P), PKS seems to be less attentive politically to individual leaders.[46]

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[44]For a detailed account of the significance of actors, see David Synder and William R. Kelly, "Conflict Intensity, Media Sensitivity and the Validity of Newspaper Data," American Sociological Review, 42, 1977, pp. 105-123.

[45]Ortiz, Myers, Walls, and Diaz, "Where Do We Stand," p. 399.

[46]For a detailed account of the significance of political leadership in Indonesia, see R. William Liddle & Saiful Mujani, "Leadership, Party and Religion," *Comparative Political Studies,* 40, 7 (July, 2007), 832-857.

Accordingly, in order to drive up coverage, PKS tends to maximize the size of participants in its actions.[47] Nonetheless, the media, which covers PKS events, still needs a leader or actor which can represent the party and thus become the focus of the coverage. The data illustrates that among other leader of PKS actions captured in this study, Hidayat Nurwahid, former president of PKS, who resigned from the position after being elected as the chairman of the People's Consultative Assembly, is the most media-cited person (22.1%). Media preference also goes to Tifatul Sembiring, which serves currently as the president of the party (19.9%). Al-Muzammil Yusuf, a senior leader of PKS and the chairman of the Palestine caucus in the parliament, makes up 5.1%, while Ahmad Heryawan, the leader of Jakarta branch of PKS (4.4%). Other leaders are reported at about the same level, on average no more than 1.5% of the total PKS/PK/KAMMI events gathered in this work.

Graph 7

[47]Untung Wahono, Interview, 4 October 2007.

Illustration 2

Caption: PKS supporters march toward the United States Embassy during an anti-Israel rally in Jakarta (date unspecified). Available at zioneocon.blogspot.com/ Indonesian%20rally.jpg.

Illustration 3

Caption: Thousands of protesters from PKS rally in front of the Danish Embassy in Jakarta on 6 February 2006, to demand an apology for the publication of caricatures of Prophet Muhammad *(JP/Mulkan Salmona).* Available at newscompass.blogspot.com/ 2006_02_01_ archive.html

CHAPTER 4

BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES: THE EMERGENCE OF PKS AND ITS POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES

In this chapter, I will apply the fundamentals of social movement theory to illuminate the dynamics of PKS and reveal that the party is not an unusual social movement organisation (SMO). In this chapter, I will discuss theories of political opportunity structures and examine the double track of political opportunity structures; the international contexts and domestic possibilities for political opportunities that facilitated or constrained the emergence of PKS.

4.1. Political Opportunity Structures (POS)

Since its emergence in the late 1970s, the concept of political opportunity structures (POS) has become popular among social and political scientists and has spurred much research in the field of social movements. Various scholars have pointed out the different dimensions of POS. For example, Tarrow's formulation, emphasizes openness or closure of a political system, while Kriesi and his collaborators concentrate on the formal institutional structure. Tarrow defines political opportunity structures as:

> "[C]onsistent—but not necessarily formal or permanent—dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure. Theorists of political opportunity structure emphasise the mobilisation of resources *external* to the group" (*emphasis in original*).[1]

In order to synthesize across the different interpretations of political opportunities, McAdam provides the following broadly accepted list of fundamental dimensions of POS: (1) the relative openness or closure of a political system; (2) the stability or instability of a broad set of elite alignments; (3) the presence or absence of elite allies; (4) the state's capacity or propensity for repression.[2] In this chapter, I will use McAdam's scheme of POS with emphasis on his central arguments on the extent to which a political system is open or closed and the extent to which a regime is able or unable to sideline any challenges.

According to McAdam, the openness and the closure of political systems are amongst the most salient factors of POS, which is influential in determining the movement emergence. Dyke supports this notion stating that "groups are more likely to mobilise when the institutionalised political system is open to them."[3] On the contrary, the more the political system is closed, the less opportunity there is for collective action. However, Eisinger indicates that protest is most likely to

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[1]Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Mass Politics in the Modern State*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, p. 85.

[2]McAdam, "Conceptual Origins, Current problems, Future Directions," in Doug McAdam, John D. Mc.Carthy, and Mayer N. Zald (eds.) *Comparative Perspectives*, p. 27.

[3]Nella Van Dyke, "Protest Cycles and Party Politics: The Effects of Elite Allies and Antagonists on Students Protest in the United Stated, 1930-1990," in Jack A Goldstone (ed.), *States, Parties, and Social Movements*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 226.

occur in a political system characterized by a mix of open and closed factors,[4] as is represented graphically in Figure 2.

Figure 2 Eisinger's model of mobilisation

In other words, Eisinger suggests that collective action is less likely to occur in extremely closed or authoritarian systems or in extremely open or democratic ones.[5] This is largely because repression, which usually happens in the closed political system or undemocratic regime, would discourage protest in the prior case and would suppress the sustained interaction of collective action actors and authorities that is the hallmark of social movements."[6] Meanwhile, a completely open and democratic political configuration would render protest

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[4]Peter K. Eisinger, "The Conditions of Protest Behavior," p. 15.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Actions and Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, p. 92.

unnecessary, because the structure of political configuration has provided a greater access for citizens to participate.[7]

The idea that a partially open political system encourages protest is vindicated in the newly democratic states or semi-democratic regimes, which have undergone a transitional phase from an authoritarian or closed political configuration to a more democratic regime. Under such circumstances, the political system is not fully open or the political openness has not been institutionalised. Nonetheless, the capacity of the regime to suppress the movement has declined significantly, thereby opening new opportunities for collective action.

In short, social movements do not occur in a vacuum. Instead, they rely heavily on external conditions that provide opportunities for collective action. As a social movement, PKS is not a spontaneous gathering because before it emerged in public there is a series of socio-political processes which overtime contributed to its development. In the following section, I will employ the aforementioned theoretical approach of POS to explain the emergence of Tarbiyah in the context of Suharto's authoritarianism and the formation of the Justice Party (PK), the predecessor to PKS, in the aftermath of the collapse of Suharto regime.

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[7]Dyke, "Protest Cycles," 2003, p. 232.

4.2. The Emergence of PKS and the Double-Track of POS

In order to examine external conditions that facilitated or constrained the emergence of PKS, I will use what is called "the double track of political opportunity structures," that is, both international and domestic factors which contributed to the emergence of the party. The international context of political opportunities helped to structure the domestic possibilities for the development of PKS.

4.2.1 International Context of Political Opportunities

As explained by McAdam, the international context of political opportunities is employed to oppose the tendency among social movement scholars to reveal, often unintentionally, a state-centred or closed-polity bias. In this regard, alongside the domestic factors outlined above, the following international dimensions help to explain the emergence of Tarbiyah and its current political wing, PKS.

The first international impetus for Islamic revivalism in Indonesia that facilitated the emergence of Tarbiyah is the triumph of the Islamist revolution in Iran. As was suggested by many scholars, the revival of Islam was perceived as a popular assertion of Muslim identity against Western political and cultural dominance.[8] Revivalists perceive the strength of Western culture in everyday life

[8] Among other things, Nikki Keddie, *Roots of Revolution: On Interpretative History of Modern Iran*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1981; See also, Nikki Keddi, "Islamic Revival in the Middle East: A Comparison of Iran and Egypt," in Samih Farsoun (ed.), *Arab Society, Continuity and Change*, Croom Helm, London, 1985.

as the highest stage of imperialism and 'cultural invasion' that undermines their Islamic authenticity and cultural basis of identity. As a result of the 1979 Iranian revolution, revivalists in many Muslim countries felt that it was now possible for Islamic forces to overthrow Western-supported regimes —such as that of the Shah which adopted a secular autocratic state— and they were inspired to do so in their own countries.

Another international factor that helped the emergence of the Tarbiyah was the strengthening of links between the modernist-Islamist groups DDII and Saudi Arabia. As noted in the previous chapter, DDII played a vital role in establishing the campus *dakwah* movement. Having said that the Iranian revolution was proudly welcomed in many predominantly Muslim countries, including Indonesia, Saudi Arabia sought to spread its political and religious influence across the Muslim world in order to counter the increasing dominance of Iran. DDII emphasised the distinctions between Sunni Islam (subscribed to by Indonesian Muslims) and Shiite Islam (subscribed to by the majority of Iranians).[9] A prominent PKS leader Abu Ridha stated:

> First of all, we think that the 1979 Iranian revolution was the triumph of Islam. Then we had been learned that the Shi'ah is the only officially recognized sect in Iran. We then see the revolution more objectively, claiming that it is not only a representation of Islam, but, more importantly, the triumph of the Shi'ah on the world's stage.[10]

[9] Abu Ridha, Interview, 25 September 2007.
[10] Abu Ridha, Interview, 25 September 2007.

Shiism was continuously described by DDII, who are close to Saudi Arabia, as a fatal deviation of Islam.[11] As discussed in chapter two, DDII utilised its close ties with the kingdom to boost the development of campus *dakwah.* Among other things, in the 1970s DDII sent a number of students to undertake Islamic studies in Saudi Arabia with scholarships provided by the kingdom. At this time, Islamic activism and enthusiasm, called *al-Sahwa al-Islamiyyah* (Islamic awakening), gripped Saudi universities.[12] According to International Crisis Group (ICG), the impetus for this phenomenon was derived from the Saudi regime giving shelter to a large number of Brotherhood activists from Syrian and Egypt who escaped from political persecution in their own countries.[13]

Aside from political considerations,[14] at the time Saudi authorities also urgently needed skilled workers and professionals following the oil price which enabled the kingdom to improve their social, health and education sectors. The Brotherhood activists played a key role in filling the gap, especially in education where they designed educational systems and curriculum at schools and universities in the country.[15] The PKS ideologue Abu Ridha who was a student in Saudi Arabia recalled that most books in university libraries in the 1970s were

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[11]For a detailed account of DDII's accusation of Shiism, see Burhanuddin, "The Conspiracy of Jews," 2007.

[12]International Crisis Group (ICG), "Saudi Arabia Backgrounder: Who are the Islamists?" *ICG Middle East Report No. 31*, 21 September 2004.

[13]Ibid.

[14]According to ICG, the Saudi regime used the Brotherhood's politicized version of Islam as 'a weapon in its political-ideological disputes with Nasserist [Egypt] and Baathist [Syrian] neighbours." See, ICG, Ibid.

[15]Ibid.

written by the Brotherhood's associates.[16] It is hardly surprising that Saudi alumni were then influenced by the Brotherhood's ideas and activism. Apart from that, the Saudi Kingdom established the Institute for Islamic and Arabic Studies (LIPIA, Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab) in Jakarta in 1980 in order to bolster the relationship with Indonesia. Its lecturers in the 1980s and 1990s were mostly inspired by the Brotherhood thinking and the majority of books in the library were written by members of the Brotherhood. According to Mahfudz Sidiq, LIPIA also played a crucial role in disseminating the Brotherhood's approach (*manhaj haraki*) in Indonesia.[17]

In addition, the link between Indonesian revivalists and their fellow activists from Malaysia is another international dimension that contributed to the emergence of Tarbiyah.[18] According to Untung Wahono, many young Indonesian revivalists in the early 1970s benefited from relations with Malaysian revivalist groups.[19] A number of writings of Sayyid Qutb, Hassan al-Banna and other leading ideologues of Islamic revivalism had previously been translated into Malay by, most notably, the Islamic Youth Movement (ABIM, Angkatan Belia

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[16]Abu Ridha, Interview, 25 September 2007.

[17]Sidiq, *KAMMI dan Pergulatan Reformasi*, 2003, p. 83. A majority of LIPIA's lecturers are now dominated by salafist ideology.

[18]For purposes of this analysis, I simply describe the benefit taken from the link with Malaysian young revivalist groups. It is worth noting that ABIM and the National Union of Malaysian Muslim Students (PKPIM, Persatuan Kebangsaan Pelajar-pelajar Islam Malaysia) had utilised the links with the leading Muslim Students' Association in Indonesia (HMI). HMI helped their Malaysian counterparts to organize several *dakwah* training trips to Jakarta and Bandung. See, Zainah Anwar, *Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia: Dakwah among the Students*, Pelanduk Publications, Malaysia, p. 19.

[19]Untung Wahono, Interview, 4 October 2007. See also, Sidiq, *KAMMI dan Pergulatan Reformasi*, 2003, p. 83.

Islam Malaysia).[20] In the early 1970s, when the present Islamic awakening was beginning to surface, religious enthusiasm among students in Indonesian secular campuses (which generally did not have expertise in Arabic) was greatly facilitated by the presence of translated books made possible by their counterparts in Malaysia. It was a high-profile DDII member and the initiator of LMD, Imaduddin Abdulrahim, then a lecturer at the University of Technology Malaysia (UTM) in Kuala Lumpur, who brought Malay versions of the Brotherhood books into Indonesia.[21]

The influence of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's ideas and activism was, not surprisingly, also visible in Tarbiyah's political thinking and actions. Yusuf al-Qardhawi, the influential Egypt cleric, one-time Brotherhood leader, called Tarbiyah's political vehicle PKS an extension (*imtidad*) of the Brotherhood.[22] Mashadi, a former PK legislator, admitted that PKS has drawn its ideology and model of action from the Brotherhood, largely because the Egyptian Islamist group offers a thorough understanding of Islamic teachings rather than concentrating on abstract theological debates.[23] Like the Brotherhood, PKS gives priority to political actions over missionary activities. Although the influence of the Brotherhood is much more visible in the party's ideas and approach, a number

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[20]Anwar, *Islamic Revivalism.*

[21] Sidiq, *KAMMI dan Pergulatan Reformasi*, 2003, p. 83. It is worth pointing out that in spite of bringing those translating books to Indonesia, Imaduddin had a very important role in influencing Malaysian students toward the totality of Islam. Zainah wrote that Imaduddin developed selected groups of Islamic students in Malaysia and began to conduct religious circles. See, Anwar, *Islamic Revivalism*, pp. 19-21.

[22]Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, 2004, p. 285.

[23]Mashadi, Interview, 4 October 2007.

of leading figures of PKS use rhetoric to justify the relationship between the Brotherhood and Indonesian society in general. Hidayat Nurwahid even claimed that the Egyptian recognition of Indonesian independence was as a result of the Brotherhood's support.[24] During an official visit to Egypt, H. Agus Salim and Dr. HM. Rasyidi came to the Brotherhood's headquarters and extended their deepest thanks on behalf of the Indonesian people to Hasan Al-Banna for his support for independence.[25] Surely, this is a post-factum justification which is repeatedly stated by PKS leaders to exaggerate the role of the Brotherhood in the independence of Indonesia. Historical sources show that a majority of Egyptian people and the country's political groups in 1940s, including its socialist-nationalist groups, strongly supported the Indonesian independence from the Dutch.

4.2.2 Domestic Factors

Despite the fact that the development of Tarbiyah and its current political manifestation, PKS, cannot be viewed in isolation from international contexts, there were still domestic factors that contributed to the emergence of Tarbiyah. To begin with, I will discuss two domestic factors that directly enhanced the emergence of Tarbiyah: Suharto's repressive measures against political Islam, and the regime's restrictions on student activism in tertiary campuses. I will also point

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[24]Hidayat Nurwahid, Interview, 4 October 2007.

[25] K.H. Rahmad Abdullah, "Pengantar," in Sa'id Hawwa, *Memoar Hasan Al-Banna: Untuk Dakwah dan Para Dainya*, Hawin Murtadho, Salafuddin (translators), Era Intermedia, Surakarta, 2004.

out Suharto's formulae combining political stability and developmentalism (*pembangunan*) and the impact of this on certain sociological and anthropological changes which contributed to the emergence of Tarbiyah. These domestic factors will be discussed in the following contexts: authoritarianism since the regime's inception, Suharto's rapprochement with Islam in the late 1980s, the fall of Suharto and transition to democracy.

The first notable domestic factor that led to the emergence of campus *dakwah* was the proscription of explicit Islamic political expressions. Suharto's hostility towards political Islam emerged shortly after he took in power in 1967. Clear evidence of this can be found in a number of political maneuvers, including: the formation of Parmusi instead of the rehabilitation of Masyumi, the policy of party reduction which required all Islamic party to fuse into the United Development Party (PPP), and the promulgation of legislation to ensure all mass-based organisations accepted Pancasila as the sole basis (*asas tunggal*).

In addition to this, Suharto had repeatedly proven his capacity to suppress dissident voices.[26] Further, the regime did not hesitate to resort to military action or harsh measures to confront Islamic opposition which often claimed hundreds of lives.[27] Notable among these was the tragedy of 12 September 1984 which took place in a mosque in Tanjung Priok, Jakarta. Hundreds of protesters led by Amir Biki were shot at by the military as they demonstrated against military personnel who tore down brochures advocating that Muslim women should wear Islamic

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[26] *Asiaweek*, July 5, 1996.
[27] Salim, "The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (1982-2004)," 2005.

attire (*jilbab*). The regime also took harsh measures against a radical *usrah* group, Jihad Command (*Komando Jihad*), headed by Imran Zein who hijacked a Garuda Woyla flight to Thailand on 28 March 1981. Long suppressed under authoritarian rule, a few Islamic activists became more radicalised and went underground.[28] Under such circumstances, some Islamic activists instead took non-political activities like *dakwah* and focused primarily on the cultivation of religious practices.

A second domestic factor that facilitated the birth of campus *dakwah* in universities was the regime's restrictions on student activism. In the early 1970s, student protests intensified. Student protest exploded in January 1974 during the visit of the Japanese Prime Minister Mr. Kakuei Tanaka in Jakarta. In 1977-1978, large-scale student unrest emerged, including at the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) that led the military to occupy campuses. Several student leaders were arrested and put in jail. In response to the wave of student radicalism, the regime launched a depoliticisation program on campuses under the headings of Normalisation of Campus Life (NKK) and Student Co-ordination Bodies (BKK) in the late 1970s. These policies banned all student activism inside university campuses, replacing the previously independent Students' Councils (Dewan Mahasiswa/DEMA).

The extensive use of administrative and coercive powers prevented critical Islamic groups as well as Islamic students from engaging in explicit political activism. As a reaction to such a hostile environment, some of them undertook to

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[28]Ibid.

revive their faith by establishing the so-called campus *dakwah* movement and concentrating on non-disruptive forms of Islamic activism, which used campus mosques as their bases. In terms of resource mobilisation, which draws primarily upon rational choice theory, coercive force and repression raise the costs and risks of participation and consequently depress collective action.[29] Wiktorowicz called this a "web of disincentives" which dissuades ordinary people from engaging with social movement organisations that challenge the *raison d'etre* of the state or threaten to mobilise mass-based social protest against the regime.[30]

Accordingly, campus *dakwah* then took the form of a less formally institutionalised movement, used a non-confrontational approach, and focused on the cultivation of religious understanding and practices among Islamic students in prestigious universities. Hence, the presence of campus *dakwah* can best be understood as a rejection of the regime. To escape from the regime's control and repression, campus *dakwah* decided to retreat to what Wiktorowicz called "the networks of shared meaning" with secretive leadership structures and no formal organisation to achieve its goals.[31]

This is particularly the case when campus *dakwah,* as a representation of Tarbiyah, adopted the concept of *Sirriyat al-Tandzim wa Alamiyyat al-Dakwah* (Secret Organisational Structure and Open Predication).[32] This notion implies that

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[29]Karren Rusler, "Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 61, Issue 1, February, 1996, p. 138.

[30]Quintan Wiktorowicz, "The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan, State University of New York Press, New York, 2001, p. 14.

[31]Ibid.

[32]Irwan Prayitno, *Kepribadian Dakwah*, Pustaka Tarbiyatuna, Jakarta, 2003.

every Muslim is obliged to perform *dakwah* in an open way, except in less democratic political systems where overt *dakwah* risks harsh regime reprisals.[33] Under such circumstances, activists of campus *dakwah* must keep the structural organisation of the movement and its leadership secret.[34]

The secret nature of the movement in the early stages of its development was manifested in the use of informal organisations and religious networks, which linked its members through shared meaning about how Islamic society should be implemented.[35] These networks were embedded in everyday interactions in religious circles and activities (*daurah*, *liqa*, etc.) Its members share beliefs like 'Islam as the solution' and 'Islam as the concept beyond the nation-state.' They withdrew from domestic politics and paid significant attention to international Muslim issues such as the Palestine-Israeli conflict, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the like. Overall, these were all strategic choices of actions as a result of the harsh realities of repression under the New Order.

While the first two domestic factors are related to external political pressures imposed by the Suharto regime, the following domestic changes are primarily concerned with the growing interest in Islamic studies and practices. This phenomenon, referred to as "the Islamic turn," was most notable among students in secular universities where many students became "born again

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[33]Ibid.

[34]Sidiq, "KAMMI dan Pergulatan Reformasi," 2003, p. 84.

[35]Singerman distinguishes the terms "informal" and "social" to describe Islamist networks in Cairo. She prefers "informal" to "social" to explain Egyptian Muslim networks, because "it calls attention to the extremely sensitive and politicized nature of associational life in contexts where the state closely and minutely supervises any formal, legal and public associations." See, Diane Singerman, "The Networked World of Islamist Social Movements," in Wiktorowicz, *Islamic Activism*, 2004, p. 155.

Muslims”. Indeed the trend of Islamic revivalism among students in the early 1980s was also related to events and socio-political changes in the world-wide Muslim community. The sources of these phenomena did, however, have local impetus.

First of all, the phenomenon of the Islamic turn in Indonesia was fueled by rapid economic development under Suharto.[36] During this time, enormous progress was made in education, health and poverty reduction, to mention just a few of the most important sectors.[37] In sum, tremendous socio-economic achievements enabled more people to obtain better education.[38] Among those who enjoyed tertiary education came from what Clifford Geertz coined a “*santri*” (pious Muslim) background.[39] In other words, the economic achievements had enabled

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[36]Shortly after Suharto gained power, price stability had been achieved. The real gross domestic product had expanded by over 450 percent compared to the previous regime.[36] A successful campaign on family planning (KB, *Keluarga Berencana*) reduced population growth from an average of 2.4 percent in the period 1965-1980 to an average of 1.8 percent in 1980-1996.[36] The poverty rate declined sharply from 70 percent at the end of the 1960s to only 27 percent in the mid 1990s.[36] The urban population increased significantly from under 20 percent of the population to 35 percent in the mid 1990s.Hal Hill and Jamie Mackie, “Introduction,” in Hal Hill (ed.), *Indonesia’s New Order: The Dynamics of Socio-Economic Transformation*, Allen and Unwin, Australia, 1994, pp. xxiv-xxv.

[37]That is why Herbert Feith called Suharto’s regime as a repressive-developmentalist referring to a pair of magic mantra, that is “developmentalism” (*pembangunan*) and political stability, which cost political freedom and democracy. See, Herbert Feith, “Repressive-Developmentalist Regimes in Asia: Old Strengths, New Vulnerabilities,” *Prisma*, No. 19 (1980, pp. 39-55.

[38]One of the best Suharto’s legacies has been the expansion of education to the point where universal primary education has been almost attained.[38] The percentage of young adults with basic literacy skills grew significantly from 40 percent to 90 percent.[38] The percentage of people completing senior high school increased dramatically from 4 percent in 1970 to 30 percent in 1990.[38] More importantly, the percentage of people completing academy or university education reached an unprecedented level from 0.4 percent in 1970 to 1.6 percent in 1990. Terrence H. Hull and Gavin W. Jones, “Demographic Perspectives,” in Hal Hill (ed.), *Indonesia’s New Order: The Dynamics of Socio-Economic Transformation*, Allen and Unwin, Australia, 1994.

[39]The term ‘*santri*’ (pious Muslims) refers to the interpretative school in Indonesian studies pioneered by the American anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, in the 1950s. Clifford Geertz, “The Javanese Village,” in G. William Skinner, ed., *Local Ethnic, and National Loyalties in*

more *santri,* either from small towns or rural areas, to pursue their study at universities.

In a further development, the emergence of international events that led to Islamic resurgence like the triumph of Islamist revolution in Iran in 1979 brought influences to many predominantly Muslim countries. In Indonesia, as elsewhere, the process of Islamic revivalism began to affect students in secular universities who come from various backgrounds. Coincidentally, in the face of the depoliticisation of the student world through the policy of NKK/BKK, many Islamic students found campus mosques organised by Tarbiyah as a site for fulfilling their growing interest in Islamic studies and practices. Through this religious activism, those who came from, in Geertz's term, *abangan* or less pious Muslim backgrounds, became more conscious of their "Muslimness" and tried to be more pious and committed to live by teachings and precepts of Islam.

The notion of *dakwah,* which literally means "call" as in missionary activities, has therefore been expanded to include the task of making Muslims better Muslims. Meanwhile those who came from modernist and traditionalist *santri* backgrounds tend to merge with each other becoming what Machmudi coined "convergent santri."[40] Since then, those Muslim students from various backgrounds were unwilling to identify with a particular sub-group, such as the *abangan*, traditionalist, or modernist Muslims. Instead, they were more likely to call themselves Muslims without applying an adjective, in an effort not to

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Village Indonesia, Cornell University Modern Indonesian Project, Ithaca, 1959. For the most detailed account, see Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java*, Free Press of Glencoe, London, 1964.

[40]Machmudi, "Islamising Indonesia," 2006.

reproduce the *santri-abangan* and the modernist-traditionalist dichotomies as well as means of identifying with the wider Muslim community (*umma*).

4.3. Suharto's Changing Relationship with Islam

As explained earlier, the development of Tarbiyah in Indonesia has utilised informal networks and less visible organisations. Nonetheless, the adoption of such informal networks and institutions as part of the Tarbiyah movement's collective activities were only valid at times of the regime's repression against political Islam. Arguably, less visible organisations are often seen as "transitory stages" in the development of a social movement, which subsequently turn into more formal structures when the state provides a greater access for individuals to participate.[41] In this sense, the fall of Suharto in 1998 created opportunities for Tarbiyah to transform from an informal movement to a political party promoting their political ideals in an explicit tone by utilising formal and visible structures.

Prior to the collapse of the regime, Suharto's changing relationship with Islam in the late 1980s, led Tarbiyah and other Islamic groups to emerge into public view. The formation of an intercampus predication organisation FSLDK in 1986 and the establishment of KAMMI in the 1998, which played a significant role in the reformation struggle that led to the resignation of Suharto, proved that

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[41]Wiktorowicz, "The Management," 2001, p. 8. See also, Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge, "Networks of Faith: Interpersonal Bonds and Recruitment to Cults and Sects," *American Journal of Sociology* 85, 6 (May 1980), pp. 1376-95.

Tarbiyah began to emerge from its secretive stage adopted throughout the 1970s and 1980s.

Since the late 1980s, the Suharto regime began responding positively to demands from various Islamic organisations. For instance, the Ministry of Education and Culture abandoned its long firmly held policy, that is, decree no 052/Kep/D/1982 forbidding the wearing of the *jilbab* or Islamic attire for women in schools. The Ministry of Religious Affairs presented to parliament a bill expanding the authority of Islamic courts. It also published a compilation of Islamic law. Protests by Muslims against the state's controlled national sport lottery (*Sumbangan Dermawan Sosial Berhadiah* or SDSB) led to the closing of the lottery. The Catholic editor of the weekly popular tabloid *Monitor* was put in jail for three years for announcing a poll which discredited the Prophet Muhammad as the 11th most admired person below President Suharto. The birth of ICMI in the late 1990, above all, was perceived as the most striking evidence of the new centrality of Islam in Indonesian public life. In 1991, Suharto himself moved his public identity towards Islam by undertaking a pilgrimage to Mecca, and then adopting the name Haji Muhammad Suharto. Although many scholars view Suharto's shift to Islam as simply a part of the regime's strategy to generate Muslim support,[42] many *dakwah* organisations and activists, including Tarbiyah,

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[42]Among other things, William Liddle and Michael Vatikiotis works are viewed by many as the best examples of literature which draw such a conclusion, namely that ICMI's formation was facilitated by Suharto due to his changing perception of political Islam. See, Michael Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics under Suharto: Order, Development and Pressure for Change* Routledge, London and New York, 1994. See also, R. William Liddle, "The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 55, 3 (August, 1996).

welcomed the changing relationship with the regime and seized the momentum for enhancing their activities in public.

4.4 The Fall of Suharto and the Emergence of PK/PKS

In mid-1997, a deep economic crisis in Asia began to affect Indonesia. The crisis was markedly evident in the dramatic decline in the value of Indonesian currency (*rupiah*). Thousands of enterprises, from small to large-scale businesses, collapsed. Since the outbreak of the crisis, people became increasingly frustrated by miserable socio-economic conditions. Unemployment levels jumped to the highest level since the 1960s. As a result of the sharp increase in prices, the number of people living below the poverty line increased to around 50 percent of the total population.[43]

The deterioration of economic conditions undermined the regime's greatest pillar of strength and Suharto's legitimacy built on a strong economic development track-record had reached its lowest point. The crisis was a trigger for a series of student demonstrations.[44] In the early stages of mobilisation, student rhetoric expressed a deep concern about the crisis. Students across the nation, including the Tarbiyah-influenced student group KAMMI, were united by the similarity of their

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[43]For detailed accounts of the impact of the crisis, see Arief Budiman, Damien Kingsbury and Barbara Hatley, *Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia*, Monash Asia Institute, Clayton, 1999; Fadli Zon, *The Politics of the May 1998 Riots*, Solstice Publishing, Jakarta, 2004.

[44]For a detailed account of the 1998 student movement, see Edward Aspinall, "The Indonesian Student Uprising of 1998," in Arief Budiman, Damien Kingsbury and Barbara Hatley, *Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia*, Monash Asia Institute, Clayton, 1999; Cypri Aoer et al., *Aksi Mahasiswa: Reformasi Total*, Mentari, Jakarta, 1998.

discontent: high prices which then turned into a call for Suharto to resign.[45] The economic crisis, which created a window of opportunity to mount challenges against the state, set in motion the reemergence of the student movement after many years of suppression.

It is true that during the initial stages of student protest, the political system was not fully open, but the capacity of Suharto's regime to suppress the movement had declined significantly. The crisis did not only cause an increase in poverty, unemployment and food shortages, but also put the state in a vulnerable and weak position unable to overcome the social tensions that escalated and exploded into larger-scale violent riots throughout the archipelago.

Suharto was finally forced to resign from office and B.J Habibie was then sworn in as the President of Indonesia on 21 May 1998. Facing strong opposition from various quarters due to his close association with Suharto, Habibie was forced to conduct a fair and transparent election as soon as possible.[46] He also abandoned the law No. 8 1985, concerning *Pancasila* as the sole foundation of political and mass-organisations.[47] Following these expanding political opportunities, Tarbiyah declared the formation of the Justice Party (PK, Partai Keadilan), now known as Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, Prosperous Justice Party). PK also seized the momentum of the removal of *Pancasila* as the sole basis by announcing Islam as the official basis of the new Islamist party.

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[45]For detailed information, see Diro Aritonang, *Runtuhnya Rezim daripada Soeharto: Rekaman Perjuangan Mahasiswa Indonesia 1998*, Pustaka Hidayah, Bandung, 1999.

[46]For more discussion about the Habibie Presidency, see Dewi Fortuna Anwar, "The Habibie Presidency," in Geoff Forrester (ed.), *Post-Suharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999, pp. 34-37.

[47]Ibid.

In sum, the birth of PK can best be seen as a result of expanding political opportunities following the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998. During Suharto's authoritarian regime, Tarbiyah advocates developed campus *dakwah* by utilising less visible organisations and informal religious networks. By applying the political opportunity framework, the use of these kinds of organisations is most often seen in less democratic political systems where overt protest and visible institutions are more vulnerable to suppression. Nonetheless, in the late 1980s, Tarbiyah activists emerged into public following Suharto's rapprochement with Islam. Finally, following the fall of Suharto in 1998, Tarbiyah advocates seized the momentum by establishing PK, now known as PKS, to pursue their ideals within the framework of a democratic system.

Illustration 4

Caption:
Former President of PKS and chairman of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), Hidayat Nurwahid, during interviews with the author (October 4, 2007).

CHAPTER 5

FROM CAMPUS TO POLITICAL MOVEMENT:

THE RISE OF PKS AND ITS RESOURCE MOBILISATION

In earlier chapters I have described how political opportunity is a necessary prerequisite to collective action. Nonetheless, political opportunities alone do not make a movement. Even the most conducive political environment will be to no avail if the movement does not have sufficient organisation and networks to realise its political potential. Accordingly, the study of "means" or resources is crucial in social movement theory in order to understand the supportive infrastructures required for collective action. The study of means has come to be known as *resource mobilisation*[1] or mobilising structure approaches.

This chapter will look primarily at the various "means" of mobilisation utilised by PKS in order to support its collective actions, and it will focus on the importance of organisational factors or mobilisation of resources that either facilitate or constrain the rise of PKS. In an attempt to describe the organisational strength of PKS, I will emphasise its cadres, organisational models and leadership, communication networks and financial assets.

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[1]This framework is strongly influenced by rational choice theory. This perspective adopts as one of its underlying problems, American economist Mancur Olson's (1968) concept of "free-rider." McCarthy and Zald subsequently offered an answer by introducing the perspective of *resource mobilisation* which focuses on means available to the actors of social movements.

5.1. Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT)

Scholars of social movements define resource mobilisation theory (hereafter, referred to as "RMT") as "collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action."[2] RMT emphasises both societal support of and constraints on collective action phenomena.[3] It deals with the variety of resources that must be mobilised to maintain collective action, the dependence of movement vehicles on external support and the strategies used by authorities to control or incorporate collective action.[4]

Having said that the concept of resources is crucial in RMT, a thorough understanding of this approach requires presenting a clear definition of what resources and movement vehicles are. Unfortunately, there is little agreement on the definition of *resources*. In his definition, Tilly argues that one of the most important resources of mobilisation is the formal and informal networks that connect individuals and movement organisations.[5] The term "network" refers to social structures, that is, sets of social relationships that encourage or discourage people's behaviour, attitudes, and possibilities for action.[6] Klandermans reveals

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[2]Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, "Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilising Structures, and Framing Processes – Toward a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements," in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (eds.), *Comparative Perspectives*, 1996, p. 3.

[3]John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource Mobilisation," 1987, p. 16.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Charles Tilly, *From Mobilisation to Revolution,* 1978, p. 3.

[6]John. L. Campbell, "Where Do We Stand?" 2005, p. 61.

the importance of leadership to constitute the resource for mobilising participants.[7] Maguire divides the resources into two categories, that is, *tangible* (money, space, equipment, and so on) and *non-tangible* (leadership capacity, managerial and organisational experience, ideological justification, tactics and the like).[8] Oberschall[9] along with McCarthy and Zald[10] include a diverse list of resources such as income, savings, communication networks, trust and moral commitment, legitimacy and labor. Most commonly, resources refer to material resources, most notably time and money.[11]

For purposes of this analysis, I will exclude labour and legitimacy from the kinds of resource mobilisation that PKS relies on. Instead, I will include 'cadres', given that the party proclaims itself to be a "cadre party" and the role of cadres in PKS' collective action is significant. In addition to this, I follow two categories of resource mobilisation, that is, material and immaterial resources, which include: (1) formal or informal organisations; (2) networks; (3) income generation capacity; and (4) leadership.[12]

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[7]Bert Klandermans, *The Social Psychology of Protest*, Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge: Massachusetts, 1997, p. 133-134

[8]See, Diarmuid Maguire, "Opposition Movements and Opposition Parties: Equal Partners or Dependent Relations in the Struggle for Power and Reform?" in J. Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans (eds.), *The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1995.

[9]Anthony Oberschall, *Social Conflicts and Social Movements*, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1973.

[10]McCarthy and Zald, "Resource Mobilisation," 1987.

[11]McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982.

[12]I followed this category devised by Agus Salim, "The Rise of Hizb ut-Tahrir (1982-2004)," p. 115.

5.2. The Birth of Jemaah Tarbiyah and Its Organisational Strength and Networks

Among other things, organisation is one of the most important resources.[13] Klandermans called organisation a means to goal-achievement,[14] by which various resources required in collective action can be accumulated and allocated.[15] The availability of organisation is also crucial in order to enhance existing networks as well as recruit members and mobilise contention.

Nonetheless, a focus on social movement theories in Western traditions tends to equate social movement organisations (SMOs) with formal and visible organisations,[16] thereby neglecting informal forms of collective action. Islamist movements, in fact, tend to utilise "informal, personal networks and religious and cultural associability to build movements."[17] Curiously, the use of less formal networks is often found in authoritarian systems where overt protest and formal institutions are more vulnerable to state control and repression.[18]

Given that PKS and Tarbiyah were born in different political contexts, I will discuss their capacities to generate organisational resources in separate sections. As noted in the previous chapters, PKS has become a highly visible institution in the post-Suharto era where all barriers to collective action have been

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[13] McAdam, *Political Process*, 1982; Aldon Morris, *The Origin of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change*, Free Press, New York, 1984.

[14] Klandermans, *The Social Psychology*, 1997, 120.

[15] Knoke, "The Political Economies of Associations", in Richard D. Braungart (ed.), *Research in Political Sociology*, Vol. 1, 211-242, JAI-Press, Greenwich, 1985.

[16] Wiktorowicz, *The Management*, 2001, p. 8

[17] Singerman, "The Networked World," 2004, 151.

[18] Wiktorowicz, *The Management*, 2001, p. 8

removed. By contrast, Tarbiyah was formed at the height of Suharto's authoritarianism, when the regime utilised a combination of harsh suppression and administrative techniques of social control in the management of Islamic activism, which successfully contained movements challenging the state (see, Chapter 4).

I will trace the development of the Tarbiyah movement's organisational forms by looking at the following phases of activities: (1) a campus mosque-based movement; (2) LMD as the initial network of *dakwah* activists; (3) LDK and FSLDK as vehicles of the movement; (4) controlling student senates for recruitment and organisational purposes; and (5) the formation of an intercampus Islamic student movement, KAMMI. Given that these aforementioned forms of Tarbiyah organisational activity have been mentioned in Chapter 2, in this section I will discuss them very briefly, and just focus on the perspective of resource mobilisation.

First of all, the spirit of Islamic revivalism among Islamic students in secular universities began to flourish from the 1970s with the establishment of a *dakwah* network centred in campus mosques. Hence, campus mosques became a key institutional focus for the initial development of Tarbiyah's religious and social networks. Through mosques, the growing interest in Islamic studies and practices among students was facilitated. They prayed together and congregated for the *khutbah* (Friday sermons) in mosques as well as conducted a number of religious study circles and trainings such as *liqa* (meeting every week), *mabit* (staying the whole night at mosques), *daurah* (training program). It is clear that the

mosques not only serve the religious needs of students, but also create a potential institution for further collective action.

The Institute of Predication Strivers (Lembaga Mujahid Dakwah, LMD) also influenced the development of Tarbiyah's networks. Imaduddin Abdul Rahim founded LMD, which, since 1974 conducted regular trainings at ITB's Salman Mosque. This intensive religious training attracted a large number of students and its alumni were spread out not only in Java, but also in Sumatra.[19] Imaduddin's monumental training handbook, *Kuliah Tauhid* (Lectures on Islamic Principles) became a key reference and was distributed on many campuses.[20] After returning from LMD, its alumni began to set up propagation training in their own campuses. In UI, for instance, they developed a sense of commitment to the cause of Islam and maintained a spirit of *dakwah* through various bodies in each faculty under different names, such as the Integrative Studies about Islam (*Integratif Studi tentang Islam*, ISTI) in the Faculty of Economics, the Integrated Islamic Studies (*Studi Islam Terpadu,* SIT) in the Faculty of Letters and the Study Forum of Islamic Principles (*Forum Studi Dasar Islam,* Fondasi) in the Faculty of Science.[21]

Having said that religious enthusiasm among students developed rapidly, the presence of LDK in managing a broad range of religious activities was important. Interestingly, since LDK was a formal student organisation established on campus, it became automatically one of the Student Activity Units (*Unit*

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[19]Ibid.

[20]Machmudi, *Islamising Indonesia,* 2006. Machmudi's account was based on his interview with Mustafa Kamal, 11 June 2003.

[21]Sidiq, *KAMMI dan Pergulatan Reformasi,* 2003, 71.

Kegiatan Mahasiswa, UKM) and it was therefore allocated funding by the university. As an officially recognised student body, LDK was used by *dakwah* activists to carry out regular recruitment campaigns among incoming students.[22]

Since the early 1990s, the Tarbiyah movement expanded rapidly and began to grow in influence throughout Student Senates (SM, Senat Mahasiswa) in secular state universities. Rama Pratama, a PKS legislator who was a the chairman of the University of Indonesia's (UI) student senate in 1997, for example, was one of leading figures among *dakwah* activists. Zulkieflimansyah, who is currently a PKS legislator, was also elected as the head of UI's Student Senate in 1994. Kamaruddin, former head of the mosque at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, UI, won the student election in 1995 followed by Selamat Nurdin, another influential figure of *dakwah* movement from FISIP UI, who was elected in 1996. The straight victories of *dakwah* activists in securing student senate positions both at the faculty and university level at UI have inspired their colleagues in other prestigious universities, such as ITB, IPB, and UGM to take over the student senates on their own campuses.

Finally, notable among Tarbiyah's organisational strengths was its close connections to the Islamic student group KAMMI. Utilising the tenth annual meeting of FSLDK in 1998, some LDK activists announced the birth of KAMMI. The formation of KAMMI signaled that Tarbiyah was beginning gradually to expand its networks with campus *dakwah* groups, allowing its activists to take to

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[22]Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan*, 2002, pp. 129-131.

the streets and call for regime change following the 1997 economic crisis. The significant role of KAMMI in the *reformasi* struggle, which helped to bring about Suharto's downfall, marked the beginning of Tarbiyah's use of more visible and formal networks and institutions in the pursuit of its political and social goals.

5.3. The PKS' Centralised Federal Structure and Leadership

As noted earlier, the fall of Suharto gave the Tarbiyah movement an opportunity to transform itself into a political party. PK, which then metamorphosed into PKS, was seen as a formal organisation of Tarbiyah.[23] Prior to establishing PK, Tarbiyah cadres were responsible for all recruitment and training activities. Since the formation of PK, all Tarbiyah members automatically became PK members and all religious circles and training activities were taken over by PK.[24] In an attempt to accommodate leaders of Tarbiyah, PK set up a peak body called the Majelis Syuro or Consultative Council, which determined all strategic decisions within the party.[25]

There are many examples which point to the complexities inherent in the transformation from Tarbiyah, an informal movement, to PK, a formalised political party. The complexities emerged immediately after the party set up its organisational structures. In general, Tarbiyah resembled an *isolated* SMO, which had no branches and relied heavily on direct contact between its members, which

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[23]Machmudi, *Islamising Indonesia,* 2006.
[24]Interview, Yon Machmudi, Jakarta, 21 August 2007.
[25]Ibid.

was understandable during the repressive Suharto period when the regime silenced political Islam. In contrast to Tarbiyah, the leadership of PK in the post-Suharto era resembled what McCarthy and Zald have called a "federated structure," which provides local branches whose contact with constituents can be facilitated by the party's local units or direct communication.[26] In terms of decentralisation and autonomy, federated structures can be divided into three modes: the loosely coupled network structure,[27] the pyramid structure,[28] and the centralised structure.[29]

In the case of PK, now PKS, the organisational model of the party is a centralised federal and national institution. There is a Central Executive Board (*Dewan Pimpinan Pusat*, DPP), which coordinates all local branches from the Province-Level Executive board (DPW, Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah), the District-Level Executive Board (DPD, Dewan Pimpinan Daerah), the Sub-District-Level Executive Board (DPC, Dewan Pimpinan Cabang) to the lowest level of the PKS structure, that operates at the village level, called Dewan Pimpinan Ranting (DPRa). The DPP is ultimately responsible but administratively hierarchical up to

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[26]John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource Mobilisation," 1987. See also, Klandermans, *The Social Psychology*, 1997, pp. 122-124.

[27]This loosely coupled network structure was initially described by Gerlach and Hine. They said that the features of the structure are the following: (1) segmentation, that is a multitudes of different groups and organisations with different groups and organisations with different goals and ideologies; (2) a polycephalous structure, that is, a structure with several leaders and no single leader controls the whole movement; and (3) a reticulate structure, an availability of networks of bonds and linkages which connect other groups or organisation. See Klandermans' description of Gerlach and Hine account in *The Social Psychology*, 1997, p. 123

[28]Meanwhile the pyramid structure was introduced by Lawson (1983), in which interaction with the local branches usually takes the forms of top-down approach. See, Klandermans, *The Social Psychology,* 1997, p. 123.

[29]Ibid.

each level. The DPP's main task is to manage and coordinate all activities within the party.

The DPP is currently led by Tifatul Sembiring, who graduated from a university in Pakistan. The formal composition of DPP is a president, a deputy president, department heads, secretary general and treasurer. There are over 100 members on the full DPP. According to the statutes of PKS, the DPP is at the same level as the Central Shari'a Supervisory Council (DPS, Dewan Pengawas Shari'a) whose duty is to control party policies based on the rules and principles of *shari'a* and the advisory council (MPP, Majelis Pertimbangan Partai) whose task is to provide some degree of consultation with top members of DPP both formally, in regular MPP and DPP meetings, and informally (see, Figure 3).

Figure 3

PKS' Organisational Structure and Decision-Making Process[30]

Hierarchically, however, the DPP, MPP and DPS are subordinate to the most powerful body, the Majelis Syuro. According to PKS statutes, the Majelis

[30] Yudi Latif, Aay Muhammad Furkon and Edwin Arifin, *Studi Monografi Partai Politik: Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, The Reform Institute, Jakarta, 2005.

has undisputable power to select the party's president (who then becomes the chief executive of the DPP), to legalise the composition of the advisory council (MPP), to select the daily board of the Central Sharia Supervisory Body (DPS), to determine party policy and strategic issues and the like.[31] This supreme council is chaired by Madinah University graduate K.H Hilmi Aminuddin, PKS' chief ideologue. It is made up of nearly 100 representatives, which serves, according to the Council member Aan Rohanah, like a senate/congress.[32] Representatives of the council are chosen by the highest levels of cadre called *kader inti* or core cadres[33] to "represent the interest of members in local areas and ensure their voice is heard at the national level."[34] However, Zulkieflimansyah and Rohanah's accounts fail to acknowledge the fact that not all of the representatives of the Council are elected by PKS members. Among the Council's 99 members, nearly half of them are chosen by the members-elect in order to represent (1) various provinces;[35] (2) expertise and professionalism;[36] and (3) cadreisation levels or *tarbawi*.[37]

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[31]Anggaran Dasar dan Rumah Tangga PKS, available at http://www.pk-sejahtera.org.

[32] Interview, Aan Rohanah, Jakarta, 4 October 2007.

[33]As noted earlier, PKS members are trained through a series of six levels ending with *takhassus*, holders of special expertise in *dakwah*. The four highest levels are called *kader inti*, core cadres who have the right to vote for the Majelis Syuro representatives.

[34]Zulkieflimansyah, "Understanding PKS as Living Entity within Indonesia's Democratic Space," in *The Jakarta Post*, 10 August 2007. See also, Sapto Waluyo, *Pilihan Sulit PK Sejahtera*, 2004, available at http://pk-sejahtera.org/article.php?storyid=2644.

[35]As noted earlier, PKS members must have passed through a series of six levels ending with *takhassus*, holders of special expertise in *dakwah.* The four highest levels called core cadres are granted opportunities to vote for the Council. Unfortunately, some provinces do not have enough core cadres so that they cannot elect their own representatives in the Council. Accordingly, in order to represent them, the elect-members of the Council select their representatives.

[36]Accordingly, the Council is not made up of only conservative *ulama* (Islamic scholars), but some of the Council members also come from non-*ulama* background such as nuclear expert, lobbyist, and so on.

[37]Latif, Furkon and Arifin, *Studi Monografi Partai Politik*, 2005.

Another driving factor to the development of PKS' organisational structures and its leadership is a rapid increase in party branches throughout Indonesia. PKS has now opened provincial-level branches (DPW) in all provinces in Indonesia. Furthermore, figure 5 shows that in 2004 PKS succeeded in establishing district (*kabupaten*) or municipality (*kotamadya*) level branches (DPD) across the entire country (100%). Meanwhile, the party has sub-district (*kecamatan*) level branches (DPC) in 65% of 4300 of sub-districts in Indonesia (see in details in Figure 6). Interestingly, PKS also operates at the lowest level of government, that is, at village levels (*desa* or *kelurahan*) by forming village-level branches called Dewan Pimpinan Ranting (DPRa).

Figure 4

The Growth of PKS Branches at the District and Sub-district Levels[38]

More so than most other parties, PKS exploited the removal of Suharto's floating mass policy,[39] which limited party activities to the level of district and

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[38]Ibid.

municipalities (i.e., no party branches were permitted to operate at sub-district and village levels), by establishing party branches from the central to the lowest level. The ability of PKS to set up local party units nation-wide shows that it began gradually to expand its organisational structures and networks in order to attract new voters other than PKS traditional voters. In the run-up to the 1999 elections, PKS' predecessor, PK was widely perceived to be an exclusive party of urban people, most notably urban educated youth and pious middle class Muslims, and was unable to form local party units in many rural areas. Unsurprisingly, PK failed to garner more than 2% of the popular vote in that election.

The rapid rise of PKS' organisational structures was one of the key factors in the good performance of the party in the 2004 elections. The PKS general-secretary Anis Matta claimed that the party successfully increased their votes in 2004 in sub-districts or villages where new PKS branches had been found.[40] It is worth noting that PKS' branches at sub-district and village levels were still limited so that the party's main support in the 2004 elections came largely from urban areas, where the lower middle class and urban poor are numerous. Accordingly, in the run-up to the 2009 elections, Matta predicted that PKS sub-district level

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[39]Suharto argued that the political parties were always trying to gain mass support for the sake of their own political interests. Likewise, the presence of party conflicts in the past had harmed village people. The issuance of Article Mo. 10 of Law No. 3 had clearly intended to limit the scope of political parties' activities. Ironically, the ruling party Golkar was exempted from this limitation so that they could reach all the village people day-to-day activities. See, Muhammad Ryaas Rasyid, "State Formation, Party System and the Prospect for Democracy in Indonesia: The Case of Golongan Karya (1967-1993)," Ph.D. Dissertation at Hawaii University, 1994.

[40]Anis Matta, *Integrasi Politik dan Dakwah*, Sekjen Bidang Arsip dan Sejarah and Arah Press, Jakarta, 2008, p. 7.

branches would be 100% up from 65% in 2004 and the party's village-level units would be 75% from the total number of villages in Indonesia.[41]

Figure 5

The Correlation between Party Branches and Increasing Votes in 2004[42]

DAKWAH AREAS[43]	**SUB-DISTRICT**	**DPC**	**PERCENT (%)**	**VOTES**	**SEAT**
Dakwah Areas I	1554	1009	65		
NAD	237	146	62	192,469	2
North Sumatra	352	234	66	427,724	2
West Sumatra	161	149	93	236,858	2
Riau	126	89	71	135,903	1
Riau Islands	42	25	60	61,565	-
Jambi	82	70	85	68,846	1
Bengkulu	69	32	46	61,906	-
South Sumatra	149	132	89	204,870	1
Bangka Belitung	163	35	21	26,619	-
Lampung	173	97	56	290,796	2
Dakwah Areas 2	1278	818	86		
DKI Jakarta	51	44	86	1,057,246	5
West Java	583	434	74	2,369,231	13
Banten	131	131	100	520,202	3
West Kalimantan	150	57	38	66,608	-
South Kalimantan	133	75	56	166,847	1
Central Kalimantan	103	1	1	25,137	-
East Kalimantan	127	76	60	129,819	1
Dakwah Areas 3	1645	1039	63		
Central Java	596	466	78	839,356	3

[41]Ibid.

[42]This data is my own analysis based on various sources including Pemi Apriyanto, *Database Pemilu 2004, Peta Daerah Pemilihan, Perolehan Suara dan Kursi untuk DPR RI, DPRD Propinsi dan DPRD Kabupaten/Kota se-Indonesia*, Spirit Research and Database, Jakarta, 2007 and Latif, Furkon and Arifin, *Studi Monografi Partai Politik*, 2005.

[43]In order to organise and generate votes across Indonesia, PKS has divided the archipelago into four *dakwah* territories or areas called "wilayah dakwah."

DI Yogyakarta	84	78	93	141,114	1
South Sulawesi	316	196	62	146,594	1
Southeast Sulawesi	123	77	63	39,397	-
Central Sulawesi	89	32	36	42,768	-
North Sulawesi	111	44	40	18,939	-
Gorontalo	43	24	56	16,184	-
Maluku	60	29	48	47,947	1
North Maluku	55	43	78	43,772	1
Papua	168	50	30	21,872	-
West Irian Jaya				8,130	-
Dakwah Areas 4	1053	746	71		
East Java	681	593	87	608,810	2
Bali	62	22	35	18,837	-
West Nusa Tenggara	102	82	80	111,471	1
East Nusa Tenggara	208	49	24	19,827	-

As a newly established party, the fact that PKS expanded to open offices in the sub-districts and villages is viewed by many as a remarkable achievement. Unlike New Order parties i.e. Golkar, PPP and PDI-P[44] which took advantage of a government decision permitting them to keep their existing assets and party offices,[45] PKS had to build up its branch structures from scratch, using relatively new personnel and infrastructures. Other new parties, such as PKB and PAN

[44]Since Megawati, now the chairwoman of PDI-P, was ousted by Suharto from the leadership of the regime-endorsed PDI, PDI-P then relied on her former PDI loyalist and cadres. Coincidentally, most of PDI cadres backed Megawati and her new party PDI-P, thereby enabling PDI-P to benefit from their cadres and resources to build up new infrastructure.

[45]It is worth noting that among New Order parties, Golkar is the only party that could operate its political machine below the district level. PPP and PDI had been barred from any political activity in the sub-district and village levels. At this point, PPP and PDI-P also experienced financial challenges to expand their infrastructure to sub-district and village levels.

profited from close ties and associations with large social-religious organisations something which PKS lacked.[46]

PKS is the only party that emerged after the fall of Suharto without much of the historical legacy carried by PKB, PAN, and PBB. Additionally, unlike Golkar, PPP, and, to a certain extent, PDI-P, PKS was not burdened by identification with Suharto's New Order. The aim behind PK/PKS, according to Mutammimul Ula, was to 'start from nil; a radical beginning.'[47] Indeed PKS profited greatly from preexisting networks of the campus-based religious movement Tarbiyah. However, the secretive nature of Tarbiyah during Suharto period and its lack of assets and infrastructure relative to NU and Muhammadiyah, mean that it was less able to give PK a flying start.[48]

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[46]PKB's nomination came from a team established by the national leadership of the traditionalist Muslim organisation, NU. To some extent, PKB can be seen as the revival of an earlier political party, the NU. Similarly, despite PAN styling itself as a pluralist party, it benefited from its close links to the largest Modernist Muslim organisation, Muhammadiyah. In addition, among Islamic political parties that tried to revive Masyumi, PBB is the largest and is officially supported by ex-leaders of Masyumi within DDII. See, Platzdasch, "Religious Dogma," 2005. See also, Greg Fealy and Bernhard Platdasch, "The Masyumi Legacy: Between Islamist Idealism and Political Exigency," in *Studia Islamika*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2005.

[47]Cited from Platzdasch, "Religious Dogma," 2005, p. 98.

[48]Recently, there has been a growing tension between PKS and Islamic mass-organisations, Muhammadiyah and NU. The two accused PKS of infiltrating their institutions such as mosques, schools, universities, hospitals, charities and so on for the party's political self-interests. In the perspective of resource mobilisation theories, such accusation shows the appearance of 'competition' to seize religious and social institutions. Muhammadiyah, for instance, is well-known as the century-old, 30 million-strong Islamic organisation with its immense network of social services. The chairman of Muhammadiyah Prof. Din Syamsuddin even issued a decree in 2007 distancing the organisation, its cadres and resources from "parties of any kind whose primary goal is the acquisition of political power for themselves." The decree was believed to counter the PKS penetration to Muhammadiyah. See, Bret Stephens, "The Exorcist: An Indonesian Man Seeks "to Create an Islam that will Make People Smile," in *The Wall Street Journal*, April 10, 2007, available at http://opinionjournal.com/columnists/bstephens/?id=110009922.

5.4. The Network Expansion and Organisational Growth of PKS

In order to expand its social services and organisational capacities, PKS has created numerous institutions under the coordination of its central board (DPP). There are at least five departments in the DPP. The department of cadreisation, whose main programs are related to recruitment, training, *dakwah* activities, sport and youth, holds responsibility for coordinating and managing such PKS-affiliated organisations as the Justice Guard (Garda Keadilan), the youth organisation Gema Keadilan, the Indonesian Muslim Senior and Junior High School Students' Action Union (KAPMI, Kesatuan Pelajar Muslim Indonesia (KAPMI),[49] the Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union (KAMMI, Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia),[50] the Asia-Pacific Student and Youth Foundation (YPPAP, Yayasan Pemuda dan Pelajar Asia Pasifik), and the Mission Group for School Predication (GTDS, Gugus Tugas Dakwah Sekolah).[51]

The department of public policy, whose sub-divisions include politics and defense, law and human rights, art and culture and communication and networks, supervises PKS affiliated think-thanks and strategic institutions such as the Center for Indonesian Reform (CIR),[52] the Indonesian Advocacy Center for Law and Human Rights (PAHAM, Pusat Advokasi Hukum dan Hak Azasi Manusia),[53] the

[49]For more information of KAPMI, visit these links http://kapmi.tripod.com/ and kapmijakarta.blogsome.com/

[50]For more information about KAMMI, see its official website http://www.kammi.or.id

[51]Latif, Furkon and Arifin, *Studi Monografi Partai Politik*, 2005.

[52]For a detailed description of CIR, visit its official website http://www.cir.or.id/

[53]PAHAM was formed in May 1999. The organisation's goal is "justice for all." It promotes social justice by providing advocacy programs to educate and empower people regarding their rights. Despite PAHAM shares an argument that human rights are universal, but it maintains

Institute for Economics Studies (INFES), the Institute of Student and Youth for Democracy (INSYD) and Yayasan Pengembangan Sumber Daya Pemuda (CYFIS).[54]

Meanwhile the department of planning and human resource development, whose primary task is to manage a number of programs related to education, health, science and environment, formed the Indonesian Society of Scientists (MITI, Masyarakat Ilmuwan dan Teknologi Indonesia) in 2004.[55] This department also extended its activities to include a variety of private voluntary organisations such as charities, schools, medical clinics and day care centers. Notable among these is the Network of Integrated Islamic Schools (JSIT, Jaringan Sekolah Islam Terpadu) which organizes hundreds of Integrated Islamic Primary Schools (SDIT, Sekolah Dasar Islam Terpadu, SDIT) throughout Indonesia. Also, through the establishment of the Islamic Medical Association and Network Indonesia (IMANI) in 2002 PKS cadres seek to provide social welfare services to larger society.

In addition, the department of economic empowerment has endeavored to develop the PKS-affiliated labor union Serikat Pekerja Keadilan (SPK), the Indonesian Shari'a-based Small Cooperation (KOSINDO), and the like. PKS also has links to a number of professional and sectoral associations such as the Network of Indonesian Muslim Entrepreneurs (JPMI, Jaringan Pengusaha Muslim

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Islam as its foundational ideology. See, Ann Marie Murphy, "The Role of Professional Organisations in Indonesia's Socio-Political Transformation," in *NBR Analysis,* Vol. 18, No. 3, March 2008, available at www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/pdf/vol18no3.pdf

[54]Ibid.

[55]Ibid

Indonesia),[56] the Indonesian Labor Foundation (ILF) and the Indonesian Association of Prosperous Farmers and Fisherman (PPNSI, Perhimpunan Petani Nelayan Sejahtera Indonesia).[57] The Department of Women is responsible for supervising the Women's Association (Salimah, Persaudaraan Muslimah)[58] and the Women's Group for Justice (Pos Wanita Keadilan). PKS has also extended its activities to include social work and charities, including efforts to help the victims of natural disasters across Indonesia by establishing social organisations such as the National Humanitarian Foundation Pos Keadilan Peduli Umat (PKPU),[59] the Ummul Qura Social Fund (DSUQ, Dompet Sosial Ummul Qura) and the Indonesian Red Crescent (BSMI, Bulan Sabit Merah Indonesia)[60] that engage in collecting donations from both internal and external contributors. These organisations are under the supervision and coordination of the treasurer.[61]

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[56]The main aim of this professional association is 'to enhance the skills and capacity of Muslim entrepreneurs through seminars, provision of credit via the organisation's networks in the sharia banking system, and assistance in securing government contracts." Like other Islamic professional associations, Islam is the sole ideology of JPMI. See, Murphy, "The Role of Professional Organisations," 2008. For more information about this, visit JPMI's official website, www.jpmi.or.id/

[57]Ibid.

[58]For a detailed information of the Salimah, visit its official website http://www.salimah.or.id/

[59]PKPU was established in response to the multi-dimensional crises that hit Indonesia in 1997. It is a non-profit institution whose main program is to provide a relief to the social problems of the poor (*dhu'afa*). For more information of PKPU, visit its official website http://www.pkpu.or.id/homes.php

[60]BSMI was established by Muslim medical professionals in response to a perception that the Muslim victims of the conflict in Maluku were not receiving the same access to medical care as Christian victims. BSMI claims no formal relationship to PKS, but the former president of PKS Hidayat Nur Wahid sits on the organisation's steering committee. See, Murphy, "The Role of Professional Organisations," 2008. For a detailed description of BSMI, visit this link www.bsmipusat.net/

[61]Ibid

It is true that other major political parties in Indonesia have similar bodies. In terms of women's divisions or women's affiliated organisations, for example, PPP has the United Women (Wanita Persatuan); PAN has the Women's National Mandate (Perempuan Amanat Nasional, PUAN). Other parties are catching up with the mobilisation of youth and students too. Golkar Party, for example, has the Multipurpose Cooperative of Mutual Assistance (Kosgoro) whose main supporters are youth. However, most other organisations affiliated with political parties do not function well. Unlike PKS-affiliated associations which actively engage in all year-round activities, other political parties' bodies mostly only engage with their constituents during election time. This is largely because PKS is unusual parties whose cadres are ideologically motivated people and are required to rise through a series of intensive trainings. In short, PKS relies heavily on its highly motivated cadres to run the party's bodies.

Undoubtedly, the aforementioned extensive networks linked to PKS demonstrate the proliferation of Islamic professional associations. Indeed, they are not all professional associations nor are they —borrowing Clark's term— "Islamic social institutions (ISIs)." In terms of the emergence of PKS' professional associations, it can be seen as a result of higher rates of Muslim participation in tertiary education since the 1970s. As noted in Chapter 4, the Suharto's regime's tremendous economic achievement had allowed Muslim students to enjoy university education, most of who were involved in the campus *dakwah* movement since the growing interest in Islamic studies and practices in the late 1970s. After

graduating from university, "[they] move into profession and professional associations in which they were previously underrepresented relative to the numbers of Muslims in society."[62] They use such associations as vehicles for maintaining their spirit of *dakwah*, as well as advancing their own distinctive piety and professionalism.[63]

From the perspective of resource mobilisation, these Islamic professional associations alongside PKS-affiliated organisations have played an important role as "webs or networks of linkages, institutional or personal, in which their associated institutions are embedded."[64] In the vocabulary of PKS, such groups are called "*wajihah*" (literally means 'cover'). Within this network of institutions, professional and non-professional associations linked to PKS have been particularly successful, providing social and medical services to many people. Through its ideologically motivated cadres, PKS has also run schools called SDIT as well as provided financial aid through small cooperatives (*koperasi*). Indeed, other parties occasionally provide relief to victims of natural disasters. Unlike PKS, however, their assistance is temporary and non-institutionalised.

By providing social services, PKS appears to be in stark contrast to other political parties by proving that the party's social concern is backed up by grassroots-based regular activities. More significantly, these PKS-affiliated organisations and professional associations have served as a tool of recruitment.

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[62]Robert W. Hefner, "Introduction: Civic Platforms or Radical Springboards," in in NBR Analysis Vol. 18, No. 3, March 2008, available at www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/pdf/vol18no3.pdf

[63]Interview, Mahfudz Sidiq, Jakarta, 28 September 2007.

[64]Janine Clark, "Social Movement Theory," 2004, p. 942.

The hope is that the disenfranchised poor who utilise social welfare services provided by Islamic social institutions linked to PKS could be mobilised to become its new cadres.

5.5. The PKS Recruitment of Cadres and Its Process of Cadreisation

Aside from the growth of PKS organisational structures and its affiliated institutions, the rise of PKS in the 2004 elections can also be explained by the expansion of its membership. After the modest performance of the party in 1999, when there were only 5,000 core cadres and 42,000 cadres in total, its leadership set the target of expanding to 800,000 total cadres by 2004. The hope was that each cadre would attract five to ten new voters per-week prior to the election.[65] In 2004, PKS had only 500,000 active cadres, but it received approximately 8.3 million votes in that election, a significant increase from 1.4% of the popular votes in 1999.[66] In the 2009 elections, the secretary-general of PKS, Anis Matta aimed to expand PKS' total cadres to two million.[67]

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[65]Al-Muzammil Yusuf, *Isu Besar Dakwah dalam Pemilu*, PT Syaamil Cipta Media, 2003, p. 41.

[66]Tifatul Sembiring, "Berpolitik Itu Indah," *Republika*, 17 October 2004. Tifatul explores the growth of PKS cadres in more detail in Tifatul Sembiring, *Dakwah adalah Perubahan ke Arah yang Lebih Baik*, Arah Press and DPP PKS, Jakarta, 2008. In other pieces, however, Anis Matta claimed that PKS had only 400,000 cadres in 2004. See, Matta, *Integrasi Politik*, 2008, p. 6.

[67]According to Anis Matta and Zulkieflimansyah, however, the remarkable success of PKS in 2004 had more to do with the party's massive campaign on clean and caring government than with mobilisation by their cadres. The two influential leaders were interviewed by William Liddle as quoted in Liddle and Mujani, "Islamist Parties and Democracy: The Indonesian Case." Interestingly, Anis Matta, in other occasions, does not downplay the role of cadres in the rise of PKS in 2004 and repeatedly stated that the party should increase the total number of cadres in the next elections in order to generate votes. See, Matta, *Integrasi Politik*, 2008, p. 6.

To this end, like Tarbiyah on which it is based, PKS employs two mechanisms of recruiting new participants.[68] The first is the individual pattern of recruitment (*al-da'wah al-fardhiyyah*), the person-to-person form of outreach, which involves direct personal contact. Rather than approach a stranger, this mechanism begins by persuading potential recruits among families, friends, and neighbours. In other words, PKS recruitment is built on preexisting relationships while at the same time enhancing a new kind of solidarity based on shared beliefs, strong commitment and loyalty.[69]

Those potential recruits will be encouraged to participate in the bulk of religious circles and training organised by PKS such as *usrah* (family) or *halaqah* (small study group) or *liqa* (weekly meeting), *rihlah* (recreation), *mukhayyam* (camping expeditions), *daurah* (intellectual training and Islamic workshops), *nadwah* (seminars) and the like. The hope is that each new participant will know (*ta'aruf*), understand (*tafahum*) and support (*tafaul*) each other.[70] Given that these organised activities are conducted regularly, it is also hoped that new participants can be directed towards shared values and meaning.

The second is the institutional pattern of recruitment (*al-da'wah al-'amma*). There are various institutional forms of outreach involving PKS organisational structures, PKS-affiliated organisations as well as benefiting from religious institutions i.e. mosques as well as educational institutions i.e. schools

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[68]As noted earlier, after the birth of PK, all *Tarbiyah's* religious training and recruitment activities were carried out by the party structures.

[69]For elements of comparison, notably in the case of Egyptian Islamist movements, see Wickham, *Mobilising Islam*, 2002, pp. 130-131.

[70] Hassan al-Banna, *Usrah dan Dakwah,* Ikhwan Agency, Kuala Lumpur, 1979, p. 4.

and universities. As a political party, PKS' involvement in the national and local governments has become a new form of recruitment. It decided to engage with the governing coalition led by President Yudhoyono, and had three of its nominees in the thirty-four member cabinet. Zulkieflimansyah admitted that these posts like agriculture, youth and sports and public housing are important to expand the party's networks to rural areas.[71] PKS has also participated in many gubernatorial and district/municipality executive elections.

Above all, the aforementioned forms of cadre recruitment in PKS can be divided into two categories in terms of political objectives.[72] The first is aimed at mobilising as many new members as possible, regardless of their ethnicity, race or gender, to be PKS members, sympathisers or volunteers in all political activities and social activities organised by the party. This mechanism of cadre recruitment is clearly a matter of numbers given the nature of PKS as a political party, which focuses largely on numbers, is clearly to increase PKS' popular support in society.

The second is aimed at enlisting potential cadres in selective ways. Having proclaimed itself to be a cadre party which sets strict standards of recruitment, PKS requires its cadres to rise through a series of intensive trainings. These trainings are comprised of hierarchical levels (*marhalah*), which consist of the learning process (*ta'lim*), organisational skills (*tandzim*), character development

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[71]Zulkieflimansyah, USINDO Open Forum: Prospects for the Justice and Prosperity Party (PKS) and Political Islam, Washington D.C., June 8, 2006.

[72]Interview, Al-Muzammil Yusuf, as cited by Latif, Furkon and Arifin, *Studi Monografi Partai Politik*, 2005.

and internalisation of Islamic tenets (*taqwin*) and evaluation (*taqwim*).[73] In sum, the process of cadreisation, which determines the hierarchical levels of cadres within PKS, can be divided into six levels. As noted earlier, PKS members are trained through a series of six levels ending with *takhssus*, holders of special expertise in *dakwah*.

Figure 6

The Cadreisation System of PKS

TYPE	SUB-TYPE	DEFINITION AND LADDER OF CADREISATION	REGISTRATION
Tamhidi Cadres(Be-ginners)	Registered Beginners (Terdaftar)	These newly recruited cadres have just completed the first training for the party orientation (TOP, *Training Orientasi Partai* 1).	Tamhidi Cadres are usually registered in the list of members at the sub-district level branches (DPC)
	Cultivated Beginners (Terbina)	The second category of the beginners has completed TOP 1 and 2. They are also required to attend cadres' regular meeting (TRK, *Taklim Rutin Kader*). If they pass through this level, they will be granted a certificate called SKAP/KTAP (*Surat Kelulusan Anggota Pemula/Kartu Tanda Anggota Pemula*) in order to rise to the next training called Basic Training (TD, Training Dasar 1).	
Muayyid Cadres (Young)		Those who completed TD 1 and have been recommended by their *murabbi* (instructor) to be Muayyid Cadres. Besides attending TRK and participating in PKS activities, they are also required to take KISP1 (*Kajian Ilmu Sosial Politik* or Course for	These cadres are recorded in the lists of members at the district level branches (DPD)

[73]Djony Edward, *Efek Bola Salju Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, Harakatuna Publishing, Bandung, 2006, p. 18.

		Social and Political Sciences).	
Muntasib Cadres (Medium)		Cadres in this level are attending training and religious circles as the muayyid, but the content and intensity of trainings are more advanced. They are required to pass through Advance Training (TL, *Training Lanjutan* 1)	These cadres are enlisted at the district level branches (DPD)
Muntazim Cadres (Adult)		Cadres in this level are attending training and religious circles as the *muntasib*, but they are also required to pass through TL 2. Their *murabbi* have a right to recommend them to rise to the next level.	These cadres are recorded in the Provincial level branches (DPW)
Amil Cadres (Specialist)		These cadres have completed all required trainings and are attending the training at the specialist level. These cadres have the right to hold high and strategic positions in the party.	These cadres are documented and registered by the Central Executive Board (DPP)
Takhassus Cadres (Post)		This is the highest level of trainings holding special expertise in *dakwah*, completing the *ahli* trainings.	These cadres are registered by the Central Executive Board (DPP)
Honorary Cadres (Kehorma-tan)		Those, who are regarded as being meritorious, have rendered a service and deserve to be honoured by the party. They are not required to pass through these series of training.	MPP has a right to decide those who are eligible to be honourary cadres.

The multilayered process of cadreisation reveals that PKS employs the organisational model of Islamism "based on intense cohesion, persuasive guidance and conformity which together creates unanimity."[74] In order to sustain a code of belief and to create strong identification among cadres, they need to take an oath of

[74]Platzdasch, "Religious Dogma," 2005, pp. 50-51.

allegiance (*baiat*).[75] Likewise, the party's cadreisation and its membership ladder are hierarchical systems. As can be seen in figure 6, the four highest levels, i.e., *takhassus* (post), *amil* (specialist), *muntazim* (adult), and *muntasib* (medium), are called *kader inti* or core cadres who enjoy the right to vote for the representatives of Majelis Syuro. In addition, they have the right to hold strategic positions in the national leadership of PKS.

Further, such cadreisation processes demand obedience from members to the command of the party's elite. The President of PKS, Tifatul Sembiring, says:

> The enjoyment of being a party cadre will not exist without loyalty, the enjoyment of loyalty will not exist without obedience, the enjoyment of obedience will not exist without sacrifice, and the enjoyment of sacrifice will not exist without sincerity (*keikhlasan*).[76]

Another influential figure, Zulkieflimansyah, stated cheerfully that the cadreisation system of PKS has very much in common with "a communist party with Islamic ideology.'[77] It is clear that PKS has put weight on the issue of cadreisation and it strongly believes that its religious and political ideals cannot be realised without the systematic formation of devoted cadres and campaigners.

In addition to being the only cadre party in Indonesia, PKS members are also different in terms of their demographic backgrounds. PKS has attracted many talented Muslims in the country. They are usually young and better educated than other political party members. Some of them have advanced degrees from foreign

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[75]Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan*, 2002, p. 11.

[76]Nurhasan Zaidi, "Resepsi PKS," *Republika*, 30 July 2005. This excerpt is not my translation. I cite from Firman Noor, "Moderate Islamic Fundamentalism," 2007.

[77]Zulkieflimansyah, *USINDO Open Forum: Prospects for the Justice and Prosperity Party (PKS) and Political Islam*, Washington D.C., June 8, 2006.

universities, particularly from the U.S., England, Australia, Germany, and Japan. PKS has also particularly found acceptance in urban areas. Many are graduates from Indonesia's top secular universities such as UI, ITB, and UGM. Most of their qualifications are in the medical and natural sciences. It comes as no surprise then that PKS members seem to be technologically savvy, often communicating and disseminating their views on audiocassettes, videotapes, email and web pages.

One should note that PKS members have tried to improve the 'quality' of individuals in terms of moral rectitude and behaviour. In Indonesia where people smoke everywhere, it is almost impossible to find a cadre of the party who smokes. PKS cadres strive to follow closely Islamic norms and practices by appearing strictly Islamic in terms of wearing Islamic attire and eating *halal* food (lawful food according to Islamic beliefs). In a country where most women do not cover their heads, it is difficult to find a female PKS cadre without a *jilbab* (veil). Meanwhile its male members usually wear *baju koko*. In connection with the *halal* issue, PKS members would prefer to take the option of eating food with label *halal* on it and scrutinising the ingredients. In addition, PKS members frequently use Arabic words in their daily conversation such as *ikhwan* (brothers), *akhwat* (sisters), *siyasah* (politics), *hizb* (party), *ma'isyah* (income), and so on.

5.6. The Political Financing of PKS

Social movement organisations require financial resources in order to achieve the movements' long and short-term objectives. As a social movement which actively mobilises its supporters onto the streets, PKS faces financial challenges to meet the needs of transporting its protesters to the site of demonstrations, producing leaflets, logistics, and the like. Similarly, as a newly established party, PKS is experiencing a heavy financial burden due to its lack of business networks while at the same time it must cover the routine costs of political party activity such as an increase in the operational expenses, expenditures for electoral campaigning and constituency mobilisation and the like.[78] Additionally, the nature of election campaign in Indonesia has been changed by the increasing role of the media in political campaigning through expensive advertisements.[79] Also, political parties must now spend more money on opinion pollsters and political consultants, most of whom are professionals who have only a loose emotional relationship to their employers.[80]

The argument offered by some PKS leaders that the party relies primarily on the financial support of individual cadres through various mechanisms of

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[78]Hidayat Nurwahid and Zulkieflimansyah, "Piety and Pragmatism Trends in Indonesian Islamic Politics," *Asia Program Special Report*, April, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2003.

[79]The increasing expenditures for electronic and print media advertisement can clearly be seen in the 2004 elections, which made up at least 30 percent of the total campaign costs. Marcus Mietzner, "Party Financing in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Between State Subsidies and Political Corruption," in *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, August 2007, 29, 2. p. 253.

[80]Ibid.

Islamic philanthropy is implausible.[81] Machmudi, for instance, said that "most of the political activities are self-funded through professional arrangements of religious charities. Members of the party are obliged to pay religious dues, *zakat* (alms), *infaq* (gift for specific purposes), and *shadaqah* (charitable gifts)."[82] However, he does not supply the claims with sufficient data. Basic questions about how these arrangements are carried out and how much money is collected from these internal donations remain unanswered.

The head of a PKS faction in parliament, Mahfudz Sidiq, describes in some detail how PKS has collected funds.[83] In spite of internal contributions, PKS relies financially on several mechanisms. First, PKS instructs its cadres who hold parliamentary seats in national, provincial, and district levels to pay contributions to the party. Anis Matta reveals that PKS has asked for 50 to 60 per cent of its parliamentarians' salaries.[84] Furthermore PKS MPs are increasingly required to help pay for the party functions as well as satisfying financial demands from their constituencies which eventually reduces their take-home salary even further.[85] Second, PKS is attempting to advance a spirit of entrepreneurship among cadres.[86] The hope is that such attempts will encourage them to be wealthy entrepreneurs who are maximally attached to PKS and will use their financial benefits to cover the party's routine costs.

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[81]For example, Machmudi, *Islamising Indonesia,* 2006; Interview, Khairuddin, Jakarta,

[82]Machmudi, *Islamising Indonesia,* 2006.

[83]Interview, Mahfudz Sidiq, Jakarta, 28 September 2007.

[84]Matta, *Integrasi Politik*, 2008, p

[85]Interview, Mahfudz Sidiq, Jakarta, 28 September 2007.

[86]Ibid.

Third, PKS has also been open to external contributions from companies and individuals who share religious and political ideals with the party.[87] In fact, however, 'most donors have clearly defined political and economic interests and they expect the party and its politicians to take those interests into consideration if elected to public office."[88] PKS leaders repeatedly claim that their party does not accept funds from corrupt donors and keeps distanced from politically and economically interested sponsors.[89] The party's reluctance to engage in corruption limits its funding. In practice, however, PKS has drawn criticism. The most controversial of these was the nomination of Tamsil Linrung as the PKS legislative candidate, despite his bad reputation for financial mismanagement.

This clearly indicates that, as a new party, PKS is still struggling to expand its business networks and access to wealthy entrepreneurs. In Indonesian politics, in fact, entrepreneurs and large corporations make up important sources of income for most parties.[90] According to the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) which conducted a series of seven polls since the April 2004 election, the lack of PKS' resource mobilisation, notably financial income, has partly contributed to the declining support for the party.[91]

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[87]Ibid.

[88]Mietzner, "Party Financing," 2007, p. 240.

[89]Hidayat Nurwahid and Zulkieflimansyah, "Piety and Pragmatism," 2003.

[90]Ibrahim Fahmy Badoh, "Manipulasi Dana Kampanye dan Politik Uang Pemilu. Deskripsi dan Evaluasi untuk Perbaikan Pasal-Pasal Dana Politik dan Paket Undang-Undang Politik," Position Paper, Political Finance Indonesian Corruption Watch, 2005.

[91] Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI), "Trend Dukungan terhadap Islam Politik," 9 October 2007, available at http://www.lsi.or.id/riset/216/peta-partai-politik-maret-2007. Hidayat and Zulkieflimansyah admitted that such financial constraints hinder the party from making visits throughout the entire country to spread its message. See, Hidayat Nurwahid and Zulkieflimansyah, "Piety and Pragmatism," 2003.

Faced by such financial constraints, PKS is now selling nominations for legislative and executive office to wealthy individuals who have no particular connection to the party or its ideology. Notable among these was the former deputy chief of the national police, Gen. Adang Daradjatun, who was widely speculated to have paid considerable contributions to the party in exchange for his nomination as a governor of Jakarta.[92] Many analysts believe that Adang's money was almost certainly corruptly gained. Also, a prominent figure from the Institute of Public Administration (IPDN, *Institut Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri*), Inu Kencana Syafei, told the public that he was asked to pay a large sum of money to a PKS branch in Payakumbuh if he would run as the party's mayor nominee in the municipality.[93] To some PKS cadres, the nomination of Adang was seen as PKS breaking an earlier commitment to nominate its own cadres in the regions' local elections where it had sufficient prior electoral success, such as in Jakarta where the party won the capital decisively in the last elections. More significantly, these dubious fund-raising efforts have raised further questions about PKS integrity.[94]

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[92]Adang was widely reported to pay somewhere between Rp 13 billion and Rp 15 billion and even PKS did not deny that financial compensation was involved while popularising new term in Indonesian political financing "uang mahar." See, Mietzner, "Party Financing," 2007.

[93]"PKS Usung Ardi-Nasrullah, Inu: Saya Tak Punya Uang Rp1 Miliar," *Padang Ekspress*, 23 Mei 2007; "Inu: Mereka Bilang, Saya Pilih Rp1 M atau Rp3 M?" *Padang Ekspress*, 25 Mei 2007, available at http://www.padangekspres.co.id/mod.php?mod=publisher&op=viewarticle&artid=105

[94]During my interview with a chief ideologue of PKS Abu Ridha, he deeply expressed his serious concern to the recent development of the party in regard to the involvement of money politics. He did not apologetically deny Azyumardi Azra's remarks on PKS saying that the party has no different with other parties in terms of its political behaviours.

According to Mietzner, such illicit fund-raising efforts have partly been caused by the cut in state subsidies for political parties in 2005.[95] The Wahid administration issued a Government Regulation on Financial Assistance to Political Parties (PP 51/2001) by which the central board of any political party would annually receive Rp 1,000 per vote gained in the 1999 elections.[96] Likewise local governments were also asked to pay subsidies to political parties according to the popular vote obtained in each region.[97] Based on the Rp 1,000 per-vote scheme, PKS which inherited the popular vote of its predecessor, PK, received Rp 1.4 billion each year for its central board. Nonetheless, the current government issued a new decree, that is, the Government Regulation 29 of 2005 stating that the per-vote based formula would be replaced by a seat-based one. According to the new decree, political parties were to receive annually Rp 21 million per-seat obtained in the 2004 elections, with local authorities to issue their own regulations. This new funding formula resulted in a significant decrease in income for any political party.[98] PKS, for instance, witnessed a decline of its central state subsidy from the annual Rp. 1.4 billion it received until 2004 to only Rp. 945 million in January 2006, when the first payment according to the new formula was made. If the government uses the old funding scheme, PKS central office would receive Rp. 8.3 billion each year given its remarkable achievement in the 2004 elections.

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[95]Mietzner, "Party Financing," 2007.
[96]Ibid. pp. 243-244.
[97]Ibid.
[98]Ibid.

Against this background, it comes as no surprise if political parties, including PKS, endeavour to find alternatives forms of income to cover their rising costs. To some extent, PKS has, more so than other mass parties, mostly funded its activities through membership fees and small contributions made by its cadres.[99] In some instances, PKS can rely on its highly motivated cadres to perform unpaid secretarial work, electoral activities and the like. Similarly in many instances of the party's social movement activities, its cadres work voluntarily to mobilize huge rallies. The model of an internal funding mechanism can reduce the dependence of PKS on state subsidies on the one hand and external contributions made by politically interested donors on the other. Unfortunately for PKS, Abu Ridho admitted that "PKS is a poor party whose main base of support comes from poor people."[100] Likewise Hidayat and Zulkieflimansyah suggest that PKS is mainly supported by young people, who do not have ample financial resources.[101] It is therefore difficult for PKS to rely primarily on its cadres in dealing with financial constraints.

5.7. Media as Communication Networks

As noted earlier, the ideological outreach of PKS and its recruitment channels are typically personal and based on preexisting social relationships. But such relationships have been reinforced by other electronic and printed media as

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[99]For further discussion on the mass parties, see Richard Katz, *Democracy and Elections*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997.

[100]See also Abu Ridha, interview, cited in Latif, Furkon and Arifin, *Studi Monografi Partai Politik*, 2005.

[101]Hidayat Nurwahid and Zulkieflimansyah, "Piety and Pragmatism," 2003.

well as the wide range of Islamic publishing, pamphlets, video cassettes, cassette tapes and so on. Among other things, the weekly news magazine *Sabili* is the most popular Islamist publication, the circulation of which in 2000 was more than one hundred thousand per-issue.[102] Although *Sabili* claims no formal relations with any political party, it has links to Tarbiyah and PKS. The birth of *Sabili* can be traced by the involvement of Tarbiyah's leading figures such as Rahmat Abdullah (the first chairman of the PKS' Majelis Syuro), Zainal Muttaqin and so on.[103] In the run up to the 2004 elections, *Sabili* openly declared its support for PKS.[104]

In addition to *Sabili*, there are numerous Islamic publications linked to *Tarbiyah* and PKS such as *Saksi, Annida, Ummi,* and *Tarbawi*. *Saksi* is the news magazine whose primary sections are national political issues, international news, especially from the Muslim world, and columns and opinions provided by PKS intellectuals and affiliates. *Saksi* has presented itself as a publication wing of PKS by disseminating the party's political views. Meanwhile, *Annida* is a less politically interested magazine targeting young Muslims whose rubric is mostly dominated by Islamic short stories. However, on some occasions, *Annida* appeals to its readers to help Palestinians perceived as suffering from the Israeli occupation.

Likewise, *Tarbawi* offers less political news. Instead, the magazine, whose readership mostly comes from Tarbiyah activists, focuses primarily on the

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[102]For a detailed account of Sabili, see Syamsu Rijal, "Media and Islamism in Post-New Order Indonesia: The Case of *Sabili*, in *Studi Islamika*," Volume 12, Number 3, 2005.

[103]Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan*, 2002, p. 158.

[104]See, Murphy, "The Role of Professional Organisations," 2008.

significance of education and religious values. The magazine often reports on social work and activities carried out by PKS as well as featuring the personal sides of PKS leading figures. For example, former president of the party Hidayat Wahid's story with his mother as well as PKS MP, Mutammimul Ula's wife's efforts to raise their eleven children were given a large space in the special edition of *Tarbawi* on women. Finally, as evident by its name *Ummi* which means "my mother," the magazine focuses on the cultivation of family values targeting Muslim mothers rather than devoting its reports on divisive political issues. According to Rijal, there are numerous indications showing the issues and views raised by such Islamic magazines are concomitant with the characteristics of Tarbiyah.[105] In addition, many contributors and Muslim figures consulted for the magazine have a PKS/Tarbiyah background.[106]

PKS also makes the most effective use of the Internet of any political party. PKS central office and its branches, ranging from the provincial level to the village level, promote their political views and religious values through more than 50 websites. Also, PKS special branches overseas utilise websites and mailing lists to reinforce their networks. Some PKS leading figures and the party's members have also promoted their political views and affiliations through personal websites or homepages.

In sum, the remarkable achievement of PKS in the 2004 elections and its ability to mobilise collective action have been facilitated by the availability of

[105] Rijal, "Media and Islamism," 2005, p. 431.
[106] Ibid.

supportive infrastructures. These infrastructures that are required for collective action have become known as ‘resource mobilisation.’ PKS relies on a variety of resources, which include cadres, organisational strengths, leadership, communication networks and financial assets. PKS was formed by activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah which seized the momentum of the downfall of Suharto regime. During Suharto’s authoritarianism, Tarbiyah used less formal and visible organisations and networks in order to avoid the sustained regime’s repression. Nonetheless, the collapse of the regime created opportunities for Tarbiyah to form PKS and thus utilising a far more visible institution and network. Since the post-Suharto era, PKS has also endeavoured to boast its resource mobilisation, including acquisition of income, cadre recruitment, organisational and networking expansion, so that the party can actively engage with collective action and thus requires no jump start at election time.

CHAPTER 6

"ISLAM IS THE SOLUTION:"

THE PKS' COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMES AND ITS ISLAMIST TRANSNATIONAL FRAMING

I have argued that the development of Tarbiyah which led to the formation of PKS, occurred under favourable conditions (political opportunities), and in a supportive organisational environment (resource mobilisation). However, the development of the Tarbiyah movement that led to the emergence of PKS cannot only be treated in organisational and political terms, but also in a way to link shared ideas, meaning and beliefs with political and organisational factors. In social movement theory, the study of ideas and the social construction of ideas has come to be known as *collective action frames.*

Many proponents of collective action frames indicate the strong relations between frames and the role of ideology in mobilising collective action. In this way, PKS has successfully proven its ability to produce clear summations of its ideology that resonate with its target audience. In this chapter, I will concentrate on PKS framing processes and dynamics. This chapter will also describe PKS' Islamist transnational framing which is being used in the context of recruitment and mobilisation.

6.1. Key Elements of Collective Action Frames

Social movement scholars use the concept of collective action frames to define a problem in collective terms that necessitates a collective response.[1] The key point of 'collective action frames' is that people feel aggrieved about certain problems in their lives and believe that through protest they can redress them.

At this point, students of social movements refer to Klandermans coined *consensus and action mobilisation* by which the support or the erosion of support for participation is influenced by attitudinal and behavioral aspects. The consensus mobilisation is "the process through which a social movement organisation tries to obtain support for its viewpoint."[2] Meanwhile, action mobilisation is related to the classic social psychological problem of the relationship between attitude and behaviour. While consensus mobilisation refers to the so-called struggle for the minds or the ideological support of individuals, action mobilisation implies a struggle for individuals' willingness by offering resources such as money, time, skills, or expertise.[3]

In order to understand the complexities of consensus and action mobilisation, students of social movements introduce the concept of frame resonance. This notion examines "the ability of a movement to transform a mobilisation potential into actual mobilisation [which] is contingent upon the

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[1]Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," *Annual Review of Sociology*, August 2000, Vol. 26; William Gamson, *Talking Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992.

[2]Bert Klandermans, *The Social Psychology,* 1997, p. 7.

[3]*Ibid.*

capacity of a frame to resonate with potential participants."[4] Benford and Snow identify three core elements of framing for social movements.[5] The first is diagnostic framing that entails the identification of a problem and the attribution of responsibility and targets of blame or causality. The second is prognostic framing that entails the articulation of a proposed solution to the problems and the identification of strategies, tactics and targets. The third is motivational framing that is "the elaboration of a call to arms or rationale for action that goes beyond the diagnosis and prognosis."[6]

6.2. The Diagnostic and Prognostic Framings of PKS

As a social movement, PKS is heavily involved in the production of meaning and concomitant framing processes. A crucial component of PKS diagnostic frames is to blame the spread of Western liberal beliefs and practices for a broad range of problems including moral decay, economic injustice and political degradation. More specifically, PKS activists point to what they perceive to be the root of Western values, that is, secularism, as it manifests itself in various spheres of life. They regard this as the greatest challenge ever to the Muslim community and Islamic values. In the words of PKS president, Tifatul Sembiring,

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[4]Wiktorowicz*, Islamic Activism*, 2004, p. 16.

[5]Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, "Framing Processes", 2000, pp. 615-617; see also, David A Snow and Robert D. Benford, "Ideology,"1988, pp. 199-204.

[6]David A Snow and Robert D. Benford, "Ideology," 1988, p. 202.

'secularism is incompatible with PKS, which is also opposed to the reality of Indonesia's social life.'[7]

According to PKS, the marginalisation of political Islam in Indonesia has to do with the adoption of secular values in the state's national ideology, Pancasila, marked by the failure of founding fathers to include in the preamble of the constitution a phrase known as the Jakarta Charter,[8] which would have given *shari'a* constitutional status and would have acknowledged the role of Islam in political discourse.[9] In a later development, activists of political Islam were continuously suppressed by the nationalist-secular regimes of Sukarno and Suharto.[10] For PKS, because the majority of Indonesians are Muslims, it is imperative that Islam be given a voice in the nation as a whole.[11] However, in the minds of PKS supporters the deepening processes of secularisation has led Indonesian Muslims to divert attention from their own religious rules and caused them to look at Islam merely as a religion that consists of ritual and worship.

Accordingly, PKS has conducted prognostic framing to counter the problem of sustained secularisation among Indonesian Muslims by proposing the

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[7]*The Jakarta Post*, an Interview with Tifatul Sembiring, 'The PKS and Shari'a Law: Indonesia,' 8 February 2006.

[8]In the earliest stage of Indonesia's independence, some Islamic figures fought for the inclusion in the preamble to the constitution of a phrase which would have given the *shari'a* constitutional status. The Jakarta Charter attributed to the preamble that proclaimed Indonesia was based on 'belief in God' (Ketuhanan), followed by seven words: 'Dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariah Islam bagi pemeluknya' (with the obligation to practice Islamic *shari'a* by its adherents). Those serious efforts failed because of the strong opposition from the secular-nationalist-Christian political parties. For a detailed account of the 1945 Jakarta Charter, see B.J Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia,* Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1971, pp. 25-27.

[9]MPP (Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat) PKS, *Platform Kebijakan Pembangunan Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Terwujudnya Masyarakat Madani yang Adil, Sejahtera dan Bermartabat,* (no publisher, no place, no date), p. 42.

[10]Ibid., pp. 42-43.

[11]Ibid., p. 47.

idea that "Islam is the solution" (*al-Islam huwa al-hall*). In its vision and mission statement PKS proclaims itself as "a *dakwah* party that struggles for Islam as the solution in the life of the nation and the state."[12] Although this frame is common among Islamist movements elsewhere, there are crucial divergences over tactics and strategies. Jamaah Tabligh, for example, focuses on 'pure *dakwah*,' dealing with the transformation of individual beliefs with Islamic values, but avoid engaging in politics. By contrast, Hizbut Tahrir is heavily involved in political matters campaigning for Islam as the only solution for the current human-made system i.e. democracy, secularism, capitalism.

Instead, PKS appears to frame Islam as both the solution both for the transformation of individuals and for the so-called Islamising of the state through formal political participation. The party offers two patterns of Islamisation.[13] The first is cultural Islamisation that involves individuals and community groups. The basic argument is that the process of cultural imperialism through secularism has undermined Muslim society so that they must return to the true path outlined in the sources of Islam (*al-ruju' il al-Qur'an wa al-Hadist*). Islam must be understood as *kaffah*, a total, comprehensive and all-encompassing way of life with no separation between *al-diin wa al-dawlah* (religion and state). In other words, PKS views Islam as a comprehensive corpus of rules and guidelines that provides all the spiritual and worldly needs of human beings (*syamil*). This conception is

[12]PKS' official website, http://www.pk-sejahtera.org/v2/index.php?op=isi&id=110
[13]MPP PKS, *Platform*, p. 48.

combined with the assertion that Islam is universal. Such universality of Islam will provide a moral basis for the development of Indonesia.

Cultural Islamisation, carried out in gradual and incremental ways, is a long process.[14] Accordingly, PKS' second type of prognostic framing is the structural approach of Islamisation.[15] Some leading figures of PKS admit that the party's true political objective is "a state based on Islamic law."[16] As is stated in the paradigm of PKS, this structural pattern takes the form of formal political participation to restructure state policies and institutions in order to implement Islamic laws (*shari'a*) in society.[17] The basic argument is that Islam must play a key role within the state. To PKS, *shari'a* is an inherent part of Indonesian people, which should be absorbed into national law.[18]

According to PKS, the implementation of Islamic values in the state is the final step of the Islamisation process following continuous efforts to Islamise individuals, family, neighbours, communities and other collectivities.[19] In order to advance its structural approach of Islamisation, PKS is willing to work within the existing political system. This is the major defining trait differentiating the party from Indonesia's more radicalised Islamist groups such as Hizbut Tahrir which rejects democracy.

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[14]Interview, Aan Rohanah, Jakarta, 4 October 2007.

[15]MPP PKS, *Platform*, p. 50.

[16]Notable among these was an interview with the president of PKS, Tifatul Sembiring, *The Jakarta Post*, 'The PKS and Shari'a Law: Indonesia,' 8 February 2006.

[17]MPP PKS, *Platform*, p. 50.

[18]*The Jakarta Post*, 'The PKS and Shari'a Law: Indonesia,' 8 February 2006.

[19]MPP PKS, *Platform*, p. 35

The structural change proposed by PKS is distinguished from "either an Islamic state, which demands the formalisation of *shari'a* without considering other believers interests, or a secular state, which is perceived as a system that rejects the idea that *shari'a* be implemented within state policies."[20] Although the definition of Islamic state is starkly at odds, PKS seems to distinguish itself from other Islamist parties such as PPP and PBB. When the Islamic parties in the 2000 legislature pioneered by PPP and PBB raised the issue of returning to the Jakarta Charter, which would have formalised Islam in the state, PKS predecessor, PK, did not support the move. Instead, PK MPs proposed what they called the 'Medina Charter' (*Piagam Madinah*), which respects all religions of Indonesia and gives equal rights and opportunities to them to carry out their teachings.[21] After the merger of PK into PKS in mid-2003, the former president of PKS, Hidayat Nurwahid, affirms that PKS is still committed to propose the Medina Charter instead of the Jakarta Charter.[22]

This is not to say that PKS has abandoned its commitment to Islamise society and the state. The project of Islamising the state remains a cornerstone of the party's struggle.[23] Given that most Indonesian people are still reluctant to support the agenda of establishing an Islamic state, PKS conveys its Islamist

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[20]Ibid., 50.

[21]Many scholars indicate that the Medina Charter was the first 'constitution' formulated by the Prophet Muhammad to regulate all inhabitants of Medina community, including Christians and Jews, into a single polity. See, Nurcholish Madjid, "Agama dan Negara dalam Islam," in *Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah,* Paramadina, Jakarta, 1994.

[22]Hidayat Nurwahid, Interview, 4 October 2007.

[23]Bubalo and Fealy, *Joining the Caravan?* 2005, p. 71.

messages in politically neutral language.[24] PKS' strategy focuses on how to implement *shari'a*-based policies without declaring Indonesia to be an Islamic state.[25] To shed light on this point Bubalo and Fealy cite the opinions of a prominent PKS leader as the following:

> If the substance sufficiently represents the name [i.e., 'Islamic state'], the name does not need to reflect the substance…What is the use of a country as large as Indonesia, whose Muslim population is the largest in the world, declaring itself to be [an Islamic state]. Previously, the people ran this nation in a secular way [but] now we want run it Islamically. That is the essence of it. Hence, PK(S) never bears aloft the Islamic state or *syariat* Islam.[26]

In order to intensify the two patterns of Islamisation, PKS promotes its motivational framings by engaging in a massive Islamic outreach program called *dakwah ila Allah*, literally, "the call" or "invitation" to God. Having said that PKS has attempted to address individual and structural changes, the party draws on the existing concept of *dakwah*, but adapts it for new purposes. First, the notion of *dakwah* was shifted to include the task of making "ordinary Muslims" better Muslims. Second, PKS introduced new content into the material of *dakwah* with emphasis on the interpretation of Islam as more than a code governing moral conduct; instead it is a total way of life which provides guidance for the transformation of individual beliefs and for the organisation of society and state.[27]

The adoption of a new interpretation of *dakwah* in the realities of post-Suharto Indonesia gives more room for political Islam to maneuver and indicates

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[24]Ibid.

[25]MPP PKS, *Platform*, p. 50.

[26]Bubalo and Fealy, *Joining the Caravan?*2005, p. 71.

[27]MPP (Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat) PKS, *Falsafah Dasar Perjuangan PKS*, no publisher, no place, 2007.

the success of PKS activists to articulate and transmit messages through *dakwah*. This has formed a basis for their Islamist framing process, in a way similar to the framing defined by David Snow, that is, "conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action."[28] Through the medium of *dakwah*, the party introduces a new conception of Islam, claiming that it is a religious obligation (*fardhu 'ain*) for every Muslim to participate in the Islamic reform of individuals, society and state.[29] *Dakwah* is therefore framed as Islamic activism that demands self-sacrifice and total commitment to the cause of Islam.[30] So long as PKS cadres follow this path of *dakwah*, they will be rewarded for their obedience. In the case of PKS, this reward manifests into two ways: 'heaven' as was promised by God and structural positions within the party due to the fact that merit and *dakwah* commitment become its usual basis for promotion.[31]

PKS then divides its activities of *dakwah* into four stages called the orbit of *dakwah* (*mahawir*).[32] The first is *mihwar tanzhimi*, which focuses on the consolidation and strengthening of cadres.[33] The bottom line is that change must begin from the ability of PKS to create strong cadres through small training and

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[28]Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer Zald, "Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes: Towards a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings*, eds. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 6.

[29]MPP PKS, *Platform*, pp. 16-19.

[30]Ibid.

[31]Interview, Khairuddin, Jakarta,

[32]K.H Hilmi Aminuddin, *Bingkai Dakwah di Jalur Politik*, Arah Press, Jakarta, 2008, pp. 1-5; MPP PKS, Platform.

[33]MPP PKS, Platform, 30.

mentoring cells (*usrah*) to cultivate distinctive beliefs and customs. Abu Ridha, ideologue and PKS leading figure wrote:

> For an Islamic party, Islamic ideology is the foundation of all structures of its actions and, at the same time, [it works] as the axis of its political moves. In this context, the department [of] cadreisation is responsible to implant Islamic ideology among all cadres so that their political mind-set unequivocally is based on ideology.[34]

The second is *mihwar sya'bi* which concentrates on attempts to encompass wider sectors of society.[35] At this point, the proliferation of Islamist social institutions linked to PKS (*wajihah*) such as schools, hospitals, charities, and so on become important sites of the party's outreach.[36] The third stage is *mihwar muassasi*, when PKS cadres are pushed to reach out to penetrate public and state political institutions.[37] This stage is divided into two sectors, either *dakwah* in parliament or in bureaucracy. The two are an extension of the *dakwah* arena where cadres are encouraged to struggle in constitutional ways for the application of Islamic norms through state policies and legislation.[38] The forth stage is *mihwar daulah,* whisch has the purpose of runing Indonesia Islamically, in a total way.[39] Nonetheless, the party's constitution and manifesto make no clear explanation of the last crucial stage of *dakwah*.

Those PKS stages of *dakwah* are carried out gradually, starting from the bottom up. The set of preparatory steps to Islamise Indonesia culminating with the

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[34]Abu Ridha, "Ideologi dan Energi Politik," *Suara Keadilan*, October-November 2001. Not my translation. I cite from Platzdasch, "Religious Dogma," 2005.

[35]MPP PKS, Platform, p. 31.

[36]Ibid., p. 32.

[37]Ibid.

[38]Ibid., pp. 32-33.

[39]Ibid., p. 35.

incorporation of *shari'a* into the constitution are called '*tadarruj'* (*pentahapan*, gradualism). As the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna, put it:

> "We begin with the individual, the family, the local neighbourhood or community, and then the society at large. When society itself has become truly Islamic, it will be only a matter of time before Islam is extended to the sphere of the state."[40]

6.3. Electoral Strategy and Non-Islamist Agenda

As a political party seeking to extend support beyond its traditional basis outside pious Muslim middle-class and educated people, PKS faces a major challenge of how to appeal to wider society. PKS leaders believe that promoting the party's commitment to Islamist causes in Indonesia's political discourse would be counterproductive for electoral purposes. That is why PKS downplayed Islamist issues in the 2004 elections and shied away from showing its Islamist stance too plainly. Instead, the party decided to promote a clean and caring image and emphasised "secular" themes of fighting corruption, good governance and socio-economic equality in the last elections. This electoral strategy was successful in 2004 where PKS increased of its share of the vote to 7.34 per cent from 1.4 per cent in 1999.

Since then, PKS has prioritised to building its reputation for incorruptibility. Unlike other parties where structural positions or nominations for executive or legislative offices can be "purchased" or guaranteed by powerful

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[40]Cited from Wickham, *Mobilising Islam*, 2002, p. 127.

patrons, advancement in PKS depends on merit and ideological commitment.[41] In the national and local parliaments, the party takes every opportunity to flaunt its clean image. It has opposed several plans to increase salaries for legislators and has pledged to refuse bribes. Recently, the PKS faction in DPR reported the gratification funds its members received and returned the money to the Corruption Eradication Commission in an attempt to promote clean government.[42] In an effort to avoid conflicts of interest, PKS leaders who were chosen as public officials usually resigned from high party positions, such as occurred with Hidayat Nurwahid (former President of PKS stepped down after taking over as the leader of MPR) and Nur Mahmudi Ismail (former President of PK resigned after being appointed as a minister during Abdurrahman administration).

To be fair, PKS is not entirely free of corruption allegations. It was attacked for its choice of Suripto as a legislative candidate despite the fact that he was under investigation for corruption. It has also been widely speculated that PKS sold nominations for executive office, most notably, the former deputy chief of the national police Adang Daradjatun who reportedly paid a large amount of money to the party in exchange for his nomination as a governor of Jakarta. However, relative to other parties, PKS is far more committed to the ideals of clean government and has consistently taken an uncompromising stance in the fight against corruption.

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[41]Bubalo and Fealy, *Joining the Caravan?*2005, p. 71.

[42]Suarasurabaya.net, Fraksi PKS Kembalikan Uang Gratifikasi Rp. 2 Milyar, available at http://www.suarasurabaya.net/v05/politik/?id=f1b34e8eb87778159edd8d9c0bb2ec91200851112

Furthermore PKS leaders have tried to frame their position on these non-Islamist issues i.e., anti-corruption and social work, in religious terms. In his interview with a Jakarta-based daily newspaper, President of PKS, Tifatul Sembiring, held:

> People often simplify *shari'a* as cutting off hands and stoning. *Shari'a* is very broad, covering all aspects of life and having a universal nature. In our understanding, a government creating public welfare performs *amar ma'ruf* (doing what is correct) in the sense of *shari'a*, and one eradicating corruption carries out *nahi munkar* (rejecting what is wrong) as obliged by *shari'a*.[43]

The Muslim political mainstream represented by the two largest Islamic organisations, NU and Muhammadiyah, also take a similar stance. Along with fourteen other Indonesian Islamic organisations, NU and Muhammadiyah called every Muslim to perform jihad (*fight*) against corruption.[44] They strongly believe that fighting corruption is a part of *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* (Islamic teaching of commanding good and forbidding evil deeds). PKS' position on this issue, which is combined with the assertion that combating corruption is informed by Islamic norms, can be seen as an attempt to broaden its appeal to the Muslim mainstream.

Also, the agenda of eradicating corruption in Indonesia, which is a problem deeply rooted both at the both the local and national level is attractive for Indonesian people in general regardless of their religion and background. This is particularly the case for PKS whose rhetoric of clean government is backed up by its visible and steadfast position against corruption. Unsurprisingly, in the 2004

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[43]*The Jakarta Post*, 'The PKS and Shari'a Law: Indonesia,' 8 February 2006.
[44]Lanny Oktavia, 'Jihad Bushido," available at http://www.islamlib.com.

elections, PKS received more than eight million votes, many of which came from outside the party's traditional basis.

6.4. Islamist Issues and the Maintaining of PKS' Base

Aside from strenuous efforts to extend its base by promoting its broader messages through the adoption of the language of clean government and social concern, PKS seeks to preserve its traditional support by maintaining its earlier commitment to Islamist causes. It is clear that the party has adopted what Liddle and Mujani called a two-track—simultaneously Islamist and non-Islamist—electoral strategy.[45]

For all PKS' efforts to moderate its image by promoting non-Islamist issues, it is still likely seen as an Islamist party that has a 'hidden' agenda to eventually push for the implementation of *shari'a* in public life and other conservative legislation products.[46] This can be seen from the party's strong support to enact the draft anti pornography bill. In addition, there are also growing signs that local campaigns which involve PKS cadres in many provinces and districts in Aceh, West Sumatra, West Java, Banten, and South Sulawesi pushing for laws based on Islamic norms such as regulating Islamic attire in public office, banning alcohol, gambling, and prostitution. Despite some criticism against the implementation of local laws inspired by *shari'a*, PKS leaders saw that the

[45]Liddle and Mujani, "Islamist Parties," unpublished paper.
[46]Steele, "The Decline of Political Islam."

application of *shari'a* in some parts of Indonesia should not be deemed negative.[47] PKS strongly argues that "any controversy over the substance of national law against Islamic/local laws should be avoided."[48]

Many analysts have been suspicious that PKS was all along masquerading behind non-Islamist issues (i.e., anti-corruption credentials and public services), while quietly pushing forward its Islamist agenda.[49] It is clear that there are some contradictions between the rhetoric of PKS 'secular' issues and its conservative agenda. In many instances, PKS has continuously tried to burnish its image as an open party committed to pluralism and tolerance. However, this self-proclamation is clearly at odds with PKS training documents indicating widespread intolerant interpretations of Islam among many of its leaders and cadres.[50]

The above indications of maintaining an Islamist agenda have much to do with PKS' attempt to convince its traditional base that it will not abandon its initial vision of striving for Islam as the solution for the nation's problems. As noted earlier, PKS' support base is among young orthodox, well-educated Muslims. In order to understand the characteristics of PKS members and their support for Islamist agendas, it is useful to referring to LSI's survey findings on "Support for Radical Religious Attitudes and Behaviour."[51] To measure support for Islamist

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[47]The Jakarta Post, 'The PKS and Shari'a Law: Indonesia,' 8 February 2006.
[48]Ibid.
[49]Steele, "The Decline of Political Islam."
[50]Bubalo and Fealy, *Joining the Caravan?* 2005, p. 72.
[51]As a researcher of the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI), I had an opportunity to access a number of LSI's survey findings. The institute has conducted a nationwide survey through face-to-face interviews with 1,200 respondents as a sample selected through multistage random sampling. This method is used to produce a sample that enables us to make inferences and generalisations about the national population. The number of samples was determined to account for

agenda, 1,200 respondents of the survey were asked about their opinions on polygamy, bank interest, cutting thief's hand off, and so on. It recorded that a number of factors correlate positively with support for Islamist agendas, most notably support for PKS compared to support for PDI-P and other large parties.[52] Above all, the survey showed that PKS' constituents are more likely to support Islamist agendas relative to other major political parties.

LSI's findings confirm that PKS has brought Islamist political orientations, including support for the implementation of an Islamist agenda at the polity. In short, despite the fact that PKS has promoted non-Islamist agendas, the party is still committed to Islamist policies in order to reassure the party's base about its long-term goal to Islamise Indonesian society culminating in a state based on *shari'a*.

6.5. PKS' Collective Action and Its Islamist Transnational Framing

Aside from striving to impose Islamic laws through institutionalised politics, PKS also uses collective action, most notably large-scale demonstrations, to maintain its Islamic image. As described in Chapter 3, roughly 60% of PKS demonstrations can be called Islamist in essence. These Islamist issues range from moral reform to transnational Islamism. PKS collective action on non-Islamist

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approximately ± 2.9% margin of error with 95% reliability. For more detailed information of this measurement, see Lembaga Survey Indonesia, *Support for Religious Radical Attitudes and Behaviour*, 2006, available at http://www.lsi.or.id.

[52]This survey asserts the term of radical and Islamist in parallel ways. For more detailed information of this measurement, see Lembaga Survey Indonesia, *Support for Religious Radical Attitudes and Behaviour*, 2006, available at http://www.lsi.or.id.

issues such as anti-corruption and the *reformasi* struggle are outnumbered by the party's demonstrations against anti-pornography, -Ahmadiyah—an allegedly deviant sect, and Israel and the U.S. I have also noted that PKS remains preoccupied by distant but religiously charged issues (Chapter 3).

Those results, which are tabulated from Indonesian daily newspapers by utilising protest event analysis, demonstrate that PKS' collective action is geared more toward advancement of Islamist issues and transnational framing of mobilisation rather than grappling with non-Islamist domestic issues that correspond with national interests.

In the following pages, I will present three of the major Islamist transnational frames employed by PKS. The first is that Islam is under siege by the West. The second is there is a Jewish conspiracy to undermine Islam. The first two frames are seen as the crux of all problems in the Muslim world and represent PKS' diagnostic framing. The third, replicating one of most common frames among Islamist movements elsewhere, is the idea of the global *umma* as the parameter of the Muslim identity.

These Islamist transnational framings are vital to understand the nature of PKS' collective action which is driven by a strong antipathy to America and Israel. Also, these cultural framings show the ability of PKS to link its ideology with a more specific interpretation of a situation. Students of social movement

have argued that frames can draw on ideology and discourse.[53] In the framing process, however, movement activists must be able to construct their ideology and discourse with the objective of mobilising support.

6.5.1. Islam is under Siege by the West

One of PKS' missions is to "contribute positively to uphold justice and oppose oppression, particularly toward oppressed Muslim countries."[54] This mission indicates that the party is greatly concerned with the perceived Muslims' pain and misery across the world. It also suggests that PKS founders who formulated the vision and mission of the party were driven by a strong sense of global Muslim subjugation and suppression. They contrasted this with Islam's glorious past.

The invocation of an Islamic golden age is especially prevalent in the thinking of Muslims whose outlook is shaped by a deep reverence for history. Like most Islamist groups, PKS divides the history of Muslims into two phases. The first encompasses the Prophet's lifetime, the period of the Prophet's first four successors, the 'rightly guided caliphs' (*al-khulafa al-rasyidun*), the formation of the first Islamic state, the phenomenal expansion of Islam out of Arabia, and the spread of great empires under the Islamic caliphates of Umayyad, Abbasid, and

[53]For discussions of the relationship between discourse, ideology and frames, see, for example, Pamela Oliver and Hans Johnston, "What a Good Idea: Frames and Ideology in Social Movement Research," *Mobilisation*, 5 (1), 2000, pp. 37-54.

[54]PKS' official website, http://www.pk-sejahtera.org/v2/index.php?op=isi&id=110

Uthmaniya that brought Islamic civilisation to its height.[55] This phase is viewed as an exemplary period.

The second phase is the decline of Muslim power in the late seventeenth century exemplified by loss of territory and the period of Western colonialism.[56] This period was marked by the Western cultural, economical, political and intellectual dominance. Again, this is not a unique of PKS view. Virtually everywhere in the contemporary Muslim world, Islamists have felt subordinate to the West. "The trauma of modern Islam," Daniel Pipes stated, "came about from this disparity between medieval successes and recent troubles," which lead to "a pervasive sense of debilitation and encroachment in the Islamic world today."[57] The following PKS training material describes the vulnerability of the contemporary Muslim world. It holds:

> The condition of Muslims today is…pitiful and under the rule of the enemies of Islam. Muslims as the best and grand community obviously no longer display their grandness amidst other humankind; even appears to wane more and more because of ignorance [*jahiliyyah*]…Muslims today have deficiencies such as ethics, training, culture …organisational management [and] intellect. This situation exists in a majority of Islamic countries.[58]

To restore the past glory of Islam, Islamists, including PKS, act on the presumption "that Muslims lag behind the West because they are not good

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[55]Lawrence Davidson, *Islamic Fundamentalism*, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut and London, 1998, p. 3.

[56]Ibid.

[57]Daniel Pipes, "Islam and Islamism: Faith and Ideology," *The National Interest*, Washington, Spring 2000, pp. 87-93.

[58]Irwan Prayitno, *Ahwaal Al-Muslimun Al-Yaum (Kondisi Umat Islam Saat Ini*), reprinted in Prayitno, *Kepribadian Dai*, 2005, p. 155. Not my translation. I cite from Platzdasch, "Religious Dogma," 2005.

Muslims."[59] Accordingly, PKS promotes an 'active and comprehensive form of *dakwah'* (*al-dakwah al-harakiyyah al-syamilah*) to create better Muslims.

> There is only one simple solution: *dakwah* has to tell to the *umat* and the people of this country: **"You are Muslims!"** until they openly declare with the conviction: **"We are Muslims!"** Or in other words the solution is to REESTABLISH THE ISLAMIC IDENTITY (emphasis in original).[60]

Dakwah is seen by PKS as an essential instrument to re-Islamise society and to return Indonesian Muslims to their religious identity.[61] To PKS, many Muslims are reluctant to embrace Islamic identity, because of the existence of a Western conspiracy to undermine Muslims across the world.[62] Central to this notion of cultural undermining was *al-ghazw al-fikri* (war of ideas). This concept is frequently used by PKS to counter what is perceived as Western ideological challenges to Muslim worldviews. It holds that there is a fundamental division of the world into two categories: Islamic and non-Islamic or *jahiliyyah*. The word *jahiliyyah* is initially translated to 'the age of ignorance' and taken to refer to the Arabian society of the century prior to the advent of Islam. Nonetheless, Sayyid Qutb and modern Islamists expanded the meaning to a set of un-Islamic cultures in Muslim societies.[63] In a guideline written specifically for preachers and religious

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[59]Daniel Pipes, "Islam and Islamism," pp. 87-93.

[60]Mahfudz Sidiq, *Pemilu dan Urgensi Tarbiyatul Ummat: Agenda-agenda Besar Dakwah Menuju Perbaikan Umat dan Bangsa melalui Kemenangan Politik Islam,* Pustaka Tarbiatuna, Jakarta, 2003, p. 35. Not my translation. I cite from Platzdasch, "Religious Dogma," 2005.

[61]MPP PKS, *Platform*.

[62]Irwan Prayitno, "Al-Ghazw Al-Fikri," reprinted in Prayitno, *Kepribadian Dai*, 2005, pp. 3-4.

[63]Ibid.

trainers of Islamic study groups, Irwan Prayitno, ideologue and PKS' MP, addresses the doctrine of *jahiliyyah.*

> The infidels…have since looked for an alternative way of destroying the Islamic community…The strategy they have chosen to destroy Islam is *al-ghazw al-fikri. Al-ghazw al-fikri* is an ideological, cultural, mental and conceptual attack waged continually in a systematic, organised and well-planned fashion. The result is the emergence of a change in the personality, lifestyle and behaviour of the Muslim community…These efforts…began with the severing of ties between Islamic countries under the Islamic caliphate, causing the emergence of nationalist groups and national ideologies. The separation of religion and state, orientalism, Christianisation, and the women's emancipation movement are also *al-ghazw al-fikri* activities...[64]

6.5.2. Jewish Conspiracy

Like most Islamist groups in Indonesia, PKS is fundamentally anti-Semitic. In many PKS training documents, Jews and Zionists are conflated leading to a tendency to see the Palestine-Israeli conflict in fundamentally religious, not nationalist, terms. Furthermore, PKS propagates the view of Jewish control over the world.

> The Jews aspire to control the world by conquering every system owned by each nation or nation. Whatever method the Jews may employ through their Zionist movement, their aim is always to control the world. At present, the world's political, economic, legal and social systems, wherever they have developed, are controlled by Jews. This urge to control the world is founded on a conviction that God has appointed Jews as the leaders of nations and the heirs of the earth and all that is legitimate in it. Islam holds the same conviction, called a caliphate, namely that a faithful and pious organ has been given a mandate to develop and tend the earth and all that is in it. This conviction on the part of Muslims will motivate Jews to wage war on Islam, because Islam has the potential to defeat the Jews. The Jews

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[64] Irwan Prayitno, "Al-Ghazw Al-Fikri," reprinted in Prayitno, Kepribadian Dai, 2005, pp. 3-4. Not my translation. I cite from Greg Fealy and Virginia Hooker (eds.), Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia: A Contemporary Sourcebook, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2006.

> work hard to wage war on the Muslim community, so that Muslims will follow them, as mentioned in the Qur'an, Al Baqarah, verse 120: "The Jews and Christians will not be pleased with you until you follow their religion'…To achieve this obsession they have employed all means. The Jews are widely known to have orchestrated various secret movements. They have also been behind many catastrophes throughout history. There are indications that the September 11 tragedy was a Jewish conspiracy to corner Islam, so that Israel could justify attacks on Palestinians using terrorism as a reason…Islam does not have a history of attacking innocent civilians…The history of the Jews is full of evil, such as cruel slavery, arrogance, extreme patriotism, blind fanaticism to their bloodline, material greed, a usurious economic system, and other evil behaviour such as being suck-ups, slippery, cruel, hypocritical, with rotten intentions, stubborn, seizing other people's possessions by illegitimate means and obstructing humans from the path of Islam…This behaviour is the behaviour of the devil…The actions of the U.S. in attacking Islamic states are also the result of the strong Jewish lobby in the U.S. The Jews control world or foreign politics through effective way to conquer the world, which they follow, is by economic means. History also shows that the Jews defeat other people through their economic strength, namely through a system of bank interest and control of assets using unjust and dishonest trade practices.[65]

6.5.3. Global *Umma*

PKS uses the rhetoric of returning society to genuine Islamic identity by utilising the concept of *umma* and Muslim brotherhood, above notions of race, blood, clan, tribe, nation, and birth place. Accordingly, the party shares a greater sense of Islamic unity and solidarity and views Muslims in different parts of the world within the framework of a global Muslim *umma* than do other Indonesian Islamist parties. As stated in the basic policy adopted by PKS, one of principles on

[65]Irwan Prayitno, "Yahudi sebagai Hizbus Syaithan Menguasai Dunia," reprinted in Prayitno, *Kepribadian Dai*, 2005, p. 111. Not my translation. I cite from Fealy and Hooker (eds.), Voices of Islam, 2006..

which the party's political policies and operational activities are based, is that it is part of global *dakwah* (*al-'alamiyah*).[66]

> In principle, any Islamic *dakwah* movement must have a global vision in parallel to the universality of Islam. This, indeed, has been the very nature of the *dakwah*. It is an activity that is not limited to certain ethnics, or by state or regional boundaries. This recognition highlights that the existence of our *dakwah* is part of the *dakwah* activities around the globe. It is, therefore, essential that every policy made, program planned and step taken is in harmony with the international *dakwah* strategy and follows the *sunnat al-dakwah* whilst not setting aside specific issues happening locally.[67]

It is true that that PKS has made no plain statement in its political platform but this does mean that it has no desire to the idea of an Islamic caliphate. In the founding manifesto of PK, PKS' predecessor, however, there were calls for the restoration of an Islamic caliphate. In the 2000 national congress of PK when the party deliberated over policy guidelines it was revealed that the Islamic caliphate is seen as its long-term orientation.

> [We are] aware that the objective of *dakwah*, which will be realised, is a large objective, that is to implement God's religion on earth and to install Islamic Sovereignty or state in an Islamic caliphate system of which the results possibly can be enjoyed by following generations. Hence, every policy…and program…connects [to] three time dimensions. The past as lesson, the present as reality and the future as hope.[68]

After the formation of PKS, these calls for the resurrection of a caliphate were written off for political purposes from the party's political platform. Nonetheless, the notion of global *umma* is still strong in the minds of PKS leaders.

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[66]For more detailed about PKS' basic policy, see http://pk-sejahtera.us/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8&Itemid=25

[67]Ibid.

[68]Komisi C Kebijakan Dasar Partai, Musyawarah Nasional I Partai Keadilan, 18-21 Mei 2000. Not my translation. I cite from Platzdasch, "Religious Dogma," 2005.

Andi Rahmat, a PKS MP, argues that PKS shares its belief in the notion of caliphate with other Islamist groups.[69] He called the idea of *umma* "the foundational basis for the formation of political community."[70] Additionally, in a PKS' document training, there are texts referring to how the economic problems of the Muslim world are due to the absence of an Islamic caliphate.[71] It has been argued that the caliphate is the solution of Muslims' economic dependence on the West.

Among Islamist groups, Hibut Tahrir is the most vocal group and widely propagates the necessity of restoring a single and universal caliphate for all Muslims across the world. PKS also shares this idea, but there are important differences in strategies for rebuilding the caliphate. Andi Rahmat states that the main difference between PKS and HTI is not in goals, but methods. In contrast to Hizbut Tahrir which aims to resurrect the caliphate by rejecting the concepts of nation-state and democracy, critics within PKS consider this method to be unrealistic. To PKS, the Islamic caliphate could be realised through a gradualist approach which has strong strategic value. Unlike Hizbut Tahrir, PKS' approach remains firmly grounded in political realism and thus it accepts Indonesia as the nation-state and pursues its short-term objectives through a democratic system. Untung Wahono summed up the differences between PKS and Hizbut Tahrir.

> While Hizbut Tahrir views the Islamic global caliphate as the necessary condition, PKS saw it as an outcome of the unity of the Muslim world. We

[69]Andi Rakhmat, Interview, 27 August 2007.
[70]Ibid.
[71]Panduan Lengkap Manhaj, 2005, p. 321.

must be united first prior to rebuild the caliphate. PKS is now striving to achieve the integration of *umma.*[72]

Based on the aforementioned Islamist transnational framings, it is hardly surprising that PKS seems to extend the global jihad of fighting against distant enemies. PKS' outlook is anchored in geographically distant issues such as the Israeli occupation of Palestine, the U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan and so on. These, rather than domestic matters, have become PKS' most favoured issues throughout collective action. There is a growing belief among PKS supporters that Muslims are the community's most discriminated. A key leader of the party, Untung Wahono, holds:

> We are bonded together by no other quality than the fact of being Muslim. When Palestinians are suffering from Israeli brutal attacks, Indonesian Muslims should express their Islamic solidarity beyond geographical boundaries.[73]

In brief, the collective action frames of PKS have provided a mechanism for mobilising collective action. PKS' frames, which draw primarily upon the party's ideology, aspire both to explain the world and to change it. PKS replicates the most common frame among Islamist groups in the Middle East, that is, the notion of Islam as the solution (*al-Islam huwa al-haal*). The vulnerability of the Muslim world and social ills of the society are attributed to the departure from Islamic values.

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[72]Untung Wahono, Interview, 4 October 2007.
[73]Ibid.

Illustration 5

Caption:
This is the PKS "One Man, One Dollar" Campaign/Demonstration (07 May 2006).
Available at: http://www. lautjenny.blogsome.com/2006/06/

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This sub-thesis studies the emergence and the rise of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and the nature of its collective action. The party successfully increased its vote by six hundred percent, from 1.4 percent in 1999 to 7.3 percent in 2004. Despite its success PKS is an unusual party in many respects, most notable is that it is not merely a political party that articulates its agenda within institutionalised politics, but it also acts as a social movement organisation which vigorously engages in collective action. It regularly uses collective action as a vehicle to continuously engage with its supporters—rather than only reaching out at election time as is the case with most other parties. No other party is so active in regularly mobilising their sympathisers on the streets.

As described in Chapter 2, PKS takes this form as a political party partly because it emerged out of an Islamist student movement called Tarbiyah. Founded in the late 1970s, Tarbiyah is a loose network of student *dakwah* groups in state secular universities whose activists are strongly influenced by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's ideas and activism. Faced with the Suharto regime's suppression towards political Islam and student activism in the 1980s, Tarbiyah took the form of a less formally institutionalised movement, used non-confrontational approaches and conducted few public activities that were alyawys apolitical. By the early 1990s, Tarbiyah began to emerge into public view

following the regime's rapprochement with Islam. Following the resignation of Suharto in 1998, Tarbiyah activists seized the momentum by transforming their movement into a political party named PK, now known as PKS.

Having this general picture in mind, I felt that it was pertinent to ask: why did Tarbiyah eventually decide to transform its activism into a political movement? In answering this question, I used a social movement integrated approach, combining three emerging trends in the tradition of social movement research, i.e. political opportunity structures, resource mobilisation theory and collective action frames.

From these three integrated perspectives, I demonstrated that PKS: (1) emerged from an array of unsettling social and political conditions that produced a political opportunity structure; (2) took advantage of favourable social and political opportunities by consolidating and enhancing its organisational resources and communication networks to support the sustainability of the movement; and (3) consciously and subjectively responded to the significant increase in political opportunities and its structural capacities to mobilise supporters with shared ideas, beliefs and values.

The first factor of the emergence of PKS was a significant increase in political opportunity structure. Based on evidence gathered in this research, it is clear that the development of Tarbiyah leading to the formation of PKS did not occur in a vacuum. Instead, the party relied on external conditions that provided a mechanism for collective action. In social movement theory, the study of

‘conditions,’ that may constrain or facilitate the emergence of a movement has come to be known as political opportunity structure.

By using “the double track of political opportunity structures,” which combines both international and domestic factors, this study revealed the complex nature of PKS’ emergence. As discussed in Chapter 4, there are a range of international influences that helped to explain the emergence of the party including the 1979 Iranian revolution, the sponsoring of DDII activities by Saudi Arabia leading to the popularity of new Middle Eastern Islamic thinking, the link between Indonesian revivalists and their fellow activists from Malaysia, and more importantly, the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideas and methods in PKS’ political thinking and behaviour. The transplantation of the Brotherhood ideas and methods into Tarbiyah was facilitated by DDII’s extensive networks, including DDII-affiliated intellectuals who massively translated the works of Brotherhoods ideologues into Indonesian.

These international contexts of political opportunities helped to structure the domestic possibilities for the development of Tarbiyah on which PKS was based. These domestic factors include the regime’s repressive measures against political Islam and restrictions on student political activities in campuses. To avoid the regime’s sustained repression, Tarbiyah organised its activities by adopting the notion of *Sirriyat al-Tandzim wa Alamiyyat al-Dakwah* (Secret Organisational Structure and Open Predication). According to this concept, every Muslim is obliged to perform *dakwah* in an open way, except in less democratic political

environment where overt *dakwah* risks harsh regime reprisals. Indeed *dakwah* activities faced no problems during the New Order era as long as they were not political. Accordingly, Tarbiyah focused its activities on the cultivation of religious understanding and practices among Islamic students in secular universities.

The second crucial factor is PKS' ability to generate organisational resources. In social movement theory, this is a large specialty area known as resource mobilisation. This approach is based on a theoretical assumption that political opportunities alone do not make a movement. As described in Chapter 5, the rise of Tarbiyah and PKS can be explained through its capacity to improve its organisational strength, including building a system cadre, leadership, communication networks and financial assets. Since its emergence in the late 1970s, Tarbiyah utilised informal forms of collective action in an attempt to escape from the regime's control by taking advantage of campus mosques as the centre of its activities. By the early 1980s, the use of *usrah* or *halaqah* became the main means to propagate Tarbiyah's core teachings and to draw students into more intensive training and involvement. In addition, the establishment of LDK as one of student *dakwah* networks across campuses is also important for managing a range of religious activities organised by Tarbiyah activists. By the mid-1990s, Tarbiyah activists began to take control of student senates in many prestigious universities along with their success in establishing the student movement group, KAMMI.

The collapse of Suharto regime in 1998 allowed Tarbiyah activists to use their organisational resources for the purpose of transforming the movement into a political party, PK, later renamed itself PKS in mid-2003. Utilising preexisting Tarbiyah networks, the party expanded its organisational structures rapidly throughout Indonesia. PKS has now opened provincial-level (DPD) and district-level branches (DPD) in all provinces and districts across the entire country. This rapid rise in party branches is seen as a key factor of PKS' remarkable success in the 2004 elections. Additionally, PKS has operated as a 'cadre party,' which requires strict standards and intensive training of members.

The last factor shaping the emergence of Tarbiyah and PKS was the formation of collective action frames. Frames identify targets of blame, offer solutions to achieve a desirable world, and provide a rationale to motivate collective action. Frames can draw upon ideology. In this way, as discussed in Chapter 6, PKS' ideology, which is based on selective interpretation of Islamic theology and history, provides a basis for its collective action. The party's ideological roots lie deep in the notion that Islam is *al-diin, al-kaffah*, or a total, comprehensive, and all-encompassing way of life with no separation between *aqidah wa shari'ah* (belief and law), *diin wa dawlah* (religion and state), and *diin wa dunya* (spiritual and temporal). Accordingly, PKS activists attribute many of the problems besetting the global Muslim community to the spread of secularism. To PKS, the adoption of secular values in the state's political platform has marginalised political Islam. Toward this end, PKS offers one of the most common

frames among Islamist groups worldwide, that is, "Islam is the solution" (*al-Islam huwa al-hal*).

Following PKS' successful campaign in 2004 on an anti-corruption ticket, PKS began to downplay its ideological frames and avoid displaying its Islamist stance too plainly. Instead, the party promotes a clean and caring image and emphasises the 'secular' themes of fighting corruption, good governance, and devotion to welfare activities. Furthermore, PKS leaders have endeavoured to frame their position on these non-Islamist issues in religious terms. They view *shari'a* in a general term, covering all aspects of live and having a universal nature. In their understanding, fighting corruption and eradicating poverty are also parts of *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* (Islamic teaching of commanding good and forbidding evil deeds). Despite this clean and caring campaign is central to PKS' self-image, PKS' strenuous efforts to promote its broader message can be seen as a way to reach out a wider audience outside its traditional base.

In addition to PKS' attempts to extend its base by promoting non-Islamist issues through the adoption of the language of clean government and social concern, PKS seeks to convince its traditional supporters by maintaining its earlier commitment to Islamist causes. Despite its success to moderate its image by promoting non-Islamist agendas, it is still likely seen as an Islamist party eventually pushing for the implementation of *shari'a* in public life and other conservative legislation products. This is markedly evident in PKS' strong support to enact the draft anti pornography bill. There are also growing signs that local

campaigns which involve PKS cadres in many provinces and districts pushing for the implementation of Islamic-inspired laws such as regulating Islamic attire in public office, banning alcohol, gambling, and prostitution.

Aside from striving to implement Islamic-based laws through formal politics, PKS also uses collective action to maintain its Islamic image. This study employed protest-event analysis, which is commonly used in the tradition of social movement research to examine PKS' collective action. The results of this study suggest that roughly six-in-ten of PKS demonstrations can be called Islamist in essence. As described in Chapter 3, PKS' collective actions have been driven by a strong sense of anti-Zionism and anti-Americanism as well as support for the Palestine cause. This indicates PKS' preoccupation with distant but religiously charged issues rather than grappling with non-Islamist and domestic issues that correspond with national interests.

It can be argued that PKS is still preoccupied with Islamist transnational framings. As discussed in the last part of Chapter 6, these PKS' Islamist framings refer to the idea that Islam is under siege by the West as well as a belief in Jewish conspiracies to undermine the Muslim community and the importance of an integration of *umma* to deal with a range of problems faced by Muslims across the world. These Islamist framings are crucial to understand the nature of PKS' collective action which is driven by a strong antipathy to America and Israel. Also, these framings demonstrated the ability of PKS to construct its ideology and discourse with the objective of mobilising support.

APPENDIX 1

PIAGAM DEKLARASI
PARTAI KEADILAN

Bahwa sesungguhnya Bangsa Indonesia telah melintasi gelombang pasang naik dan pasang surut, menghela beban berat penjajahan, penindasan dan pengkhianatan.

Tahap demi tahap perjuangan panjang mengantarkan bangsa ini ke gerbang kemerdekaan dan kedaulatan, yang pada mulanya dicitakan untuk mewujudkan Negara yang melindungi segenap bangsa Indonesia dan seluruh tumpah darah Indonesia untuk memajukan kesejahteraan umum, mencerdaskan kehidupan bangsa, dan ikut melaksanakan ketertiban dunia yang berdasarkan kemerdekaan, perdamaian abadi dan keadilan sosial, sesuai dengan semangat Proklamasi 1945. Namun selama lima dekade berikutnya, garis sejarah itu mengalami berbagai penyimpangan, sehingga
cita-cita besar bangsa menjadi kabur.

Kejatuhan rejim Orde Lama, diikuti dengan keruntuhan rejim Orde Baru, merupakan tragedi yang seharusnya menyadarkan kembali bangsa ini akan cita-cita luhurnya semula. Seluruh kekuatan bangsa wajib bergandeng tangan dengan landasan persaudaraan, keadilan, dan berpacu dalam kebaikan, seraya meninggalkan permusuhan, kedhaliman, dan pertikaian antar kelompok.

Gerakan mahasiswa, yang disokong penuh rakyat Indonesia, telah mengobarkan "Reformasi Mei 1998" sebagai peretas jalan bagi terbentuknya "Orde Reformasi";orde yang diikat dengan nilai-nilai fitri kemanusiaan berupa keimanan, moralitas, kemerdekaan, persamaan, kedamaian, dan keadilan. Berkat rahmat Allah SWT, kemudian dipicu semangat reformasi, tercetuslah momentum untuk membangun kembali negeri yang besar ini, dengan cara pandang yang benar dan meninggalkan segala bentuk kesalahan generasi terdahulu. Mari bersatu dalam kebenaran untuk mengisi lembaran sejarah baru agar bangsa Indonesia senantiasa berdiri tegak dan berperan serta dalam mewujudkan masyarakat international yang berperadaban.

Kejayaan atau kehancuran suatu negeri merupakan buah dari kepatuhan atau keingkaran penduduknya terhadap nilai-nilai religius dan universal, terutama nilai keadilan. Pada titik ini fitrah insani bertemu dengan tuntutan reformasi dan peluang demokratisasi. Maka perjuangan menegakkan keadilan pun menjadi

keharusan, sebagai manifestasi misi utama Islam untuk menjadi rahmat bagi seluruh alam.

Demi mewujudkan cita-cita sejati Proklamasi, mengisi kemerdekaan, mempertahankan kedaulatan dan pe rsatuan, serta berbekal semangat reformasi dan dukungan umat dari berbagai daerah, kami selaku anak bangsa dengan ini mendeklarasikan berdirinya PARTAI KEADIL AN.

Semoga Allah Yang Maha Kuasa membimbing dan memberi kekuatan untuk menegakkan keadilan, mewujudkan kesejahteraan dan kemakmuran bagi seluruh bangsa Indonesia.

"... Berbuat adillah, karena adil itu lebih dekat kepada taqwa ..." (Al-Qur-an, Surah Al-Maidah: 8)

Dinyatakan di Jakarta
Ahad, 15 Rabi'ul Tsani 1419 / 9 Agustus 1998

Dewan Pendiri
PARTAI KEADILAN

Dr. M. Hidayat Nurwahid, M.A.
Ketua

Luthfi Hasan Ishaaq, M.A.
Sekretaris

Anggota

Dr. Salim Segaf Aljufri, M.A.
Dr. Mulyanto, M.Eng.
Dr. Ir. H. Nur Mahmudi Isma'il, M.Sc.
Drs. Abu Ridho, A.S.
Mutammimul Ula, S.H.
K.H. Abdul Hasib, Lc.
Fahri Hamzah, S.E.
Dr. Daud Rasyid Sitorus, M.A.
Dr. Agus Nurhadi
Igo Ilham, Ak.
Chin Kun Min (al-Hafizh)
Drs. Arifinto
Nursanita Nasution, S.E., M.E.

H. Rahmat Abdullah
Dr. Ahmad Satori Ismail
Ir. Untung Wahono
Ir. Suswono
Mashadi
Dra. Sri Utami
Nurmansyah Lubis, S.E., Ak., M.M.
dr. Naharus Surur
Drs. Muhroni
Drs. H. Suharna S., M.S.
H.M. Ihsan Arlansyah Tanjung
H. Aus Hidayat
Ir. H. Tifatul Sembiring
Drs. Al Muzammil Yusuf
Drs. Mukhlis Abdi
Maddu Mallu, S.E., M.B.A.
H.M. Nasir Zein, M.A.
K.H. Acep Abdus Syakur
Dr. Ahzami Samiun Jazuli, M.A.
K.H. Yusuf Supendi, Lc.
Hj. Yoyoh Yusroh
M. Anis Matta, Lc.
Ahmad Zainuddin, Lc.
Dra. Zirlirosa Jamil
Syamsul Balda, S.E., M.M.
Habib Aboe Bakar Al-Habsyi
Sunmanjaya Rukmandis, S.H.
Ahmad Heriawan, Lc.
Drs. Erlangga Masdiana, M.Si.
Didik Akhmadi, Ak. Mcom.
K.H. Abdur Roqib, Lc.
H. Abdullah Said Baharmus, Lc.
Ahmad Hatta, M.A., Ph.D.
Makmur Hasanuddin, M.A.
Dra. Siti Zainab

APPENDIX 2

DEKLARASI
PARTAI KEADILAN SEJAHTERA

Bismilllahirrahmaanirrahiim

Bangsa Indonesia telah menjalani sebuah sejarah panjang yang sangat menentukan dalam waktu lebih dari lima dekade ini dengan sebuah perjuangan yang berat dan kritis. Setelah lepas dari penjajahan Belanda dan Jepang selama tiga setengah abad, Indonesia memproklamirkan kemerdekaannya pada tanggal 17 Agustus 1945.

Kebangkitan ini berjalan hingga tahun 1959 ketika upaya untuk membangun bangsa yang demokratis dan sejahtera mengalami kebuntuan dengan dikeluarkannya Dekrit Presiden 5 Juli 1959 yang menandai awal diktaktorisme di Indonesia. Orde Baru muncul pada tahun 1966 tetapi ternyata hanya merupakan sebuah perpanjangan tangan kekuasaan militer yang benih-benihnya sudah mulai bersemi pada masa Orde Lama.

Pada tanggal 21 Mei 1998 bangsa Indonesia mengukir kembali harapannya untuk hidup dalam suasana yang mampu memberi harapan ke depan dengan digulirkannya Reformasi Nasional yang didorong oleh perjuangan mahasiswa dan rakyat. Reformasi Nasional pada hakekatnya adalah sebuah kelanjutan dari upaya mencapai kemerdekaan, keadilan dan kesejahteraan bagi bangsa Indonesia dari perjuangan panjang yang telah ditempuh selama berabad-abad.

Demokratisasi menjadi tulang punggung perjuangan tersebut yang mewadahi partisipasi masyarakat dalam keseluruhan aspeknya. Bertolak dari kesadaran tersebut, dibentuklah sebuah partai politik yang akan menjadi wahana dakwah untuk mewujudkan cita-cita universal dan menyalurkan aspirasi politik kaum muslimin khususnya beserta seluruh lapisan masyarakat Indonesia umumnya. Partai tersebut bernama Partai Keadilan Sejahtera.

Semoga Allah SWT memberikan hidayah dan inayah-Nya kepada kita, mengikatkan hati diantara para pengikut agama-Nya dan menolong perjuangan mereka dimana pun mereka berada. Amin.

Jakarta, 20 April 2002

Atas Nama Pendiri Partai Keadilan Sejahtera

(Drs. Almuzzammil Yusuf)

Ketua

(Drs. Haryo Setyoko)

Sekretaris Jenderal

DAFTAR NAMA PENDIRI
PARTAI KEADILAN SEJAHTERA

Abdullah
Achyar Eldine, SE
Ahmad Yani, Drs.
Ahmadi Sukarno, Lc., MAg
Ahzami Samiun Jazuli, MA, DR
Ali Akhmadi, MA
Arlin Salim, Ir
Bali Pranowo, Drs
Budi Setiadi, SKH
Bukhori Yusuf , MA
Eddy Zanur, Ir, MSAE
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Ferry Noor, SSi
H. Abdul Jabbar Madjid MA
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H.M. Nasir Zein, MA
Harjani Hefni, Lc
Haryo Setyoko, Drs
Herawati Noor, Dra
Herlini Amran, MA
Imron Zabidi, Mphil
Kaliman Iman Sasmitha
M. Iskan Qolba Lubis, MA
M. Martri Agoeng
Muttaqin
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Mohammad Idris Abdus Somad, MA, DR
Muhammad Aniq S, Lc.

Muhammad Budi Setiawan, Drs
Muslim Abdullah, MA
Musoli, MSc, Drs
Musyafa Ahmad Rahim, Lc
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P. Edy Kuncoro, SE. Ak
Ruly Tisnayuliansyah, Ir
Rusdi Muchtar
Sarah Handayani, SKM
Susanti
Suswono, Ir
Syamsu Hilal, Ir
Umar Salim Basalamah, SIP
Usman Effendi, Drs
Wahidah R Bulan, Dra
Wirianingsih, Dra
Yon Mahmudi, MA
Yusuf Dardiri, Ir
Zaenal Arifin
Zufar Bawazier, Lc
Zulkieflimansyah, DR.

APPENDIX 3

ANGGARAN DASAR

PARTAI KEADILAN SEJAHTERA

MUQADDIMAH

Bangsa Indonesia telah menjalani sebuah sejarah panjang yang sangat menentukan dalam waktu lebih lima decade ini dengan sebuah perjuangan yang berat dan kritis. Setelah lepas dari penjajahan Belanda dan Jepang selama tiga setengah abad, Indonesia memproklamirkan kemerdekaannya pada tanggal 17 Agustus 1945. Kebangkitan ini berjalan hingga tahun 1959 ketika upaya untuk membangun bangsa yang demokratis dan sejahtera mengalami kebuntuan dengan dikeluarkannya Dekrit Presiden 5 Juli 1959 yang menandai awal diktaktorisme di Indonesia. Orde Baru muncul pada tahun 1966 tetapi ternyata hanya merupakan sebuah perpanjangan tangan kekuasaan militer yang benih-benihnya sudah mulai bersemi pada masa Orde Lama. Pada tanggal 21 Mei 1998 bangsa Indonesia mengukir kembali harapannya untuk hidup dalam suasana yang mampu memberi harapan ke depan dengan digulirkannya Reformasi Nasional yang didorong oleh perjuangan mahasiswa dan rakyat.

Reformasi Nasional pada hakekatnya adalah sebuah kelanjutan dari upaya mencapai kemerdekaan, keadilan dan Sejahtera bagi bangsa Indonesia dari perjuangan panjang yang telah ditempuh selama berabad-abad. Demokratisasi menjadi tulang punggung perjuangan tersebut yang mewadahi partisipasi masyarakat dalam keseluruhan aspeknya. Bertolak dari kesadaran tersebut, dibentuk sebuah partai politik yang akan menjadi wahana dakwah untuk mewujudkan cita-cita universal dan menyalurkan aspirasi politik kaum muslimin beserta seluruh lapisan masyarakat Indonesia, dengan Anggaran Dasar sebagai berikut.

BAB 1

NAMA, PENDIRIAN, ASAS, KEDUDUKAN DAN LAMBANG PARTAI

Pasal 1

Nama dan Pendirian

Partai ini bernama Partai Keadilan Sejahtera. Didirikan di Jakarta pada hari Sabtu, tanggal 9 Jumadil Ula 1423 H bertepatan dengan tanggal 20 April 2002 M.

Pasal 2

Asas

Islam.

Pasal 3

Kedudukan

1. Pusat Partai berkedudukan di ibu kota negara Republik Indonesia.
2. Pusat partai dapat dipindahkan dalam kondisi tertentu atas keputusan Majelis Syuro.
3. Partai dapat membuka cabang-cabang di seluruh wilayah hukum negara Republik Indonesia dan perwakilan di luar negeri bagi Warga Negara Indonesia.

Pasal 4

Lambang

Gambar dua bulan sabit dengan untaian padi tegak lurus ditengah berwarna kuning emas dalam perisai segi empat persegi panjang berwarna hitam bergambar Ka'bah. Di bagian atas tertulis **PARTAI KEADILAN** dan bagian dalam kotak Ka'bah tertulis **SEJAHTERA** berwarna kuning emas.

Bab 2

TUJUAN DAN USAHA

Pasal 5

Tujuan

Partai Keadilan Sejahtera adalah Partai Da'wah yang bertujuan mewujudkan masyarakat yang adil dan sejahtera yang diridlai Allah Subhanahu Wata'ala, dalam negara kesatuan Republik Indonesia yang berdasarkan Pancasila.

Pasal 6

Usaha

Untuk mencapai tujuan tersebut diusahakanlah hal-hal sebagai berikut :

1. Membebaskan bangsa Indonesia dari segala bentuk kezaliman.
2. Membina masyarakat Indonesia menjadi masyarakat Islami.
3. Mempersiapkan bangsa Indonesia agar mampu menjawab berbagai problema dan tuntutan masa mendatang.
4. Membangun sistem kehidupan bermasyarakat dan bernegara yang sesuai dengan nilai-nilai Islam.
5. Membangun negara Indonesia baru yang adil, sejahtera dan berwibawa .

Bab 3

KEANGGOTAAN

Pasal 7

Keanggotaan

Setiap warga negara Indonesia dapat menjadi anggota partai.

Bab 4

STRUKTUR ORGANISASI

Pasal 8

Struktur Organisasi

Organisasi tingkat pusat Partai Keadilan Sejahtera adalah sebagai berikut

1. Majelis Syuro
2. Majelis Pertimbangan Partai.
3. Dewan Syari'ah Pusat
4. Dewan Pimpinan Pusat
5. Lembaga Kelengkapan Partai

Pasal 9

Masa Jabatan Pimpinan

Batas maksimal jabatan Ketua Majelis Syuro, Ketua Majelis Pertimbangan Partai, Ketua Dewan Syari'ah Pusat dan Ketua Umum Partai adalah 2 (dua) periode.

Pasal 10

Akhir Masa Jabatan Pimpinan

1. Telah selesai menjalani masa jabatannya sesuai dengan masa kerja yang telah ditetapkan.
2. Apabila tidak dapat lagi melaksanakan kewajiban-kewajibannya sebagai Pimpinan Partai , maka Majelis Syuro hendaknya mempelajari kondisi tersebut dan mengambil keputusan yang sesuai. Jika terlihat bahwa penghentian Pimpinan Partai tersebut akan membawa maslahat bagi Partai, maka hendaknya Majelis Syuro mengadakan pertemuan khusus untuk itu. Dan keputusan penghentian Pimpinan partai tersebut harus mendapatkan persetujuan lebih dari dua pertiga anggota Majelis Syuro.
3. Apabila ada Pimpinan Partai mengajukan pengunduran dirinya, maka Majelis Syuro hendaklah mengundang anggotanya untuk mempelajari latar belakang pengunduran diri tersebut dan mengambil keputusan yang sesuai. Dan apabila yang bersangkutan mendesak mengundurkan diri maka pengunduran diri itu dapat diterima berdasarkan keputusan suara terbanyak secara mutlak anggota Majelis Syuro.
4. Apabila terjadi kevakuman pada jabatan ketua dan wakil ketua Majelis Syuro dalam waktu yang sama, maka Majelis Syuro melakukan pemilihan penggantinya.
5. Apabila Ketua Umum Partai meninggal dunia atau berhalangan tetap, maka Majelis Pertimbangan Partai menunjuk salah seorang Ketua Dewan Pimpinan Pusat untuk mengambil alih seluruh tugas dan wewenang Ketua Umum hingga Majelis Syuro menetapkan Ketua Umum baru.
6. Apabila Ketua Dewan syari'ah Pusat meninggal dunia, maka wakilnya mengambil alih seluruh wewenangnya hingga habis masa jabatannya.
7. Ketentuan lain yang terkait dan atau sejalan dengan pasal ini akan ditetapkan oleh Majelis Syuro Partai

Bab 5

MAJELIS SYURO

Pasal 11

Fungsi Majelis Syuro

Majelis Syuro adalah lembaga tertinggi partai yang berfungsi sebagai Lembaga Ahlul Halli wal-Aqdi Partai Keadilan Sejahtera.

Pasal 12

Anggota Majelis Syuro

1. Anggota Majelis Syuro terdiri dari sekurang-kurangnya tiga puluh lima orang yang dipilih melalui pemilihan raya yang melibatkan seluruh anggota kader inti partai.
2. Pemilihan anggota Majelis Syuro dilakukan melalui pemilihaan raya yang penyelenggaraannya dengan membentuk kepanitiaan oleh Majelis Syuro yang sekurang-kurangnya terdiri dari:
   -Seorang ketua berasal dari anggota Majelis Syuro.
   -Seorang wakil ketua berasal dari anggota Dewan Syari'ah Pusat.
   -Seorang sekretaris berasal dari Dewan Pimpinan Pusat.
   -Dan beberapa orang anggota.

3. Pengesahan dan pelantikan anggota Majelis Syuro terpilih dilakukan oleh Musyawarah Nasional.

Pasal 13

Tugas Majelis Syuro

1. Majelis Syuro bertugas menyusun Visi dan Missi Partai, ketetapan-ketetapan dan rekomendasi Musyawarah Nasional, dan memilih Pimpinan Pusat Partai serta keputusan-keputusan strategis lainnya.
2. Membentuk Majelis Pertimbangan Partai sebagai Badan Pekerja Majelis Syuro dan Dewan Syari'ah Pusat.

Bab 6

MAJELIS PERTIMBANGAN PARTAI

Pasal 14

Tugas Majelis Pertimbangan Partai

Majelis Pertimbangan Partai adalah lembaga pelaksana harian tugas-tugas Majelis Syuro, dalam hal mengawasi jalannya partai agar sesuai dengan tujuan-tujuan Partai, Ketetapan-Ketetapan yang telah dikeluarkan oleh Majelis Syuro dan Musyawarah Nasional.

Bab 7

DEWAN SYARI'AH

Pasal 15

Struktur dan Anggota Dewan Syari'ah Pusat

1. Jumlah anggota Dewan Syari'ah Pusat sebanyak-banyaknya sepertiga anggota Majelis Syuro.
2. Ketua, Wakil Ketua dan beberapa orang anggota Dewan Syari'ah Pusat dipilih oleh Majelis Syuro dari anggotanya.
3. Dewan Syari'ah diberi wewenang membentuk struktur kepengurusan, mengangkat Mudir Idarah dan melengkapi keanggotaannya.

Pasal 16

Struktur dan Anggota Dewan Syari'ah Wilayah

1. Jumlah anggota Dewan Syari'ah Wilayah sekurang-kurangnya tiga orang.
2. Ketua, Wakil Ketua dan anggota Dewan Syari'ah Wilayah dipilih oleh Musyawarah Wilayah.
3. Struktur Dewan Syari'ah Wilayah sedapatnya mengikuti Dewan Syari'ah Pusat
4. Dewan Syari'ah Wilayah diberi wewenang melengkapi keanggotaannya dan mengangkat Mudir Idarah.

Pasal 17

Tugas Dewan Syari'ah

Dewan Syari'ah adalah lembaga fatwa dan qadha yang bertugas merumuskan landasan syar'i terhadap partai dalam melaksanakan aktifitasnya dan memberikan jawaban syar'i terhadap berbagai permasalahan yang dihadapi partai dan anggotanya serta masyarakat.

Bab 8

DEWAN PIMPINAN PUSAT

Pasal 18

Struktur Dewan Pimpinan Pusat

Struktur Dewan Pimpinan Pusat sekurang-kurangnya beranggotakan sebagai berikut

1. Ketua Umum
2. Sekretaris Jendral.
3. Bendahara Umum.

4. Departemen-departemen yang diperlukan.

Pasal 19

Tugas Dewan Pimpinan Pusat.

Dewan Pimpinan Pusat adalah lembaga tanfiziyah partai pada tingkat pusat yang bertugas melaksanakan kegiatan-kegiatan partai dengan masa kerja selama lima (5) tahun qomariyah.

Bab 9

STRUKTUR ORGANISASI WILAYAH, DAERAH,

CABANG DAN RANTING

Pasal 20

Organisasi Tingkat Wilayah

1. Organisasi Wilayah didirikan pada tingkat propinsi yang berkedudukan di ibukota propinsi.
2. Struktur Organisasi tingkat wilayah terdiri dari Dewan Syari'ah Wilayah - Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah.
3. Besarnya lembaga atau badan-badan tersebut disesuaikan dengan kebutuhan wilayah.

Pasal 21

Organisasi Tingkat Daerah, Cabang Dan Ranting

1. Dalam lingkup organisasi tingkat wilayah didirikan organisasi Daerah pada tingkat kabupaten / kotamadya yang berkedudukan di ibukota kabupaten / kotamadya.
2. Dalam lingkup organisasi tingkat Daerah didirikan organaisasi cabang dan dalam lingkup organisasi tingkat cabang pada tingkat kecamatan didirikan organisasi Ranting.
3. Struktur organisasi yang disebutkan ayat 1 dan 2 pasal ini disusun sesuai dengan Anggaran Rumah Tangga.

Bab 10

FORUM PENGAMBILAN KEBIJAKAN

Pasal 22

Musyawarah

1. Musyawarah adalah forum pengambilan kebijakan yang diselenggarakan oleh semua elemen struktural Partai Keadilan Sejahtera.
2. Jenis dan jenjang musyawarah diatur dengan ketentuan tersendiri yang ditetapkan oleh Majelis Syuro.

Pasal 23

Musyawarah Nasional

Musyawarah Nasional adalah pemegang kekuasaan tertinggi Partai Keadilan Sejahtera yang diselenggarakan oleh Majelis Syuro.

Bab 11

KEUANGAN

Pasal 24

Sumber Keuangan

Keuangan partai terdiri dari sumber-sumber berikut :

1. Iuran rutin anggota.
2. Sumbangan dan hibah dari para anggota dan simpatisan
3. Sumber-sumber lain yang halal dan tidak mengikat.

Bab 12

HUBUNGAN KEORGANISASIAN

Pasal 25

Hubungan dan Koalisi Partai

1. Ummat Islam Indonesia merupakan bagian dari ummat Islam sedunia. Partai Keadilan Sejahtera sebagai Partai Da'wah menyatakan dirinya merupakan bagian tak terpisahkan dari gerakan da'wah di berbagai kawasan dunia.

2. Untuk merealisasikan kemaslahatan ummat dan bangsa, Partai melakukan hubungan baik dan kerjasama dengan berbagai pihak di dalam maupun di luar negeri.
3. Majelis Syuro adalah lembaga yang berwenang memutuskan koalisi partai dengan partai atau organisasi lain.

Pasal 26

Hubungan Antar Struktur

Hubungan antar lembaga-lembaga partai tingkat pusat dan lembaga-lembaga partai tingkat pusat dengan lembaga-lembaga di bawahnya diatur dalam Anggaran Rumah Tangga.

Bab 13

KETENTUAN PENUTUP

Pasal 27

Perubahan Anggaran Dasar

Perubahan Anggaran Dasar dilakukan sebagai berikut:

1. Permintaan perubahan berikut alasan-alasannya diajukan melalui mekanisme struktural kepada Majelis Syuro untuk dinilai kelayakannya.
2. Pengubahan dianggap sah bila disetujui oleh dua pertiga anggota Majelis Syuro.

Pasal 28

Ketentuan Anggaran Rumah Tangga

1. Hal-hal yang belum ditetapkan dalam Anggaran Dasar ini diatur dalam Anggaran Rumah Tangga.
2. Anggaran Rumah Tangga adalah tafsir dan penjabaran Anggaran Dasar yang direkomendasikan oleh Majelis Syuro.

Pasal 29

Pengesahan Anggaran Dasar

1. Anggaran Dasar ini disahkan oleh Majelis Syuro Partai Keadilan Sejahtera berdasarkan Rapat Pendirian Partai tanggal 24 Maret 2002
2. Anggaran Dasar ini berlaku sementara sejak tanggal ditetapkan sampai diselenggarakannya Musyawarah Nasional Pertama.

APPENDIX 4

ANGGARAN RUMAH TANGGA

PARTAI KEADILAN SEJAHTERA

BAB 1

TAFSIR LAMBANG PARTAI

Pasal 1

Arti Lambang Partai

Bentuk lambang partai memiliki arti sebagai berikut :

1. Kotak persegi empat berarti kesetaraan, keteraturan dan keserasian.
2. Kotak hitam berarti pusat peradaban dunia Islam yakni Ka'bah
3. Bulan sabit berarti lambang kemenangan Islam, dimensi waktu, keindahan, kebahagiaan, pencerahan dan kesinambungan sejarah.
4. Untaian padi tegak lurus berarti keadilan, ukhuwah, istiqomah, berani dan ketegasan yang mewujudkan keejahteraan.

Warna lambang partai memiliki arti sebagai berikut :

1. Putih berarti bersih dan kesucian.
2. Hitam berarti aspiratif dan kepastian.
3. Kuning emas berarti kecermelangan, kegembiraan dan kejayaan.

Pasal 2

Makna Lambang Partai

Makna lambang partai secara keseluruhan adalah menegakkan nilai-nilai keadilan berlandaskan pada kebenaran, persaudaraan dan persatuan menuju kesejahteraan dan kejayaan ummat dan bangsa.

Bab 2

SASARAN DAN SARANA.

Pasal 3

Sasaran

Untuk mencapai tujuan partai dirumuskan sasaran berikut :

1. Terwujudnya pemerintahan yang jujur, bersih, berwibawa, dan bertanggung jawab berdasarkan nilai-nilai kebenaran dan keadilan.
2. Tegaknya 'Masyarakat Islami' yang memiliki kemandirian berdasarkan sebuah konstitusi yang menjamin hak-hak rakyat dan bangsa Indonesia.

Sasaran partai yang dimaksud ayat (1) pasal ini diupayakan dalam bingkai Kebijakan Dasar Periodik dan Agenda Nasional Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, yang merupakan bagian tak terpisahkan dari Anggaran Dasar dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga Ini.

Pasal 4

Sarana dan Prasarana

Dalam mewujudkan tujuan dan sasarannya partai menggunakan cara, sarana dan prasarana yang tidak bertentangan dengan norma-norma hukum dan kemaslahatan umum, antara lain:

1. Seluruh sarana dan manajemen politik, ekonomi, sosial, budaya dan IPTEK yang dapat mengarahkan dan mengatur kehidupan masyarakat serta dapat menyelesaikan permasalahan-pernasalahannya.
2. Ikut serta dalam lembaga-lembaga pemerintahan, badan-badan penentu kebijakan, hukum dan perundang-undangan, lembaga swadaya masyarakat, dan lain sebagainya.
3. Menggalakkan dialog konstruktif disertai argumentasi yang kuat dengan semua kekuatan politik dan sosial.
4. Aktif berpartisipasi dalam berbagai lembaga dan organisasi serta yayasan yang sesuai dengan tujuan partai.

Bab 3

KEANGGOTAAN

Pasal 5

Sistem dan Prosedur Keanggotaan

Anggota Partai Keadilan Sejahtera terdiri dari :

1. Anggota Kader Pendukung, yaitu mereka yang terlibat aktif mendukung setiap kegiatan kepartaian.
2. Anggota Kader Inti, yaitu anggota yang telah mengikuti berbagai kegiatan pelatihan kepartaian dan dinyatakan lulus oleh panitia penseleksian.
3. Anggota Kehormatan yaitu mereka yang berjasa dalam perjuangan partai dan dikukuhkan oleh Dewan Pimpinan Pusat.

Sistem dan prosedur keanggotaan serta hal-hal yang terkait dengan keanggotaan partai diatur dalam ketentuan tersendiri yang ditetapkan oleh Majelis Syuro.

Bab 4

MAJELIS SYURO

Pasal 6

Anggota Majelis Syuro

1. Syarat keanggotaan Majelis Syuro sebagai berikut:
   a.Umur tidak kurang dari 30 tahun qomariyah
   b.Telah menjadi anggota kader inti dengan status anggota ahli
   Partai
   c.Melaksanakan asas dan tujuan partai
   d.Komitmen dengan kewajiban-kewajiban anggota
   e.Berkelakuan baik dan tidak mendapatkan sangsi dalam 3 tahun terakhir.
   f.Berwawasan syar'i.
   g. Bersifat amanah dan berwibawa

2. Jika ada anggota Majelis Syuro berhalangan tetap maka majelis berhak mengangkat dan mensahkan pengantinya.
3. Majelis Syuro berhak menambah keanggotaannya dengan orang-orang yang dibutuhkan oleh Partai, terdiri dari para pakar dan tokoh dengan catatan tambahan itu tidak lebih dari 15 % anggotanya.
4. Jika anggota Majelis Syuro telah dipilih, maka masing-masing mengucapkan janji setianya di hadapan Musyawarah Nasional, dengan bunyi sebagai berikut:

   'Saya berjanji kepada Allah yang Maha Agung untuk berpegang teguh pada syari'at Islam dan untuk berjihad di jalan-Nya, menunaikan syarat-syarat keanggotaan Majelis Syuro Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, melak sanakan tugas-tugas darinya dan untuk mendengar serta taat kepada pemimpinnya dalam keadaan lapang maupun sempit -selain untuk maksiat-, sekuat tenaga melaksanakannya. Dan saya bersumpah kepada Pengurus

Majelis Syura untuk itu, dan Allah menjadi saksi atas apa yang saya ucapkan.

Pasal 7

Tugas Majelis Syuro

1. Memilih dan menetapkan Ketua majelis, Wakilnya dan SekretarisMajelis dan menetapkannya sebangai ketua, wakil dan sekretaris Majelis Pertimbangan Partai.
2. Memilih dan menetapkan anggota Majelis Pertimbangan Partai.
3. Memilih, dan menetapkan Ketua, Wakil dan Anggota Dewan Syari'ah Pusat
4. Memilih, dan menetapkan Ketua Umum, para Ketua, Sekretaris Jendral dan Bendahara Umum serta beberapa orang Anggota Dewan Pimpinan Pusat.
5. Menyusun tujuan-tujuan Partai, keputusan-keputusan dan rekomendasi Musyawarah Nasional.
6. Menetapkan klausul-klausul perubahan Anggaran Dasar/Anggaran Rumah Tangga (AD/ ART) dan kebijakan politik.
7. Menetapkan anggaran tahunan dan evaluasi akhir dari laporan keuangan.
8. Menetapkan rencana kerja periodik partai, dan mengawasi serta mengevaluasi pelaksanaannya.
9. Mengambil sikap tegas dan bijak dalam hal pencemaran nama baik, kritik, pengaduan, dan tuduhan-tuduhan yang berkaitan dengan partai.

Bab 5

MAJELIS PERTIMBANGAN PARTAI

Pasal 8

Anggota Majelis Pertimbangan Partai

Majelis Pertimbangan Partai terdiri dari sebanyak-banyaknya sepertiga anggota Majelis Syuro yang dipilih oleh Majelis Syuro dari anggotanya.

Pasal 9

Majelis Pertimbangan Partai

1. Menjabarkan ketetapan-ketetapan Musyawarah Nasional dan Majelis Syuro

2. Mengarahkan dan mengawasi pelaksanaan ketetapan-ketetapan Musyawarah Nasional dan Majelis Syuro
3. Menentukan sikap Partai terhadap permasalahan-permasalahan umum dan perubahan-perubahan politik secara regional, dunia Islam atau internasional bersama Dewan Pimpinan Pusat.
4. Mempersiapkan penyelenggaraan Musyawarah Nasional dan Sidang-sidang Majelis Syuro.
5. Merekomendasikan kebijakan program pemilihan umum dan melegalisir calon-calon partai untuk Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/ Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat.
6. Menunjuk perwakilan (wakil) Partai pada lembaga-lembaga, organisasi dan kongres-kongres di dalam dan luar negeri bersama Dewan Pimpinan Pusat.
7. Meratifikasi langkah-langkah yang terarah untuk melaksanakan program kerja politik (strategis).
8. Meratifikasi anggaran proyek yang diajukan Dewan Pimpinan Pusat sebelum diajukan ke Majelis Syuro.
9. Meratifikasi pengajuan struktur dan personil Bidang Dewan Pimpinan Pusat.
10. Mengambil tindakan tegas dalam hal fitnah, kritik, aduan, dan tuduhan yang berkaitan dengan partai dan anggotanya.
11. Mejelis berhak membentuk komisi ad-hoc yang terdiri dari unsur anggota Majelis Syuro dan pakar-pakar sesuai dengan bidangnya.

Bab 6

DEWAN SYARI'AH

Pasal 10

Syarat Anggota Dewan Syari'ah

1. Umur Ketua dan wakil ketua Dewan Syari'ah Pusat tidak kurang dari 35 tahun qomariyah.
2. Umur Ketua dan Wakil ketua Dewan Syari'ah Wilayah tidak kurang dari 30 tahun qomariyah.
3. Telah menjadi kader inti partai dengan status anggota ahli Partai.
4. Berpegang dan komitmen kepada nilai-nilai moral dan kebenaran universal, adil, bertaqwa, sabar, jujur dan bijaksana.
5. Memiliki pengetahuan hukum-hukum syariat yang memadai, bersifat amanah dan berwibawa.
6. Memiliki pengetahuan di Bidang peradilan dan menguasai mekanisme pengambilan keputusan.

Pasal 11

Fungsi Dewan Syari'ah

1. Sebagai Lembaga Fatwa.
2. Sebagai Lembaga Qadha yang keputusan-keputusannya mengikat.
3. Pelaksana tugas-tugas khusus yang ditetapkan oleh Majelis Syuro.
4. Lembaga Peradilan Banding.

Pasal 12

Tugas dan Wewenang Dewan Syari'ah

1. Memberikan landasan syar'i terhadap kebijakan-kebijakan dan persoalan-persoalan yang dihadapi partai.
2. Melakukan pembinaan terhadap Dewan Syari'ah Wilayah.
3. Melakukan kajian terhadap perkara-perkara yang tidak terselesaikan di Dewan Syari'ah Wilayah.
4. Melakukan investigasi terhadap isu, pengaduan, tuduhan, evaluasi dan kesewenangan yang berkaitan dengan Pimpinan Partai dan mengungkapkan hasilnya kepada Majelis Syuro. Khusus yang berkenaan dengan Ketua Umum Partai atau Ketua Majelis Syuro atau Ketua Majelis Pertimbangan Partai atau Ketua Dewan Syari'ah Pusat untuk kasus yang menyangkut dirinya dilakukan oleh komisi khusus yang dibentuk oleh Majelis Syuro.
5. Dewan Pimpinan Pusat, atau Dewan Syari'ah Wilayah kepadanya.
6. Menyusun program dan anggaran tahunan untuk Dewan Syari'ah Pusat kemudian mengajukannya kepada Majelis Syuro.
7. Mengajukan laporan kerja setiap dua bulan kepada Majelis Syuro.

Pasal 13

Klasifikasi Pelanggaran dan Hukuman

1. Setiap perbuatan anggota yang menodai citra partai atau bertentangan dengan prinsip-prinsip kebenaran dan Anggaran Dasar atau Anggaran Rumah Tangga partai adalah pelanggaran yang harus dikenakan sangsi hukum.
2. Klasifikasi pelanggaran berikut hukuman dan cara pelaksanaannya, di atur oleh ketentuan Dewan Syari'ah yang ditetapkan oleh Majelis Syuro.

Bab 7

TUGAS DEWAN PIMPINAN PUSAT

Pasal 14 :

Tugas Konsepsional

1. Menyusun program dan anggaran tahunan untuk Dewan Pimpinan Pusat dan lembaga-lembaga struktural di bawahnya kemudian mengajukannya kepada Majelis Pertimbangan Partai.
2. Mengajukan rancangan perubahan Anggaran Dasar/Anggaran Rumah Tangga kepada Majelis Pertimbangan Partai.
3. Menetapkan Produk-produk konsepsional untuk Bidang-bidang tugas dan lembaga-lembaga struktural di bawahnya.

Pasal 15

Tugas Stuktural

1. Menerima waqaf, hibah dan dana sukarela yang legal.
2. Menyerahkan laporan keuangan dan evaluasi akhir kepada Majelis Pertimbangan Partai.
3. Mengusulkan daftar nama calon sementara anggota legislatif kepada Majelis Pertimbangan Partai.
4. Mengajukan laporan kerja setiap dua bulan kepada Majelis Syuro.

Pasal 16

Tugas Manajerial

1. Menunjuk ketua-ketua Bidang dengan persetujuan Majelis Pertimbangan Partai.
2. Memimpin, mengesahkan dan mengawasi lembaga-lembaga struktural di bawahnya.
3. Membentuk dan mengkoordinasikan lembaga-lembaga pendukung partai.
4. Mensahkan struktur kepengurusan Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah
5. Mengawasi dan mengevaluasi pelaksanaan program kerja tahunan
6. Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah dan lembaga terkait lainnya.

Pasal 17

Tugas Operasional

1. Melaksanakan kebijakan-kebijakan yang ditetapkan oleh Musyawarah Nasional dan Majelis Syuro.
2. Menerbitkan pernyataan-pernyatan resmi.
3. Mempersiapkan kader partai dalam berbagai Bidang.
4. Melaksanakan koordinasi anggota legislatif, eksekutif dan yudikatif yang berasal dari anggota kader partai.

Bab 8

DEWAN PIMPINAN WILAYAH

Pasal 18

Struktur Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah

Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah adalah lembaga eksekutif tingkat propinsi yang berkedudukan di ibukota propinsi dengan struktur sebagai berikut :

1. Ketua Umum dan beberapa ketua.
2. Sekretaris dan wakil sekretaris
3. Bendahara dan wakil bendahara
4. Deputi-deputi.

Pasal 19

Tugas Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah

1. Melaksanakan kebijakan-kebijakan yang ditetapkan oleh Musyawarah Wilayah dan Dewan Pimpinan Pusat.
2. Menyusun program dan anggaran tahunan untuk Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah dan lembaga-lembaga strutural di bawahnya kemudian mengajukan kepada Dewan Pimpinan Pusat.
3. Memimpin, mengesahkan dan mengawasi lembaga-lembaga struktural di bawahnya.
4. Menyiapkan laporan keuangan dan evaluasi akhir dan mengajukannya kepada Musyawarah Wilayah dan Dewan Pimpinan Pusat.
5. Menyusun sidang-sidang Musyawarah Wilayah sesuai dengan ketentuan yang terkait dengan hal tersebut.
6. Mengajukan laporan kerja secara terperinci setiap tiga bulan kepada Dewan Pimpinan Pusat.

Pasal 20

Syarat-syarat Ketua Umum dan Ketua Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah

1. Telah menjadi kader inti partai dengan status anggota ahli.
2. Berpegang teguh kepada nilai-nilai moral dan kebenaran, adil, bertaqwa dan kuat dalam (membela) kebenaran, serius dalam kemaslahatan dan persatuan bangsa, jauh dari fanatisme kepentingan pribadi dan golongan.
3. Memiliki wawasan politik, hukum dan syari’at yang memungkinkannya melaksanakan tugas.

4. Umur tidak kurang dari 25 tahun qomariyah.

Bab 9

DEWAN PIMPINAN DAERAH

Pasal 21

Struktur Dewan Pimpinan Daerah

Dewan Pimpinan Daerah didirikan pada tingkat kabupaten/kotamadya yang berkedudukan di ibukota kabupaten/kotamadya dengan struktur sebagai berikut

1. Ketua Umum dan beberapa ketua.
2. Sekretaris dan wakil sekretaris
3. Bendahara dan wakil bendahara
4. Bagian-Bagian.

Pasal 22

Tugas Dewan Pimpinan Daerah

1. Melaksanakan kebijakan-kebijakan yang ditetapkan oleh Musyawarah Daerah dan Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah.
2. Menyusun program dan anggaran tahunan untuk Dewan Pimpinan Daerah dan lembaga-lembaga struktural di bawahnya kemudian mengajukan kepada Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah.
3. Memimpin, mengesahkan dan mengawasi lembaga-lembaga struktural di bawahnya.
4. Menyusun laporan keuangan dan evaluasi akhir dan mengajukannya kepada Musyawarah Daerah.
5. Menyusun sidang-sidang Musyawarah Daerah sesuai dengan ketentuan yang terkait dengan hal tersebut.
6. Mengajukan laporan kerja secara terperinci setiap tiga bulan kepada Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah.

Pasal 23

Syarat-syarat Ketua Umum dan Ketua Dewan Pimpinan Daerah

1. Telah menjadi kader inti partai yang sekurang-kurangnya dengan status anggota dewasa.

2. Berpegang teguh kepada nilai-nilai moral dan kebenaran, adil, bertaqwa dan kuat dalam (membela) kebenaran, serius dalam kemaslahatan dan persatuan bangsa, jauh dari fanatisme kepentingan pribadi dan golongan.
3. Memiliki wawasan politik, hukum dan syari'at yang memungkinkannya melaksanakan tugas.
4. Umur tidak kurang dari 25 tahun qomariyah.

Bab 10

DEWAN PIMPINAN CABANG

Pasal 24

Struktur Dewan Pimpinan Cabang

Dewan Pimpinan Cabang didirikan pada tingkat kecamatan yang berkedudukan di ibukota kecamatan dengan struktur sebagai berikut

1. Ketua dan Wakil ketua.
2. Sekretaris dan wakil sekretaris
3. Bendahara dan wakil bendahara
4. Seksi-Seksi.

Pasal 25

Tugas Dewan Pimpinan Cabang

1. Melaksanakan kebijakan-kebijakan yang ditetapkan oleh Musyawarah Cabang dan Dewan Pimpinan Daerah.
2. Menyusun program dan anggaran tahunan untuk Dewan Pimpinan Cabang dan lembaga-lembaga struktural di bawahnya kemudian mengajukan kepada Dewan Pimpinan Daerah.
3. Memimpin, mengesahkan dan mengawasi lembaga-lembaga struktural di bawahnya.
4. Menyusun laporan keuangan dan evaluasi akhir dan mengajukannya kepada Musyawarah Cabang.
5. Menyusun sidang-sidang Musyawarah Cabang sesuai dengan ketentuan yang terkait dengan hal tersebut.
6. Mengajukan laporan kerja secara terperinci setiap tiga bulan kepada Dewan Pimpinan Daerah.

Pasal 26

Syarat Ketua dan Wakil Ketua Dewan Pimpinan Cabang

1. Telah menjadi kader inti partai yang sekurang-kurangnya dengan status anggota madya.
2. Berpegang teguh kepada nilai-nilai moral dan kebenaran, adil, bertaqwa dan kuat dalam (membela) kebenaran, serius dalam kemaslahatan dan persatuan bangsa, jauh dari fanatisme kepentingan pribadi dan golongan.
3. Memiliki wawasan politik, hukum dan syariat yang memungkinkannya melaksanakan tugas.
4. Umur tidak kurang dari 20 tahun qomariyah.

Bab 11

DEWAN PIMPINAN RANTING

Pasal 27

Struktur Dewan Pimpinan Ranting

Dewan Pimpinan Ranting didirikan pada tingkat kelurahan/desa dengan struktur kepengurusan sebagai berikut :

1. Ketua dan Wakil ketua.
2. Sekretaris dana wakil sekretaris
3. Bendahara dan wakil bendahara
4. Unit-Unit.

Pasal 28

Tugas Dewan Pimpinan Ranting

1. Melaksanakan kebijakan-kebijakan yang ditetapkan oleh Musyawarah Ranting dan Dewan Pimpinan Cabang.
2. Menyusun program dan anggaran tahunan untuk Dewan Pimpinan Ranting kemudian mengajukan kepada Dewan Pimpinan Cabang.
3. Menyiapkan laporan keuangan dan evaluasi akhir dan mengajukannya kepada Musyawarah Ranting.
4. Menyusun sidang-sidang Musyawarah Ranting sesuai dengan ketentuan yang terkait dengan hal tersebut.
5. Mengajukan laporan kerja secara terperinci setiap tiga bulan kepada Dewan Pimpinan Cabang.

Pasal 29

Syarat-syarat Ketua dan Wakil Ketua Dewan Pimpinan Ranting

1. Telah menjadi kader pendukung partai dengan status anggota muda.
2. Berpegang teguh kepada nilai-nilai moral dan kebenaran, adil, bertaqwa dan kuat dalam (membela) kebenaran, serius dalam kemaslahatan dan persatuan bangsa, jauh dari anatisme kepentingan pribadi dan golongan.
3. Memiliki wawasan politik, hukum dan syariat yang memungkinkannya melaksanakan tugas.
4. Umur tidak kurang dari 18 tahun qomariyah.

Bab 12

KEUANGAN

Pasal 30

Sumber Keuangan

Kekayaan Partai diperoleh dari:

1. Iuran, infaq wajib, dan shadaqah yang berasal dari anggota.
2. Infaq dan shadaqah dari luar anggota.
3. Sumbangan dan bantuan tetap atau tidak tetap dari masyarakat atau orang-orang atau badan-badan yang menaruh minat pada aktifitas Partai yang bersifat sukarela dan tidak mengikat.
4. Waqaf, wasiat dan hibah-hibah lainnya.

Pasal 31

Pemungutan Iuran dan Infaq Anggota

Partai mempunyai hak untuk mengambil iuran, infaq dan shadaqah dari anggotanya.

Pasal 32

Penyaluran/Pengalokasian Dana

1. Partai mempunyai hak untuk menentukan penyaluran dan atau pengalokasian dana Partai.
2. Dana Partai yang tidak segera digunakan untuk kepentingan aktifitas Partai, pengaturannya ditentukan oleh Majelis Syuro.

Pasal 33

Tugas Bendahara Partai

1. Mengatur kekayaan Partai.
2. Mencatat semua harta Partai dan membukukan pengeluaran dan pemasukannya.
3. Mengawasi semua jenis kegiatan keuangan dan akuntansinya serta melaporkannya kepada Dewan Pimpinan Pusat secara periodik.
4. Menyusun anggaran dan penyiapan evaluasi akhir.

Bab 13

HUBUNGAN KEORGANISASIAN

Pasal 34

Asas Hubungan Keorganisasian

1. Hubungan dengan oragisasi yang sejenis baik vertikal maupun horizontal atas asas wala' dan ta'awun.
2. Hubungan dengan organisasi Islam atas asas ukhuwah dan ta'awun.
3. Hubungan dengan organisasi umum atas asas kemanusiaan dan kemaslahatan umum yang dibenarkan Islam.

Pasal 35

Hubungan Antar Struktur

1. Hubungan lembaga tertinggi partai dengan lembaga-lembaga di bawahnya bersifat langsung.
2. Hubungan antar lembaga tinggi partai tingkat pusat bersifat langsung, melalui Pimpinan masing-masing.
3. Hubungan lembaga tinggi partai dengan lembaga organisasi partai tingkat wilayah bersifat langsung sesuai tingkat wewenangnya.
4. Hubungan departemen di Dewan Pimpinan Pusat dengan deputi terkait di Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah bersifat langsung sesuai tingkat wewenang dan kebutuhan, dengan sepengetahuan Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah.
5. Apabila departemen di Dewan Pimpinan Pusat tidak mempunyai turunannya di Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah maka departemen tersebut dapat berkoordinasi dengan Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah.
6. Hubungan antar pimpinan partai tingkat wilayah dengan struktur di bawahnya, mengikuti pola hubungan antar level kepemimpinan partai seperti tersebut dalam ayat 2 sampai dengan 5 pasal ini.
7. Hubungan lembaga-lembaga struktural di tingkat bawah dengan lembaga-lembaga di atasnya mengikuti mekanisme struktural yang telah ditetapkan.

Bab 14

KETENTUAN TAMBAHAN

Pasal 36

Ketentuan Tambahan

1. Untuk memperluas jaringan kerja dan menampung aspirasi pendukung partai, maka:

   - Dewan Pimpinan Pusat dapat membentuk kepengurusan Majelis Kehormatandan Dewan Pakar,

   - Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah dapat membentuk kepengurusan Dewan Pakar,
   - Dewan Pimpinan Daerah dapat membentuk kepengurusan Dewan Penasehat, dan
   - Dewan Pimpinan Cabang dapat membentuk kepengurusan Dewan Pembina, yang diatur oleh peraturan khusus yang ditetapkan Majelis Syuro.

2. Apabila persyaratan kepengurusan tingkat Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah, Dewan Pimpinan Daerah serta kelengkapan strukturnya tidak terpenuhi, maka dimungkinkan pembentukan struktur dan pengangkatan kader dari jenjang keanggotaan di bawahnya, dengan sepengetahuan Dewan Pimpinan Pusat dan Majelis Pertimbangan Partai.
3. Apabila persyaratan kepengurusan tingkat Dewan Pimpinan Cabang, Dewan Pimpinan Ranting serta kelengkapan strukturnya tidak terpenuhi, maka dimungkinkan pembentukan struktur dan pengangkatan kader dari jenjang keanggotaan di bawahnya, dengan sepengetahuan Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah dan Dewan Pimpinan Pusat.
4. Didirikan perwakilan Partai di kalangan warga negara Indonesia di luar negeri sesuai dengan peraturan khusus yang diterbitkan Dewan Pimpinan Pusat dengan memperhatikan peraturan perundang-undangan yang berlaku di negara bersangkutan.

Bab 15

KETENTUAN PENUTUP

Pasal 37

Penutup

Dalam hal belum dilaksanakannya Musyawarah Nasional I, maka para pendiri partai bertindak dan melaksanakan tugas selaku Majelis Syuro.

APPENDIX 5

Susunan Pengurus Pusat PKS 2005-2010

Ketua Majelis Syuro / Ketua Lembaga Tinggi Partai : K.H. Hilmi Aminuddin. Presiden Partai : Ir. H. Tifatul Sembiring. Sekretaris Jenderal : H.M. Anis Matta Lc. Bendahara Umum : H. Mahfud Abdurrahman. Badan Pemenangan Pemilu : H.M. Razikun, Ak, MS. Ketua : DR. H. Surahman Hidayat.

Lembaga Tinggi Partai

Ketua Majelis Syuro / Ketua Lembaga Tinggi Partai : K.H. Hilmi Aminuddin

Mas'ul Maktab Hay-ah Syar'iyyah/Ketua Dewan Syariah Pusta : Drs. H. Suharna Surapranata, MT.

Mas'ul Maktab Tanfidzi/Ketua Dewan Pimpinan Pusat/Presiden Partai : Ir. H. Tifatul Sembiring

Aminul 'Aam/Sekretariat Jenderal : H.M. Anis Matta

Amin Maali / Bendahara Umum : H. Mahfudz Abdurrahman

Badan-Badan di Lembaga Tinggi Partai :
Badan Pertimbangan Tugas dan Jabatan : ex officio
Ketua : Drs. H. Suharna Supranata, MT.
Anggota : Ketua Bidang Pembinaan Kader, Ketua Bidang Pembinaan Wilayah, Wilda terkait, Ketua Departemen Kaderisasi, Sekjen, Wasekjen Bidang Organisasi.

Badan Penegak Disiplin Organisasi : ex officio

Ketua : H. Luthfi Hasan Ishaq, MA
Anggota : Ketua Wilayah Dakwah terkait, Ketua Bidang Pembinaan Wilayah, Ketua Bidang Pembinaan Kader, Ket.Dept. Kaderisasi, Sekjen, MPP.

Dewan Pimpinan Pusat

Presiden Partai : Ir. H. Tifatul Sembiring

Sekretaris Jenderal : H.M. Anis Matta Lc.

Wakil Sekjen I : Ir. H. Suswono, MMA.
Wakil Sekjen II : Ir. Ade Barkah
Wakil Sekjen III : Ir. Aboe Bakar Alhabsy
Wakil Sekjen IV : Dr. Mardani
Wakil Sekjen V : H. Fahri Hamzah, SE.
Wakil Sekjen VI : Nurhasan Zaidi, S.Sos.I
Wakil Sekjen VII : Riko Desendra : SSI.

Bendahara Umum : H. Mahfud Abdurrahman
Bendahara I : P. Edy Kuncoro
Bendahara II : Masfuri, Ak.
Bendahara III : Taruna Wiyasa
Bendahara IV : H. Kiemas Taufik
Bendahara V : H. Didin Amaruddin, Ak.

Bidang Pembinaan Kader : Ahmad Zainuddin, Lc
Departemen Kaderisasi : Abdul Muiz, MA
Departemen Dakwah : Thahhah Nuhin, Lc.
Departemen MDI (Ma'hid dan Dirosah Islamiyyah) Samin Barkah, Lc

Bidang Pembinaan Wilayah : H. Aus Hidayat Nur
Departemen Wilayah Dakwah Sumbagut : Drs. Chairul Anwar, Apt.
Departemen Wilayah Dakwah Sumbagsel : Drs. M. Syahfan Badri
Departemen Wilayah DakwahBanten, DKI Jakarta, Jawa Barat : Ir. Syamsu Hilal
Departemen Wilayah Dakwah Jawa Tengah dan Jogjakarta : Zubeir Syafawi, SH.I
Departemen Wilayah Dakwah Jawa Timur dan Bali : Ir. Sigit Sosiantomo
Departemen Wilayah Dakwah Kalimantan : Abdurrohman Amin
Departemen Wilayah Dakwah Maluku, Maluku Utara, Irian : Ahmad Zaki, Ak.
Departemen Wilayah Dakwah Sulawesi : drs. Cahyadi Takariawan, Apt.
Departemen Wilayah Dakwah NTB, NTT : Triono, SH.

Bidang Kewanitaan : Ledia Hanifa, MS
Departemen Kajian Wanita : dra. Sri Utami, MM
Departemen Jaringan Lembaga Wanita : Netti Prasetyani
Departemen Pemberdayaan Wanita : Dwi Septiawati

Bidang Kesejahteraan Rakyat : drs. H. Musholi
Departemen Pendidikan dan SDM : drs. Fahmi Alaydroes, Psi, MM, Med.
Departemen Kesehatan dan Sosial : dr. H. Agoes Koos Hartoro
Departemen Kemahasiswaan : Ahmad Ariyandra, Ak.
Departemen Seni dan Budaya : H. M. Ridwan

Bidang Politik, Hukum dan Keamanan (POLHUKAM) : Ir. H. Untung Wahono,

Msi.
Departemen Politik dan Hankam : drs. H. Almuzammil Yusuf
Departemen Hukum dan HAM : Fitra Arsil, SH, MH.
Departemen Pemerintahan dan Otonomi Daerah : Achyar Eldine, SE,MM

Bidang Ekonomi, Keuangan, Industri dan Teknologi (EKUINTEK): DR. Mohammad Sohibul Iman
Departemen Ekonomi, Keuangan, Perbankan : Sigit Pramono, SE,MSE.
Departemen Pembinaan UKM : Ir. H. Ruly Tisna Yuliansyah
Departemen Teknologi, Industri, LH : DR. Edi Syukur
Departemen Buruh Tani, Nelayan : Edy Zannur, MSAE.

Bidang Pembinaan Pemuda : Ir. Ahmad Faradis
Departemen Kepeloporan Pemuda: Slamet Nurdin
Departemen Kepanduan : Cahya Zailani
Departemen Olahraga : Unggul Wibawa

Badan-Badan di Bawah DPP

Badan Pemenangan Pemilu : H.M. Razikun, Ak, MS.
Badan Legislatif : Hermanto, SE, MM.
Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan, drs. H. Mahfudz Siddiq, MSE.
Badan Hubungan Luar Negeri : H. Lutfi Hasan Ishaq, MA

Dewan Syariah Pusat
Ketua : DR. H. Surahman Hidayat
Amin Maktab (Mudir Idarah) : H. Bukhari Yusuf, MA.
Amin Mali : H. Kastiri

Laznah Qadha :
Amin Lajnah (Panitera) : drs. Muhroni
Anggota : DR.H. Muslih A. Karim, Dr. H. Mu'inuddin, H. Abdul Hasyib Hasan, Lc, H. Amang Syarifuddin, Lc, Msi.

Lajnah Tahqiq :
Koordinator : H. Iskan Qolban Lubis, MA.
Anggota : DR. H. Idris Abdu Shamad , H. Aunurafiq Saleh Tamhid, Lc, Hj. Herlini Amran, MA, Dra. Suzy Mardiani

Lajnah Ifta
Amin Lajnah : Harjani Hefni, MA
Anggota : DR. H. Muslih Abdul Karim, DR. H. Muiduddin, H. Abdul Hasib Hasan, Lc, H. Abdul Aziz Arbi, MA, H. Abdul Ghani Kasuba, Lc

Lajnah Tabrib
Amin Lajnah : H. Abdul Raqib, Lc
Anggota : A. Zairofi, Lc, drs. H. Amad Yani

Staf Sekretariat/Teknologi Informasi : Ridho Kurniawan

Majlis Pertimbangan Pusat
Ketua : Drs. H. Suharna Surya Pranata, MT.
Sekretaris : Drs H. Arifinto

Komisi Organisasi dan Kewilayahan
Ketua : Ir. Memed Sosiawan
Anggota : Najib Subroto, SE, H. Refrizal

Komisi Pembinaan Kader dan Kewanitaan
Ketua : Drs. H. Abdi Sumaithi
Anggota : Mustafa kamal,Hj. Aan Rohana, Mag., H. Yoyoh Yusroh, Sag.

Komisi Kebijakan Publik
Ketua : H. TB. Sunmandjaja
Anggota : Hj.Nursanita Nasution, SE, ME., Didik Akhmadi, Ak.,M.Com, Mutammimul Ula, SH.

Komisi Kajian Strategis
Ketua : H. Ahmad Firman Yusuf
Ketua : H. Suripto, SH, H. Ahmad Relyadi.

Dewan Pakar
Ketua : H. Suripto, SH.

APPENDIX 6

SUSUNAN PENEMPATAN ANGGOTA F-PKS DI ALAT-ALAT KELENGKAPAN DPR/MPR RI DAN KABINET PERIODE TAHUN 2004/2005

Hidayat Nurwahid : Ketua MPR 2004-2009

Komisi I: Pertahanan, Luar Negeri dan Informasi

- Hilman Rasyad Syihab
- Suripto
- Muhammad Anis Matta
- Untung Wahono

Komisi II: Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri, Otonomi Daerah, Aparatur Negara dan Agraria

- Jazuli Juwaini
- Muhammad Nasir Jamil
- Mahfudz Sidik
- RB Suryama MS

Komisi III: Hukum dan Perundang-undangan, HAM dan Keamanan

- Agus Purnomo
- Almuzammil Yusuf
- Mutamimul Ula
- Abdul Aziz Arbi

Komisi IV: Pertanian, Perkebunan, Kehutanan, Kelautan, Perikanan dan Pangan

- Syamsu Hilal
- Suswono
- Umung Anwar Sanusi
- Tamsil Linrung

Komisi V: Perhubungan, Telekomunikasi, Pekerjaan Umum, Perumahan Rakyat, Pembangunan Pedesaan dan Kawasan Tengah

- Abdul Ghani Kasuba
- Habib Aboe Bakar Al-Habsyi
- Ahmad Chudori
- Abdul Hakim

Komisi VI: Perdagangan, Perindustrian, Investasi, Koperasi UKM dan BUMN

- Refrizal
- Ahmad Najiyulloh
- Zulkieflimansyah
- Fahri Hamzah

Komisi VII: Energi, Sumberdaya Mineral, Riset dan Teknologi, dan Lingkungan Hidup

- Wahyudin Munawir
- Muhammad Idris Luthfi
- Irwan Prayitno
- Ami Taher

Komisi VIII: Agama, Sosial dan Pemberdayaan Perempuan

- DH Al-Yusni
- Djalaluddin Asy-Syatibi
- Ma'mur Hasanuddin
- Yoyoh Yusroh

Komisi IX: Kependudukan, Kesehatan, Tenaga Kerja dan Transmigrasi

- Chairul Anwar
- Mustafa Kamal
- Anshori Siregar
- Andi Salahuddin

Komisi X: Pendidikan, Pemuda, Olahraga, Pariwisata, Kesenian dan Kebudayaan

- Aan Rohanah

- Abdi Sumaithi
- Yusuf Supendi
- Zubeir Syafawi

Komisi XI: Keuangan, Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional, Perbankan dan Lembaga Keuangan Bukan Bank

- Nursanita Nasution
- Luthfi Hasan Ishaq
- Andi Rahmat
- Rama Pratama

Menteri-Menteri Kabinet

- Anton Apriyantono : Menteri Pertanian
- Adhyaksa Dault : Menteri Negara Pemuda dan Olahraga
- Muhammad Yusuf Ashari : Menteri Negara Perumahan Rakyat

Duta Besar

- Salim Segaf Al-Jufri : Duta Besar RI untuk Kerajaan Saudi Arabia dan Kesultanan Oman

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Mahfudz Sidiq, head of a PKS faction in parliament, Jakarta, 28 September 2007.

Nursanita Nasution, PKS MP, Jakarta, 22 August 2007.

Untung Wahono, PKS MP, Jakarta, 4 October 2007.

Andi Rahmat, PKS MP, Jakarta, 22 August 2007.

Aan Rohanah, PKS MP, Jakarta, 4 October 2007.

Hidayat Nurwahid, former President of PKS and chairman of the People's Consultative Assembly, Jakarta, 4 October 2007.

Khairuddin, head of PKS branch in South Jakarta, Jakarta, 10 August 2007.

Muniroh, PKS local activist from Kuningan, West Java, 12 August 2007.

Taufik, PKS local activist, Jakarta, 17 August 2007.

Mashadi, former PK MP, Jakarta, 4 October 2007.

Yon Machmudi, PK co-founder and PKS intellectual, Depok, 21 August 2007.

Imam Nurazis, Director of the Centre for Indonesian Reform (CIR), Jakarta, 18 August 2007.

M. Imdadun Rakhmat, author of a book entitled 'Transmisi Gagasan Revivalisme Islam dari Timur Tengah ke Indonesia," Jakarta, 29 August 2007.

Azyumardi Azra, Director of Postgraduate School of Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, Tangerang, 11 August 2007.

I also interviewed a number of campus *dakwah* and PKS activists during my field work in Indonesia. Nonetheless, some of my interviewees did not want their name to be cited in this sub-thesis for various reasons.

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